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Confidentiality can be usually achieved by conventional encryption, which hides sen-
sitive data from unauthorised parties. In such encryption schemes, the decryption
is all or nothing. Although it ensures the confidentiality of the encrypted data, it
does not allow computing over files and sharing. Differing from the conventional
encryption, functional encryption allows the decryption key holder to learn a func-
tion of the encrypted data and nothing else. Therefore, functional encryption makes
computing over encrypted data and sharing of encrypted data in different levels
possible.
In this thesis, we investigate functional encryption in terms of functionality, se-
curity, and efficiency. To ensure the constructed schemes are practical in real applica-
tions, we focus on functional encryption for practical functionalities, such as equality
tests, inequality tests, and inner product evaluation, which are the major function-
alities that can be applied in privacy-preserved data search and privacy-preserved
data sharing. Precisely, functional encryption for equality tests and inequality tests
can be applied in searchable encryption while the functional encryption for inner
product evaluation can be applied to achieve levelled data sharing. These appli-
cations of functional encryption are very useful and essential in cloud computing
security.
Public-key Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS) is a searchable encryp-
tion, which can be viewed as a functional encryption for equality tests. In PEKS, a
keyword is encrypted and can be searched by a single user. Based on PEKS, we pro-
pose two new cryptographic primitives named Threshold Broadcast Encryption with
Keyword Search (TBEKS) and Linear Encryption with Keyword Search (LEKS).
In TBEKS, the keyword is encrypted for a group of users as a single ciphertext
with a threshold value. To achieve a higher level of security, the data search pro-
cess can be carried out by the server only if the number of authorised users reaches
the threshold value defined in the ciphertext. Thus a single malicious user cannot
carry out a search operation if the stored data is highly sensitive. Besides, the
data in the storage server may be encrypted using different encryption mechanisms,
such as Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) and Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE).
With LEKS, we allow conversions from various encryption schemes to searchable
iii
iv
encryption schemes, keeping the same access control mechanism. Notably, we con-
vert a Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE) scheme to a Key-Policy
Attribute-Based Encryption with Keyword Search (KP-ABKS) scheme, enabling
the data to be accessed and searched using fine-grained access control policies.
For data sharing, we propose a practical Functional Encryption for Inner Prod-
ucts (FE-IP) scheme to control the revelation of the encrypted data. In FE-IP,
the secret key holder with a vector ~x can learn the value of ~x · ~y from the en-
crypted vector ~y but not the vector ~y itself. Such a functionality can be applied to
descriptive statistics such as computing weighted sums and weighted means. Fur-
thermore, we generalise the functionality of inner products to matrix products, and
upgrade functional encryption to the more advanced Hierarchical Functional En-
cryption (HFE). In HFE, the secret key holder can further generate a new key with
a narrower portion of its decryption ability. As a result, we propose a Hierarchical
Functional Encryption for Linear Transformations (HFE-LT) scheme. In addition,
we extend the definition of HFE to extended Hierarchical Functional Encryption
(eHFE) and the construction of HFE-LT to extended Hierarchical Functional En-
cryption for Linear Transformations (eHFE-LT) so that multiple secret key holders
can work together to generate a new key with a narrower portion of the union of
their decryption abilities.
Notably, all schemes in this thesis are formally proven secure in their respective
security models. In order to prove the security of LEKS, we introduce a new prob-
lem family named Decisional Bilinear (P, f)-Diffie-Hellman ((P, f)-DBDH) problem
family and a derived problem named Decisional `-Combined Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
(`-DCBDH) problem and analyse the difficulty of these problems in the generic
group model. For FE-IP, we consider the strongest security model, namely Indistin-
guishability under adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attacks (IND-CCA) for functional
encryption, and prove the IND-CCA security of our FE-IP scheme. For all the
generic constructions in this thesis, we propose practical concrete schemes instanti-
ated from various assumptions.
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In the Information Age, hiding sensitive data is one of the fundamental problems
in information security and has attracted a lot of attentions. To provide confiden-
tiality, many cryptography tools such as encryption are created to make sensitive
information out of the adversary’s reach. While confidentiality and privacy are pre-
served, it is also beneficial to allow sharing of information to authorised parties at
the same time, especially in the presence of Cloud Computing [MG11]. In addition,
the efficiency of the cryptographic tools is also an important aspect in order to en-
sure those tools can be used in practice. In this thesis, we introduce and enhance
several cryptographic primitives in the domain of Functional Encryption (FE) in
terms of functionality, security, and efficiency, and demonstrate their usage in some
real applications and cloud computing.
1.1 Background
For many centuries, conventional cryptography has been used to secure communica-
tions among multiple parties with secret keys shared among them. Such kind of cryp-
tography is usually symmetric-key-based and belongs to secret-key cryptography1.
Differing from the conventional cryptography, Diffie and Hellman [DH76] suggested
new directions to Public-Key Cryptography (PKC) where users hold asymmetric
key pairs of a secret key and a public key. Precisely, the public key is linked with
the secret key and can be released to the entire public domain whilst the secret key
is infeasible to be computed from the public key.
As in [DH76], Diffie and Hellman introduced the notions of Public Key En-
cryption (PKE) and Digital Signature, which is a mimic of traditional hand-written
signatures in the digital world. Focusing on PKE, three directions are intensively
researched in the succeeding literature, including functionality, security, and effi-
ciency.
1In the literature, secret-key cryptography sometimes is also referred to as private-key cryptog-
raphy
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Funcitonality In a standard PKE scheme, such as RSA encryption [RSA78], El-
Gamal encryption [ElG85], and Cramer-Shoup encryption [CS02], there are
three algorithms namely Setup for system setup and key generation, Encrypt
for encryption and Decrypt for decryption. However, the standard schemes are
too basic to be applied to more advanced scenarios. Therefore, various encryp-
tion schemes for different functionalities are proposed. For instances, there are
Broadcast Encryption (BE) [FN94] for a set of recipients, Identity-Based En-
cryption (IBE) [Sha85, BF01] for users authenticated by their identities, and
Public-key Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS) [BDCOP04] for search-
able encryption. After several rounds of evolution, the notion of Functional
Encryption (FE) [BSW11] is introduced to capture a large class of functional-
ities.
Security In the early stage of cryptography research, there is only an intuitive or
informal security analysis for the proposed schemes [DH76, RSA78, ElG85,
Sha85]. To formally define the security, Goldwasser and Micali [GM84] sug-
gested semantic security, which is equivalent to Indistinguishability under Cho-
sen Plaintext Attacks (IND-CPA), as the standard security notion for PKE
schemes. Generally speaking, a security model involves the syntax of the
scheme, the goal of the adversary, and the attack model. For IND-CPA secu-
rity of a PKE scheme, the goal is to distinguish two messages from a targeted
ciphertext, and the attack model allows the adversary to encrypt any message.
To prove the security of a scheme, a simulator embedded with a (computa-
tionally) hard problem is constructed and presented to the adversary. If the
adversary follows the security model and breaks the scheme, the simulator can
solve the hard problem. Since the embedded problem is hard, by contradic-
tion, the security of the scheme is ensured under the specific security model.
In some applications, the IND-CPA security is not sufficient and the security
model is elevated to Indistinguishability under adaptive Chosen Ciphertext
Attacks (IND-CCA)2 [RS92], giving more power to the adversary. It is worth
to note that PKE schemes with different functionalities have different syntax.
Thus their security models are not compatible with that of the standard PKE.
Therefore, new security models are demanded for proper security proofs for
various schemes.
Efficiency In terms of practicality and usefulness, all the schemes should be effi-
cient not only in theory but also in practice. Initially, functional encryption
schemes are proposed to handle a large class of functionalities, and even generic
functionalities. Although the functionality is powerful, the efficiency is a ma-
2The conventional name for the IND-CCA security is IND-CCA2.
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jor concern when the generic scheme is applied to a specific scenario. In other
words, a direct construction for a specific functionality is at least as efficient
as the scheme for a function class. For instance, Garg et al.’s FE for generic
circuits [GGH+13] is efficient3 in theory but it is significantly less efficient than
FE schemes [ABCP16, ABDCP15, ALS16, ZMY17] for the specific function-
ality of inner product evaluation, and is not suitable for practical use.
In practice, the standard PKE ensures the confidentiality of the user data but
it is not capable of achieving computing over encrypted files or flexible sharing of
encrypted data to authorised parties. In contrast, both scenarios are realisable by
Functional Encryption. Differently, the decryption of FE learns a function of the
encrypted data but nothing else while the decryption of the standard PKE is all or
nothing. This special decryption ability makes FE powerful to be applied in practice.
However, theoretical FE schemes [GGH+13, GKP+13] aim at general functionalities
and are not practical. Therefore, practical FE schemes for specific functionalities
are focused, such as data search and data sharing, which are two major function-
alities that require specific cryptosystems to preserve privacy, especially in cloud
computing.
Data Search A common function computed over data is search. In privacy pre-
served data search, the keyword is encrypted and uploaded to the data server.
Then the server tests the encrypted keyword with the encrypted data, and
returns the result to the user. Since the data to be searched may be en-
crypted under different access policies, efficient constructions of secure search-
able schemes for those policies are required.
Data Sharing In the privacy preserved data storage, the user data is encrypted
for a certain entity and cannot be changed. To share the data, two naive ways
are sharing the secret keys and re-encrypting the data. Obviously, sharing the
secret keys is not an acceptable solution because other user who gets the shared
key may be able to do malicious tasks. On the other hand, re-encryption of
the data for each user is costly since the data is duplicated and the storage
is wasted. Therefore, the task of creating efficient privacy-preserving data
sharing schemes that share data to multiple users without increasing storage
cost is a challenging research problem.
1.2 Motivations and Contributions
The contributions of this thesis are summarised as follows.
3In theory, an algorithm is efficient if it can be computed in probabilistic polynomial time.
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Data Search The basic searchable encryption scheme is introduced by Boneh et
al. [BDCOP04]. In their scheme, the privacy preserving keyword search for
cloud data is a one-to-one relationship that one ciphertext is only for one user.
In other words, the cloud has to encrypt the same contents to multiple users
as multiple ciphertexts, which is storage consuming. To tackle this problem,
we introduce several searchable schemes with access control applied to the
ciphertext so that the same keyword can be encrypted for and searched by
multiple users as a single ciphertext.
We introduce a new notation named Threshold Broadcast Encryption with
Keyword Search (TBEKS). In TBEKS, the keyword is encrypted for n users
as a single ciphertext. The keyword can only be search when t of n target users
work together. Furthermore, we provide a formal definition of TBEKS with
a security model named Indistinguishability in the threshold setting under
Chosen Keyword Attacks (IND-T-CKA). Based on Decisional Bilinear Diffie-
Hellman (DBDH) assumption, we propose a practical TBEKS scheme with
IND-T-CKA security.
We introduce another new notation named Linear Encryption with Keyword
Search (LEKS) and define a Linear Encryption Template (LET). With LEKS,
we are able to convert any PKE, which matches our LET, to a searchable
encryption scheme with the same access control mechanism. Specifically, we
formalise the definition of LEKS and LET. We provide two security models
for LEKS, namely Indistinguishability under Selective-ID Adaptive Chosen
Keyword Attacks (IND-sCKA) and Indistinguishability under Adaptive Cho-
sen Keyword Attacks (IND-CKA). Since our conversion from LET to LEKS
is semi-generic, we introduce a new problem family named Decisional Bilin-
ear (P, f)-Diffie-Hellman ((P, f)-DBDH) problem family as a tool to enable
provable security. We prove the newly introduced (P, f)-DBDH problem is
computationally hard in the generic group model if the polynomial f is not
dependent on P . To illustrate the feasibility of our semi-generic framework,
we convert a Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE) scheme into
a Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption with Keyword Search (KP-ABKS)
scheme, which realises searchable encryption with a fine-grained access con-
trol and is suitable for cloud computing scenarios. We prove the converted
KP-ABKS scheme is IND-sCKA secure based on the computational hard De-
cisional `-Combined Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (`-DCBDH) problem derived from
the (P, f)-DBDH problem.
We emphasise that TBEKS and LEKS are variants of Functional Encryption
for Equality Tests (FE-ET).
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Data Sharing Conventionally, the user data in the privacy preserved data stor-
age is managed under an access policy. For instance, in Ciphertext-Policy
Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE), the data can be decrypted only if the
attributes of the user matches the policy embedded in the ciphertext. In this
thesis, we focus on another approach of data sharing. Instead of decrypting the
full message from the ciphertext under a certain access control policy, we con-
trol the revelation of the encrypted message via Functional Encryption (FE)
[BSW11] such that a valid user can only learn a function of the encrypted
message. Other than FE for general functionalities, we focus on a practi-
cal functionality of inner product evaluation (i.e. f(~x, ~y) = 〈~x, ~y〉 = ~x · ~y).
This functionality can be applied to descriptive statistics such as computing
weighted sums and weighted means. By distributing different secret keys of
f~x to users, the data are shared with different levels of information revelation.
In order to enhance the security notions of Selective Security against Chosen
Plaintext Attacks (s-IND-CPA) [ABDCP15] and IND-CPA [ALS16, ABCP16],
we define a stronger security model for FE named IND-CCA. To build an IND-
CCA secure Functional Encryption for Inner Products (FE-IP), we extend the
exisiting Hash Proof System (HPS) [CS02] and propose an FE-IP generically
constructed from our extended HPS. We prove that our generic construction of
FE-IP is IND-CCA secure under the assumption of a hard Subset Membership
Problem (SMP). In addition, we propose two practical instantiations from the
Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) and the Decisional Composite Residuosity
(DCR) assumptions.
We generalise the functionality of inner product evaluation to matrix prod-
uct evaluation. Besides, we refine the definition of Hierarchical Functional
Encryption (HFE) [ABG+13, BS15, CGJS15], and formalise a new primitive
named Hierarchical Functional Encryption for Linear Transformations (HFE-
LT). With HFE, the secret key holder is able to generate a new key with ability
to reveal a narrower portion of its data share. Based on our extended HPS,
we propose a generic construction of HFE-LT with proven IND-CPA security,
assuming the underlying SMP is hard. We provide two practical HFE-LT
schemes instantiated from the DDH and the DCR assumptions. In addition,
we extend HFE and HFE-LT to extended Hierarchical Functional Encryption
(eHFE) and extended Hierarchical Functional Encryption for Linear Transfor-
mations (eHFE-LT), allowing multiple function inputs in the key generation
algorithm.
As an additional contribution, this thesis presents a novel encoding technique for
improving the efficiency of the inequality test evaluation by reducing the number of
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secret-sharing reconstruction from O(log n) as required by using the access control
tree in the Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) [GPSW06, BSW07] to O(1).
1.3 Thesis Organisation
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows.
In Chapter 2, we review the preliminaries. Starting from the basic knowledge
abstract algebra, we define the notations used by this thesis. Then, we review the
computational complexity theory and related complexity assumptions. After that,
we review the cryptographic tools used as building blocks and used in security proof.
In Chapter 3, we explore the notion of Functional Encryption. At the begin-
ning, we review the history of FE. Then, we review the formal definition of FE
and its IND-CPA security. Furthermore, we discuss the FE schemes for practical
functionalities, including Predicate Encryption (PE), equality test, inequality test,
and inner product evaluation. In the discussion of inequality test, we introduce an
encoding technique to improve the decryption efficiency of the PE with public index
related to inequality test.
In Chapter 4, we define Threshold Broadcast Encryption with Keyword Search
and its IND-T-CKA security model. Then we propose our TBEKS scheme, and
prove it is IND-T-CKA secure.
In Chapter 5, we define the (P, f)-DBDH problem family and derive the `-
DCBDH problem. We prove the hardness of the problems in terms of computational
complexity and propose our LEKS conversion from LET with definition and security
model formally defined. Then, we convert a PKE scheme to a PEKS scheme, and
prove its security. We also convert a KP-ABE scheme to a KP-ABKS scheme with
security proven.
In Chapter 6, we present a precise definition of Functional Encryption for Inner
Products. We enhance the security model for FE to IND-CCA and extend the ex-
isting HPS with new properties. After that, we propose a FE-IP scheme generically
constructed from the extended HPS. Furthermore, we prove our scheme is IND-CCA
secure. Finally, we instantiate our FE-IP scheme to two concrete schemes from the
DDH and the DCR assumptions.
In Chapter 7, we refine Hierarchical Functional Encryption and define Hierar-
chical Functional Encryption for Linear Transformations. We propose a HFE-LT
scheme generically constructed from the extended HPS. After proving the security
of our newly proposed scheme, we extend the notion of HFE to eHFE and the no-
tion of HFE-LT to eHFE-LT. Finally, we present two concrete HFE-LT schemes
instantiated from the DDH and the DCR assumptions.
In Chapter 8, the conclusion of this thesis is presented.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter, we cover the definitions and the notations used throughout this
thesis, including abstract algebra, computational complexity and assumptions, and
cryptographic tools. For the detailed basic cryptography theory, we refer readers to
the books [Gol01, Gol08, Mao03].
2.1 Abstract Algebra
In this section, we review the basic abstract algebra structures and bilinear maps.
2.1.1 Groups
Definition 2.1 (Group). A group is a non-empty set G combined with a binary
operation ◦ over elements in G, satisfying the following four properties.
– Closure: ∀a, b ∈ G, a ◦ b ∈ G.
– Associativity: ∀a, b, c ∈ G, (a ◦ b) ◦ c = a ◦ (b ◦ c).
– Identity: ∃e ∈ G, ∀a ∈ G, a ◦ e = e ◦ a = a ∈ G.
– Inverse: ∀a ∈ G, ∃a′ ∈ G, a ◦ a′ = a′ ◦ a = e.
If the binary operation ◦ is specified as addition +, we call such a group as
additive group. If the binary operation ◦ is specified as multiplication ·, we call such
a group as multiplicative group. For simplicity, we use G to denote a group with the
set G and the binary operation ◦ if the binary operation ◦ is clear in the context.
Different notations of identity and inverse are used for groups with different
operations. For additive groups, the additive identity e is denoted as 0, and inverse
a′ of a ∈ G is denoted as −a, i.e. a− a = a+ (−a) = 0 for all a ∈ G where G is an
additive group. For multiplicative groups, the multiplicative identity e is denoted
as 1, and inverse a′ of a ∈ G is denoted as a−1, i.e. a · a−1 = 1 for all a ∈ G where
G is a multiplicative group. Since a group has only one operation, the equations
or expressions of an additive group can be represented using a multiplicative group
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by replacing the notations of the operation, the identity, and the inverse. Similarly,
the equations or expressions of a multiplicative group can be represented using an
additive group.
As a group contains a set, the order of a group G is defined by the cardinality
of the internal set G, which is denoted as |G|. In addition, a group is a finite group
if its order is finite.
Other groups with extra properties are defined as follows.
Definition 2.2 (Abelian Group). A group (G, ◦) is an abelian group if the following
property is satisfied.
– Commutativity: ∀a, b ∈ G, a ◦ b = b ◦ a.
Definition 2.3 (Cyclic Group). A group (G, ·) is a cyclic group if there exists an
element g ∈ G such that G = {gi | i ∈ Z}. Such an element g is called a generator
of G. The group G can be represented as 〈g〉, and called to be generated by g.
Remark that the symbol Z refers to the set of all integers, and the Definition 2.3
also applies to groups with other operations, such as addition.
2.1.2 Rings and Fields
Definition 2.4 (Ring). A ring is an abelian group (R,+) with a binary operation ·
over elements in R, satisfying the following four properties.
– Closure under multiplication: ∀a, b ∈ R, a · b ∈ R.
– Associativity of multiplication: ∀a, b, c ∈ R, (a · b) · c = a · (b · c).
– Multiplicative identity: ∃e ∈ R, ∀a ∈ R, a · e = e · a = a ∈ R.
– Distributivity: ∀a, b, c ∈ R, a·(b+c) = (a·b)+(a·c), (a+b)·c = (a·c)+(b·c).
Definition 2.5 (Communicative Ring). A ring (R,+, · ) is a communicative ring
if the following property is satisfied.
– Commutativity of multiplication: ∀a, b ∈ R, a · b = b · a.
Definition 2.6 (Field). A communicative ring (F,+, · ) is a field if (F \ {0}, · )
forms a group.
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2.1.3 Bilinear Maps
A bilinear map is a function that maps two group spaces to a third space. In this
thesis, we use the same bilinear map as in [BF01] for simplicity where the first two
group spaces are the same.
Definition 2.7 (Bilinear Map). Let G1, G2 be two multiplicative cyclic groups of
prime order p. Let g be a generator of G1. A bilinear map e : G1 × G1 → G2 has
the following properties.
– Bilinearity: ∀a, b ∈ {0, . . . , p− 1}, e(ga, gb) = e(g, g)ab.
– Non-Degeneracy: e(g, g) 6= 1.
– Efficiency: It can be computed efficiently for any possible input.
2.2 Miscellaneous Notations
Let ∈R denote random sampling that x ∈R X means that x is uniformly and ran-
domly chosen from a set or distribution X. Let bxc denote the floor function, and
dxe denote the ceiling function of a real number x. The set Z represents the set of
all integers. For a positive integer p, the set Zp denotes the set {0, . . . , p− 1}, and
the notation Gp denotes a group of order p.
In the context of function, the symbol ◦ denotes the function composition that
(g ◦ f)(x) = g(f(x)). The function id denotes the identity function that id(x) = x
and f ◦ id = f .
In the group computation, the function sca denotes the inverse operation to the
scalar multiplication that a = scax(b) ⇐⇒ b = ax where X is an additive group
generated by x, a ∈ Z|X|, and b ∈ X. It is an analogue of the logarithm operation
in a multiplicative group.
In the matrix computation, let Xm×n be a matrix of size m× n, and In be the
identity matrix of size n. If the size is clear in the context, X and I are used for
short with size omitted. Let > denote matrix transpose. In addition to the standard
matrix addition and multiplication operations, we define the following notations for
better representations. Let f be a function that takes an element from X with
other fixed parameters as input, X ∈ Xm×n be a matrix, and def= denote equal by









Xm,1 · · · Xm,n
 , f(X, . . . ) def=





f(Xm,1, . . . ) · · · f(Xm,n, . . . )
 .
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If f is an additive homomorphism that f(a)+f(b) = f(a+b), we have f(A)+f(B) =
f(A + B) where A and B are two matrices of the same size. Besides that, we can
have more complex scalar multiplication as
Af(B) =





Am,1 · · · Am,n





































where A is an m× n matrix and B is an n× l matrix. Similarly, we have f(A)B =
f(AB). In addition, the symbol (A | B) denotes an argumented matrix of two
matrices A and B with the same row size. It can be generalised as (A1 | · · · |
An)
def
= ((· · · ((A1 | A2) | A3) | · · · ) | An).
2.3 Computational Complexity
The model of Turing machine is a general model of computation where a Turing
machine consists of a finite-state control unit, a tape, and a tape head. Let A be
an algorithm, and x be the input of A. The computation of the Turing machine
running the algorithm A (or simply the machine A) on the input tape with the
encodings of x is denoted by y ← A(x) where the result y is the output of A. The
Turing machine can run algorithms with multiple inputs by encoding all inputs on
a single tape or letting M be a multi-tape Turing machine.
For the security models defined in this thesis, adversaries are modelled as oracle
machines, which are Turing machines with a oracle tape and two oracle states.
The computation of the machine A on the input x with the access to the oracle
O : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ is denoted by y ← AO(x) where the machine A can query
O(q) with a valid string q.
A probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) Turing machine is a Turing machine
running a randomised algorithm where the running time is bounded by a polynomial
in the length of the input. An algorithm is said to be efficient or a PPT algorithm
if it can be run by a PPT Turing machine.
A negligible function negl is a function that for all positive polynomial p there
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exists an N such that for all n > N , negl(n) < 1/p(n). In this thesis, a function is
said to be negligible if it is bounded by O(negl(λ)) where λ is the security parameter
in the context. Again, a function is said to be non-negligible if it is not negligible. In
terms of probability, an event E has overwhelming probability if Pr[¬E] = 1−Pr[E]
is negligible.
2.4 Complexity Assumptions
In this section, we review the number-theoretic problems and complexity assump-
tions related to this thesis.
2.4.1 Standard Assumptions
The Discrete Logarithm (DL) problem is one of the most fundamental number-
theoretic problems in cryptography.
Definition 2.8 (Discrete Logarithm problem). Let G be a cyclic multiplicative group
of prime order p where |p| = λ and λ is the security parameter. Let x ∈R Zp, and
g ∈R G. Given g and gx, there is an algorithm A that computes x with advantage:
AdvDLA = Pr[x← A(g, gx)].
By analysing the DL problem in the generic group model (see Section 2.5.5),
Shoup [Sho97] gives a theorem that AdvDLA is bounded by O(q
2/p) where q is the
number of group operations. Therefore, the DL problem is computationally hard
for any PPT algorithm A since AdvDLA is negligible.
Based on the DL problem, Diffie and Hellman [DH76] introduced a new problem,
which is known as the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem, and apply it
to their public-key cryptosystem.
Definition 2.9 (Computational Diffie-Hellman problem). Let G be a cyclic multi-
plicative group of prime order p where |p| = λ and λ is the security parameter. Let
a, b ∈R Zp, and g ∈R G. Given g, ga and gb, there is an algorithm A that computes
gab with advantage:
AdvCDHA = Pr[g
ab ← A(g, ga, gb)].
There is a decisional variant of the CDH problem named Decisional Diffie-
Hellman (DDH) problem, and many encryption schemes are based on this problem.
For instance, the ElGamal encryption scheme [ElG85] and Cramer-Shoup encryp-
tion schemes [CS98, CS02] are well-known encryption schemes based on the DDH
problem.
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Definition 2.10 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem). Let G be a cyclic multiplica-
tive group of prime order p where |p| = λ and λ is the security parameter. Let a, b ∈R
Zp, and g, Z ∈R G. Given two probability distributions DDDH = {(g, ga, gb, gab)} and
DR = {(g, ga, gb, Z)}, there is an algorithm A that distinguishes DDDH and DR with
advantage:
AdvDDHA = |Pr[1← A(D ∈R DDDH)]− Pr[1← A(D ∈R DR \ DDDH)]| .
Similarly to the DL problem, Shoup [Sho97] points out that the advantage
AdvCDH and AdvDDH are both bounded by O(q2/p), which is negligible. Hence,
the CDH problem and the DDH problem are computationally hard for any PPT
algorithm A.
Due to the extra group operation of bilinear maps (Definition 2.7), the hard-
ness of the DDH problem does not hold. Instead, Boneh and Franklin [BF01] in-
troduced a natural variant of the DDH problem suitable for groups with bilinear
maps named Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem, and proposed an
Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) scheme based on this problem.
Definition 2.11 (Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem). Let G1,G2 be two
cyclic multiplicative groups of prime order p where |p| = λ and λ is the security
parameter, and e : G1×G1 → G2 be a bilinear map. Let a, b, c ∈R Zp, g ∈R G1, and
Z ∈R G2. Given two probability distributions DDBDH = {(g, ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)abc)}
and DR = {(g, ga, gb, gc, Z)}, there is an algorithm A that distinguishes DDBDH and
DR with advantage:
AdvDBDHA = |Pr[1← A(D ∈R DDBDH)]− Pr[1← A(D ∈R DR \ DDBDH)]| .
The advantage can be represented alternatively as
D0 ∈R DDBDH, D1 ∈R DR, b ∈R {0, 1},
AdvDBDHA =
∣∣∣∣Pr[b = b′ ← A(Db)]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
By adapting the generic group model to generic bilinear group model, Boneh et
al. [BBG05] shows the lower bound of the DBDH problem in terms of computational
complexity, indicating the DBDH problem is computationally hard for any PPT
algorithm A.
There is another variant of the DDH problem regarding to bilinear maps named
Decision Linear (DLIN) problem introduced by Boneh et al. [BBS04].
Definition 2.12 (Decision Linear problem). Let G1,G2 be two cyclic multiplicative
groups of prime order p where |p| = λ and λ is the security parameter, and e : G1×
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G1 → G2 be a bilinear map. Let a, b ∈R Zp, and g, h, f, Z ∈R G1. Given two prob-
ability distributions DDBDH = {(g, ga, h, hb, f, fa+b)} and DR = {(g, ga, h, hb, f, Z)},
there is an algorithm A that distinguishes DDLIN and DR with advantage:
AdvDLINA = |Pr[1← A(D ∈R DDLIN)]− Pr[1← A(D ∈R DR \ DDLIN)]| .
Boneh et al. [BBS04] claim that the DLIN problem is computationally hard in
the generic bilinear group model for any PPT algorithm A. Furthermore, the DLIN
problem is also captured by the Decisional Bilinear (P, f)-Diffie-Hellman ((P, f)-
DBDH) problem in Section 5.2, which gives the same result as [BBS04].
2.4.2 Subset Membership Problem
Subset Membership Problem (SMP) is a problem class introduced by Cramer and
Shoup [CS02]. Many standard decisional problems can be classified to SMP, includ-
ing DDH, DLIN, and Decisional Composite Residuosity (DCR) problems.
Definition 2.13 (Subset Membership Problem). Let L ⊂ X,W be three non-empty
sets, and R = {(x,w) | x ∈ L} ⊂ X × W be a binary relation where w is a
witness of a word x in the language L. Let Λ = (X,L,W,R) be a problem instance,
x ∈R L, and x′ ∈R X \ L. Given two probability distributions DL = {(Λ, x)} and
DX\L = {(Λ, x′)}, there is an algorithm A that distinguishes DL and DX\L with
advantage:
AdvSMPA =
∣∣Pr[1← A(D ∈R DL)]− Pr[1← A(D ∈R DX\L)]∣∣ .
An SMP is computationally hard if and only if the advantage AdvSMPA is negligible
for any PPT algorithm A. As our schemes in this thesis are based on DDH and
DCR problems, the details of how they are captured by SMP are shown as follows.
Definition 2.14 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem as Subset Membership Prob-
lem). Let G be a cyclic multiplicative group of prime order p where |p| = λ and λ
is the security parameter. Let r ∈R Zp, and g1, g2, Z1, Z2 ∈R G. Given two proba-
bility distributions DDDH = {(g1, g2, gr1, gr2)} and DR = {(g1, g2, Z1, Z2)}, there is an
algorithm A that distinguishes DDDH and DR with advantage:
AdvDDHA = |Pr[1← A(D ∈R DDDH)]− Pr[1← A(D ∈R DR \ DDDH)]| .
The DCR problem is introduced by Paillier [Pai99] for the Paillier cryptosystem.
Cramer and Shoup [CS02] adapt the original DCR problem to the SMP class as
follows.
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Definition 2.15 (Decisional Composite Residuosity problem). Let p, q be two safe
primes such that p = 2p′ + 1 and q = 2q′ + 1 where p′, q′ are two primes of length
λ bites and λ is the security parameter. Let N = pq, and N ′ = p′q′. We have that
Z∗N2 = GNGN ′G2GT where GT is a group generated by −1 (mod N2). Let P =
GN ′G2GT ⊂ Z∗N2, x ∈R P , and x′ ∈R Z∗N2 \ P . Given two probability distributions
DP = {(N, x)} and DZ∗
N2










In this section, we review the cryptographic tools used in the construction and the
security proof of our schemes.
2.5.1 Secret Sharing Scheme
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [Sha79] divides a secret s into n pieces s1, . . . , sn
using a k − 1 degree polynomial and distributes to n users. If and only if k users
or more come together, they can recover s by polynomial interpolation. Knowing
k− 1 pieces of s does not reveal any information about s. This scheme is also called
(k, n) Threshold Secret Sharing Scheme. Details are shown as follows.
Let Fq be a finite field of order q where q > n. Each user Ui is associated with
a public unique number ui ∈ Fq. To share a secret s ∈ Fq among a user set S =




where aj ∈R Fq. Each user in the user set S gets a share si = p(ui). When k users










. Then we can recover s = p(0). Obviously, we can recover
any point by
















2.5.2 Cryptographic Hash Functions
Hash functions are efficient functions mapping a bit string of arbitrary length to a
fixed-length bit string [Gol01, Mao03]. Formally, we consider universal hash families
[CW79, WC81, Dam88, Gol01, CS02] with the definition as follows.
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Definition 2.16 (Universal Hash Family). A universal hash family consists of the
following three polynomial time algorithms:
– param ← Setup(1λ): The randomised system setup algorithm takes a security
parameter 1λ as input. It specifies the hash domain X, the hash codomain
Π, and the key space K. Then it publishes the system parameter param =
(X,K,Π).
– k ← KeyGen(param): The randomised hash key generation algorithm takes
system parameter param as input, and outputs a randomly chosen hash key
k ∈R K.
– π ← Hash(k, x): The deterministic evaluation algorithm takes a hash key k
and a value x ∈ X, and outputs a hash value π ∈ Π.
In [Dam88, Gol01], the algorithms Setup and KeyGen are defined to be one
single algorithm that outputs a random hash function Hk where k is a hash key
and Hk( · )
def
= Hash(k, · ). There is a special type of hash function named Collision
Resistant Hash Function (CRHF). The adapted definition from [Dam88, Gol01] is
shown as follows.
Definition 2.17 (Collision Resistant Hash Function). A universal hash family is
collision resistant if the advantage AdvCRHFA of any PPT algorithm A is negligible.
AdvCRHFA = Pr
[
Hash(k, x0) = Hash(k, x1)
∣∣∣∣∣ k ← KeyGen(Setup(1λ)),(x0, x1)← A(k) ∧ x0 6= x1
]
.
A hash function derived from a collision resistant universal hash family is called a
collision resistant hash function.
2.5.3 Hash Proof Systems
By extending the universal hash family, Cramer and Shoup [CS02] introduced the
notion of universal projective hash family and further extend it to Hash Proof System
(HPS).
Definition 2.18 (Hash Proof System). A Hash Proof System (HPS) associated with
subset membership problems consists of the following five polynomial time algorithms:
– param ← Setup(1λ): The randomised system setup algorithm takes a security
parameter 1λ as input, and specifies an SMP instance Λ = (X,L,W,R) where
the hash domain is X. The algorithm further specifies a secret hash key space
K, a public hash key space S, and a hash codomain Π. After that, the algorithm
packs all above descriptions and publishes a system-wide parameter param =
(X,L,W,R,K, S,Π).
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– SK ← SKGen(param): The randomised secret hash key generation algorithm
takes a system parameter param, and generates a random secret hash key
SK ∈R K.
– PK ← PKGen(SK): The deterministic public hash key generation algorithm
takes a secret hash key SK ∈ K as input, and maps it to a public hash key
PK ∈ S.
– π ← Hash(SK, x): The deterministic private evaluation algorithm takes a se-
cret hash key SK ∈ K and a word x ∈ X as inputs, and outputs a hash value
π ∈ Π of x.
– π ← PHash(PK, x, w): The deterministic public evaluation algorithm takes a
public hash key PK ∈ S and a word x in the language L along with a corre-
sponding witness w ∈ W such that (x,w) ∈ R, and output a hash value π ∈ Π
of x.
A HPS is required to be correct that the private evaluation algorithm Hash and
the public evaluation algorithm PHash are equivalent when x ∈ L.
Definition 2.19 (Correctness). A HPS is correct if
∀param← Setup(1λ), ∀SK← SKGen(param), PK← PKGen(SK),
∀(x,w) ∈ R, Hash(SK, x) = PHash(PK, x, w).
Furthermore, some useful security properties of a HPS are required.
Definition 2.20 (Universal). A HPS is universal if the following probability is neg-
ligible for all PK ∈ S, x ∈ X \ L and π ∈ Π.
AdvUniversal = Pr[Hash(SK, x) = π | PKGen(SK) = PK].
Definition 2.21 (Universal2). A HPS is universal2 if the following probability is
negligible for all PK ∈ S, x∗ ∈ X, x ∈ X \ (L ∪ {x∗}) and π∗, π ∈ Π.
AdvUniversal2 = Pr[Hash(SK, x) = π | Hash(SK, x∗) = π∗ ∧ PKGen(SK) = PK].
If a HPS is universal2 and |X| > 1, it is also universal.
Definition 2.22 (Smoothness). A HPS is smooth if the advantage AdvSmoothA of
an adversary A distinguishing two random variables (x,PK, π) and (x,PK, π′) is
negligible where SK ∈R K, PK = PKGen(SK), x ∈R X \ L, π = Hash(SK, x), and
π′ ∈R Π.
AdvSmoothA = |Pr[1← A(x,PK, π)]− Pr[1← A(x,PK, π′)]|
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2.5.4 Random Oracle Model
Bellare and Rogaway [BR93] introduced the notion of random oracle model, which
is an idealised model of cryptography hash functions.
In this model, the hash function is treated as a black box that the computation
of the hash value is only available via oracle queries. More precisely, the simulator S
in a security game maintains a listH of pairs (w, h) for a hash function H. To obtain
the hash value of x, the adversary A has to query S for the value x. Upon receiving
x, the simulator S searches the list H. If there is an entry (w, h) that x = w, the
simulator S answers A with the hash value h. Otherwise, the simulator S randomly
and uniformly chooses a value h as the hash value H(x) of x, and answers A. At
the same time, the simulator S appends the newly created pair (x, h) to the list
H for later use. Since the random oracle is controlled by the simulator S, the
oracle can be programmed to answer A with any value as long as the distribution is
uniformed. This makes random oracle model extremely powerful that the simulator
can embed the hard problem into the random oracle and thus the security proof can
be simplified. As a result, the schemes designed in the random oracle model are
much more efficient than those designed in the standard model.
However, negative results have been shown by Canetti et al. [CGH98] that
there exist cryptosystems which are proven secure in the random oracle model but
insecure in the standard model.
2.5.5 Generic Group Model
Similar to the random oracle model for the hash functions, Shoup [Sha79] introduced
the notion of generic group model, which is an idealised model of group.
In this model, the group operation is treated as a black box that the compu-
tation of the group operation is only available via oracle queries. Like the random
oracle model, the simulator S maintains a list L = {(p, ε)} of pairs of a polynomial
and a uniformly random encoding string. At the beginning of the simulation, the
simulator S sends all encoding strings of the initial list L without the corresponding
polynomial. To operate on the group, the adversary A is required to query the
group operation oracle with two encoding strings ε1, ε2 and the type of the group
operation. The restriction for A is that ε1, ε2 must be on the list L. Once the
simulator S receives the query, it computes p3 = p1 + p2 or p3 = p1 − p2, depending
on whether the operation is addition/multiplication or subtraction/division. If p3
is on the list L, the simulator S answers with the corresponding encoding string.
Otherwise, it randomly and uniformly chooses a new encoding string ε3, appends
the pair (p3, ε3) to the list L, and answers A with ε3.
Differing from the random oracle model, the group operation oracle is not pro-
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grammable. It is used for probability analysis and computing the lower bound of
the computational complexity of a number-theoretic problem. As mentioned in Sec-
tion 2.4.1, Shoup [Sha79] proved that the DL problem, the CDH problem, and the
DDH problem are computationally hard in the generic group model.
The generic group model is only suitable for single groups. For groups with
bilinear maps, Boneh et al. [BBG05] adapt the generic group model to the generic
bilinear group model. In this model, the simulator S maintains different lists for
different groups. Besides the group operation oracles for different groups, the sim-
ulator S also provides a bilinear pairing oracle for bilinear maps between groups.
As mentioned in Section 2.4.1, the generic bilinear group model has been applied to
prove the hardness of the DBDH problem and the DLIN problem.
Similar to random oracle model, the generic group model is not a perfect model
that a lower bound analysed in the generic groups does not imply a lower bound in
any specific group.
Chapter 3
Exploration of Practical Functional
Encryption
In the chapter, we review the development and the formal definition of Functional
Encryption (FE), and explore the practical functionalities for FE.
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 A Brief History
In 1976, Diffie and Hellman [DH76] opened a new era in cryptography. Instead
of sharing a same secret key with both the sender Alice and the receiver Bob in
applying cryptography, Bob has a pair of secret key and public key. In Public Key
Encryption (PKE), Alice uses Bob’s public key to encrypt messages as ciphertexts.
Then Bob obtains the original messages (plaintexts) by decrypting the ciphertexts
with his secret key.
However, public keys consume a large amount of storage in a large system.
Moreover, public keys need to be certified by a trusted third party in order to
prevent impersonation. In order to simplify public keys, Shamir [Sha85] gave an idea
of using the users’ identities (e.g. name or email address, etc.) as public keys where
the corresponding secret keys are generated by a Key Generation Centre (KGC).
Unfortunately, Shamir only proposed an Identity-Based Signature scheme with his
idea in 1985 without any Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) implementation. Later in
2001, Boneh and Franklin [BF01] first proposed a fully functional IBE scheme with
proven semantical security against an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-ID-
CCA), assuming the hardness of the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem
in elliptic curve groups with bilinear pairing in random oracle model. With such
an IBE scheme, Alice can use Bob’s identity to encrypt messages under the public
key of the KGC. Later, Bob asks the KGC to obtain his secret key for his identity.
Finally, Bob decrypts the ciphertexts with his secret key. Unlike PKE, Alice can
encrypt messages before Bob getting his secret key.
Alone with the development of IBE, Sahai and Waters [SW05] introduced Fuzzy
20
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Identity-Based Encryption scheme also known as Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE)
scheme. In ABE, attributes and policies are presented as identities. If the policy
is associated with the user’s keys and the attributes are associated with the ci-
phertext, this type of ABE is named Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-
ABE) [SW05]. For instance, Alice encrypts messages with attributes “UOW” and
“Academy”. If Bob has a secret key for a policy “UOW or Student”, he can de-
crypt the ciphertext as the attributes in the ciphertext match the policy associated
with Bob’s secret key. Another type of ABE is Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based
Encryption (CP-ABE) [BSW07] where the attributes are associated with the user’s
keys and the policy is associated with the ciphertext. Different from KP-ABE, Alice
encrypts messages with a policy “UOW or Student” in CP-ABE and Bob can decrypt
with the key associated with attributes “UOW”. The policy is original implemented
in a threshold manner [SW05] which has restricted representation. For better rep-
resentation of the policy, Goyal et al. [GPSW06] proposed a KP-ABE scheme with
fine-grained access control where the policy is implemented using Monotone Span
Programs, allowing “AND” and “OR” gates in the access trees.
All previous ABE schemes [BSW07, GPSW06, SW05] are proven secure with se-
lective security. Leveraging the power of Dual Pairing Vector Space (DPVS) [OT11],
Okamoto and Takashima [OT12] proposed a fully (adaptively) secure unbounded
ABE scheme under Decision Linear (DLIN) assumption in the standard model,
including KP-ABE and CP-ABE. They also extended the span program in the con-
struction from monotone to non-monotone in order to allow “NOT” gates.
In addition, one drawback of ABE scheme is that the encryption algorithm
comprises complex computations and it is impractical to compute for the device with
low computation power. Hohenberger and Waters [HW14] proposed an online/offline
ABE that the devices can encrypt messages quickly in the online phase with the
intermediate values prepared in the offline phase.
Another drawback of ABE is the weakened identity that secret key leakage
cannot be traced to individual users since the relation between the users and the
attributes is many-to-many. Liu et al. [LCW13a] proposed a White-Box Traceable
CP-ABE scheme that the corresponding user can be traced with a secret key given.
Later, Liu et al. [LCW13b] enhanced the traceability by proposing a Blackbox
Traceable CP-ABE scheme. With the blackbox traceability, the corresponding user
can be traced with a decryption oracle associated an unknown secret key.
From the concept of ABE, a generalised notion named Functional Encryption
(FE) is introduced [BSW11, Wat13] where this term is first mentioned by Lewko
et al. [LOS+10] in 2010. Later in 2011, Boneh et al. [BSW11] defined Functional
Encryption that the intended user can only learn the output of a function of the
message and the function key from a ciphertext. In other words, the revelation of
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the information encrypted in the ciphertext can be controlled by the data owner
issuing secret key for different functions while the information retrieval for conven-
tional encryptions is all or nothing. For instance, Alice encrypts a message m under
Bob’s public key to produce the target ciphertext c. Bob generates a decryption key
sk for a function key k using his own secret key and gives sk to Charlie. Receiving
the ciphertext c and the decryption key sk, Charlie is able to learn the output of
the pre-defined function with inputs m and k. Boneh et al. [BSW11] also showed
that Functional Encryption models Predicate Encryption (PE), which further mod-
els IBE and ABE. Furthermore, Goldwasser et al. [GGG+14] extends Functional
Encryption to Multi-Input Functional Encryption (MIFE) that arbitrary functions
f are accepted and f can take multiple message inputs when decrypting multiple
ciphertexts.
Under the class of FE, researchers proposed efficient schemes for new function-
alities. Waters [Wat12] proposed a Deterministic Finite Automata (DFA) based
encryption as an improvement of KP-ABE where the number of the attributes in
the ciphertext is not fixed. For practical functionalities, Abdalla et al. [ABDCP15]
proposed an efficient FE scheme for inner product evaluation. However, the security
of their scheme is very weak and cannot be used in practice. Later, the succeeding
works [ALS16, ABCP16, ZMY17] improve the scheme to IND-CPA security and fur-
ther IND-CCA security. In the direction of MIFE, Abdalla et al. [ARW16] showed
that a secure MIFE scheme of inner products can be constructed from a Functional
Encryption for Inner Products (FE-IP) scheme trivially in the public-key setting.
Another interesting cryptographic primitive modelled by FE is Public-key En-
cryption with Keyword Search (PEKS) introduced by Boneh et al. [BDCOP04].
Precisely, a PEKS scheme is equivalent to a FE scheme for equality test functional-
ity.
3.1.2 Chapter Organisation
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 3.2, we review the formal
definition of FE and its security model. Then we discuss FE schemes for practical
functionalities in Section 3.2, including PE, equality test, inequality test, and inner
product evaluation. Finally, the summary is addressed in Section 3.4.
3.2 Formal Definitions
The definition and the security model of functional encryption by Boneh et al.
[BSW11] are reviewed as follows.
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3.2.1 Syntax
Definition 3.1 (Functional Encryption). Let f : K×X → Y be a universal function
for a function class F = {fk | k ∈ K} indexed by a function key space K, mapping
the message space X to the revelation space Y . A Functional Encryption (FE) for
a function class F consists of the following four polynomial time algorithms:
– (PK,MSK) ← Setup(1λ): The randomised system setup algorithm takes a se-
curity parameter 1λ as input, and generates system-wide parameters and a
random pair of a master secret key MSK and a public key PK.
– SK ← KeyGen(MSK, k): The (probably) randomised secret key generation al-
gorithm takes a master secret key MSK and a function key k ∈ K as inputs,
and computes a secret key SK for the function fk.
– C ← Encrypt(PK, x): The randomised encryption algorithm takes a public key
PK and a message x ∈ X as inputs, and generates a ciphertext C of the
message x.
– y ← Decrypt(SK, C): The (probably) deterministic decryption algorithm takes
a secret key SK for a function fk and a ciphertext C of a message x as inputs.
The algorithm reveals y = fk(x) ∈ Y from the ciphertext C, and outputs it.
Since f is modelled as a universal function, we may use f(k, x) to denote fk(x)
in this thesis.
3.2.2 Security Model
Indistinguishability-based security is considered in this thesis. Precisely, we consider
the Indistinguishability under Chosen Plaintext Attacks (IND-CPA) formulated by
Boneh et al. [BSW11]. In the IND-CPA game (Fig. 3.1), an adaptive IND-CPA
adversary A tries to distinguish a target ciphertext from two messages x0 and x1
chosen by A as follows.
Setup phase The challenger S runs the system setup algorithm Setup(1λ) to gen-
erate a key pair (MSK,PK), and passes the public key PK to the adversary
A.
Pre-challenge phase The adversary A can adaptively query the key generation
oracle OKeyGen with a function key k ∈ K to obtain a secret key SK for the
function fk. The restriction is that the adversaryA can only query the function
key k such that fk(x0) = fk(x1) where x0 and x1 are the messages chosen
by A in the challenge phase. Otherwise, winning the game is trivial since
Decrypt(SK, C) 6= fk(x1−b).




b ∈R {0, 1}
C ← Encrypt(PK, xb)
b′ ← AOKeyGen(C)
OKeyGen(k)
K ← K ∪ {k}
return SK← KeyGen(MSK, k)
AdvIND-CPAA =
∣∣∣∣Pr [b = b′ | ∀k ∈ K, fk(x0) = fk(x1)]− 12
∣∣∣∣
Figure 3.1: IND-CPA Game
Challenge phase At some point, the adversary A outputs two messages x0 and x1.
The challenger S randomly picks b ∈R {0, 1}, and generates a target ciphertext
C ← Encrypt(PK, xb). After that, the challenger S passes the target ciphertext
C to the adversary A.
Post-challenge phase The adversary A can further query the oracle OKeyGen as in
the pre-challenge phase with the same restriction.
Guessing phase Eventually, the adversary A outputs an educated guess b′. If
b = b′, the adversary A wins the game.
The advantage of the adversary A winning the IND-CPA game (Fig. 3.1) is
AdvIND-CPAA =
∣∣∣∣Pr [b = b′ | ∀k ∈ K, fk(x0) = fk(x1)]− 12
∣∣∣∣
Definition 3.2 (IND-CPA Security). An FE scheme is Indistinguishable under Cho-
sen Plaintext Attacks (IND-CPA) if the advantage AdvIND-CPAA for all adversary A
winning the IND-CPA game (Fig. 3.1) in the polynomial time is a negligible func-
tion.
3.3 Discussions on Practical Functionalities
In the series of works after [BSW11], FE schemes for general circuits [GGH+13,
GKP+13] are proposed. However, those schemes are not sufficiently efficient to be
applied in practical scenarios. On the other hand, real-world users are interested
in the specific functionalities in practical instead of general circuits. Therefore, we
look into efficient FE constructions for practical functionalities, which are useful in
the real world.
In this section, we review the definition of PE and its subclasses. Then we dig
into the functionalities of equality and inequality tests for both PE and FE. For
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inequality tests, we propose a minor improvement on the efficiency for PE with
public index. Besides that, we review the functionality of inner product evaluation
and related functionalities.
3.3.1 Predicate Encryption
Definition 3.3 (Predicate Encryption). Let P : K × I → {0, 1} be a predicate
function where I is the index space and M is the message payload space. Predicate
Encryption (PE) [KSW08] is a subclass of FE with the functionality
f(k ∈ K, (i,m) ∈ X = (I ×M)) =
m if P (k, i) = 1,⊥ otherwise.
Since the PE is a subclass of FE, all the syntax and security models are com-
patible. For less confusion, the attribute hiding security for PE is equivalent to
the IND-CPA security defined for FE.
As mentioned in [BSW11], there is a variant of PE that the index i ∈ I is always
public (i.e. without attribute hiding).
Definition 3.4 (Predicate Encryption with Public Index). Let P : K×I → {0, 1} be
a predicate function where I is the index space and M is the message payload space.
Predicate Encryption with public index is a subclass of FE with the functionality
f(k ∈ K, (i,m) ∈ X = (I ×M)) =
(i,m) if P (k, i) = 1,i otherwise.
PE schemes intend to apply access control for decryption ability of the payload
message. Based on the precise predicates, various cryptographic primitives can be
classified in to the class of FE, notably IBE [BF01, Gen06], ABE [SW05, GPSW06,
BSW07, LOS+10, OT12], Hidden Vector Encryption (HVE) [BW07], and Inner
Product Encryption (IPE) [KSW08, LOS+10, OT15].
Definition 3.5 (Identity-Based Encryption). Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) is
an instance of PE with public index with the predicate
P (k ∈ K, i ∈ I) =
1 if k = i,0 otherwise.
Anonymous Identity-Based Encryption (AnonIBE) is an instance of PE with the
same predicate.
There are two types of ABE named KP-ABE [SW05] and CP-ABE [BSW07].
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Definition 3.6 (Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption). Let K be the set of all
policies, and I be the power set of the set of all attributes. Key-Policy Attribute-
Based Encryption (KP-ABE) is an instance of PE with public index with the predi-
cate
P (k ∈ K, i ∈ I) =
1 if k accepts i,0 otherwise.
Definition 3.7 (Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption). Let K be the power
set of the set of all attributes, and I be the set of all policies. Ciphertext-Policy
Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) is an instance of PE with public index with
the predicate
P (k ∈ K, i ∈ I) =
1 if k is accepted by i,0 otherwise.
Like ABE, there are two types of IPE named Zero Inner Product Encryption
(ZIPE) [KSW08] and Non-zero Inner Product Encryption (NIPE) [OT15]. Conven-
tionally, the name IPE is referred as ZIPE. Let K = I = V be the same vector
space.
Definition 3.8 (Zero Inner Product Encryption). Zero Inner Product Encryption
(ZIPE) is an instance of PE with the predicate
P (~k ∈ V,~i ∈ V) =
1 if ~k ·~i = 0,0 otherwise.
Definition 3.9 (Non-zero Inner Product Encryption). Non-zero Inner Product En-
cryption (NIPE) is an instance of PE with the predicate
P (~k ∈ V,~i ∈ V) =
1 if ~k ·~i 6= 0,0 otherwise.
Let K = (G ∪ {∗})n, I = Gn be two vector spaces of the same dimension n
where G is a group and ∗ is a wildcard symbol.
Definition 3.10 (Hidden Vector Encryption). Hidden Vector Encryption (HVE) is
an instance of PE with the predicate
P (~k ∈ K,~i ∈ I) =
1 if ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, kj = ∗ ∨ kj = ij0 otherwise.
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3.3.2 Equality Test
Definition 3.11 (Functional Encryption for Equality Tests). Functional Encryption
for Equality Tests (FE-ET) is a subclass of FE with the functionality
f(k ∈ K, x ∈ X) =
1 if k = x,0 otherwise.
By observing Definitions 3.5 and 3.11, it is found that AnonIBE implies FE-ET.
Precisely, they are the same if |M | = 1 in AnonIBE. In addition, the notion of
FE-ET is equivalent to PEKS introduced by Boneh et al. [BDCOP04] both for the
syntax and the security model, i.e. IND-CPA security for FE-ET is equivalent to
Indistinguishability under Adaptive Chosen Keyword Attacks (IND-CKA) security
for PEKS. Abdalla et al. [ABC+08] concluded the same result that AnonIBE is
equivalent to PEKS and thus is equvalent to FE-ET.
Hence, FE-ET is a good start point to research searchable encryptions, which
are useful in cloud computing applications. For further research related to searchable
encryptions, we direct the reader to Part II of this thesis.
3.3.3 Inequality Test
Generally speaking, inequality is a relation that two elements are not equal. Pre-
cisely, it is more meaningful if the elements are in an ordered set so that they can
be compared. Let S be an ordered set with a total order ≤ and a, b ∈ S. The
equality test a = b is defined as a ≤ b ∧ b ≤ a, and the strict order a < b is defined
as ¬(b ≤ a). Besides, we also define a > b if b < a, and a ≥ b if b ≤ a.
Definition 3.12 (Functional Encryption for Inequality Tests). Let the infix  ∈
{<,≤,≥, >} denote a general comparison operator, and K = X = S. Functional
Encryption for Inequality Tests (FE-IT) is a subclass of FE with the functionality
f(k ∈ S, x ∈ S) =
1 if x  k,0 otherwise.
Besides the FE for pure inequality test functionality, we are also interested in
the PE with the inequality test predicate.
Definition 3.13 (Predicate Encryption for Inequality Tests). Let the infix  ∈
{<,≤,≥, >} denote a general comparison operator, and K = I = S. Predicate
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Encryption for Inequality Tests (PE-IT) is an instance of PE with the predicate
P(k ∈ S, i ∈ S) =
1 if i  k,0 otherwise.
Similar to the relation of FE-ET and AnonIBE, by observing Definitions 3.12
and 3.13, it is clear that PE-IT implies FE-IT. Therefore, a PE-IT scheme can be
built in order to obtain FE-IT.
Before the discussion of detailed implementations of FE-IT, there is a funda-
mental problem of “how to compare two integer”. For example, how to evaluate
a < b. Boneh and Waters [BW07] suggest a number-line like method that they
prepare a set B = {1, 2, . . . , b− 2, b− 1} for b and then test whether a ∈ B or not.
This method is workable but inefficient with both the time and space complexity of
O(n) since they actually encode the integers in unary and test in unary. As a better
solution, Bethencourt et al. [BSW07] encode the integers in the binary form and
compare them bit by bit, reducing both the time and space complexity to O(log n).
However, they still need to do the actual computation of the evaluation that each
bit evaluation requires reconstructions of secret-sharing schemes, which makes the
multiplicative factor of the complexity large. In addition, their computation is based
on boolean expression evaluation. If we want to obtain a PE-IT scheme via ZIPE,
the expression must be converted to conjunctive normal form (CNF) or disjunctive
normal form (DNF) so that the expression evaluation can be converted into an inner
product evaluation However, this operation may lead to an exponential explosion,
making the complexity worse than O(n).
Trying to further increase the efficiency, we leverage the idea from automata
theory [Sip96]. By observing the syntax of the PE-IT with P(k, i), we find out that
the operation  and the value k associated with secret key will never be changed
once the secret key is generated. For the ciphertext, we also find out that the
value i associated will never be changed once generated. Therefore, to maximise the
efficiency, it is nature to compile P(k, · ) into a finite automaton M,k that takes
i as the input. However, we still need to do the actual computation by running
the machine M,k, and it requires that both the machine and input are public and
not obfuscated that the alphabet symbols {0, 1} are necessary to carry out a state
transfer. Hence, we compile the inputs and alter the original automaton M,k so
that only equality tests are required instead of state transfers for computing. More
precisely, we compile the value k into a set A of prefixes of all binary strings i such
that P(k, i) = 1, and compile i into a set B of prefixes of its binary form. To
compute P(k, i), all we need is to compute A ∩B
?
= ∅.
However, the problem occurs when we implement the computation of A ∩ B ?=




b ∈R {0, 1}
C ← Encrypt(PK, xb)
b′ ← AOKeyGen(C)
OKeyGen(k)
K ← K ∪ {k}
return SK← KeyGen(MSK, k)
AdvMRA =
∣∣∣∣Pr [b = b′ | ∀k ∈ K, fk(x0) = fk(x1) = 0]− 12
∣∣∣∣
Figure 3.2: MR Game
∅ using a ZIPE scheme [KSW08]. Since [KSW08] accepts boolean expressions in
polynomials only, the above intersection test operation has to be converted to a
polynomial with the degree of d = O((log n)2) and t = O(log n) variables. The
resulted complexity is dt = O((log n)2 logn), which is worse than O(n). Therefore,
this approach is a negative result.
As an independent work, Shi et al. [SBC+07] defined an interval tree to represent
the integer universe. Similarly to our approach from automata theory, the authors
use sets of labels to represent integers and ranges, and conduct the evaluation by
computing whether the intersection is an empty set or not. They built their FE-IT
scheme on top of a AnonIBE scheme with decryption cost of O((log n)2) (or O(log n)
with optimisations). However, their scheme cannot achieve the standard IND-CPA
security for FE. Instead, the authors introduced a weaker security model named
Match-Revealing (MR) as illustrated in Fig. 3.2, and referred the standard IND-
CPA security as Match-Concealing (MC). Note that the key query for the function
fk with the condition fk(x0) = fk(x1) = 1 is allowed in the IND-CPA game but
disallowed in the MR game. The authors proved the security of their scheme in
the selective version of the MR security model. Therefore, it is a security-efficiency
trade-off for FE-IT.
Nevertheless, our approach from automata theory is still able to increase the
efficiency of PE-IT related schemes with public index. In CP-ABE [BSW07], the
comparison operation of integers is done bit by bit, which requires O(log n) recon-
structions of secret-sharing schemes. With our approach, we reduce the number of
reconstructions from O(log n) to O(1). More precisely, computing A ∩ B ?= ∅ ⇐⇒
|A ∩ B|
?
≥ 1 requires only one secret-sharing reconstruction with an OR gate (i.e.
a (k, n) secret-sharing scheme with threshold k = 1), since the sets A and B are
public.
In the rest of this subsection, we present our detailed encoding technique of
compiling integers and functions P(k, · ) into sets as follows, starting from basic
binary encodings.
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Figure 3.3: Deterministic Finite Automata M<,22 for P<(22, · )
Let S = Zn be a finite integer set where |S| = n, and ` = dlog2 ne. Therefore,
every element a ∈ S can be rewritten in the binary form with the length of `. For
instance, 22 ∈ Z42 in the binary form is 010110 of length ` = 6.
The encoding (Algorithm 1) for the machine input x is to generate all pre-
fixes of its binary form in different sizes. For instance, ENCODE(22) → T22 =
{0, 01, 010, 0101, 01011, 010110}. The size of the result set of ENCODE(x) is `.
Algorithm 1 Encoding for x
Require: x in the binary form of the length `.
1: procedure encode(x)
2: T ← ∅ . T is initialized as an empty set
3: t← “” . t is initialized as an empty binary string
4: for i = 1 to ` do
5: t← t ||xi . Append the ith bit of x to t and save to t




Our scheme supports four operations {<,≤,≥, >}. We propose the correspond-
ing encodings as follows. The encoding (Algorithm 2) for the machine P<(k, · ) is
to generate all paths to the accepting state of the original machine M<,k. In other
words, it generates all shortest-size prefixes of all binary strings x such that the
prefixes represent x < k. For instance, ENCLESS(22) → T<22 = {00, 0100, 01010},
which are the paths to the accepting states of the original machine M<,22 (Fig. 3.3).
The encoding (Algorithm 4) for the machine P>(k, · ) is to generate all shortest-
size prefixes of all binary strings x such that the prefixes represent x > k. For
instance, ENCGREATER(22) → T>22 = {1, 011, 010111}. The size of the result
sets of ENCLESS(k) or ENCGREATER(k) are at most `. The encoding (Algo-
rithm 3) for the machine P≤(k, · ) and the encoding (Algorithm 5) for the ma-
chine P≥(k, · ) add k itself to the results of Algorithms 2 and 4 for non-strict
inequalities. For instance, ENCLEQ(22) → T≤22 = {00, 0100, 01010, 010110} and
ENCGEQ(22)→ T≥22 = {1, 011, 010110, 010111}.
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Algorithm 2 Encoding for P<(k, · )
Require: k in the binary form of the length `.
1: procedure encless(k)
2: T ← ∅ . T is initialised as an empty set
3: t← “” . t is initialised as an empty binary string
4: for i = 1 to ` do
5: if ki = 1 then . ki means the ith bit of k
6: T ← T ∪ {t||0} . Append 0 to t and add the result to T
7: end if




Algorithm 3 Encoding for P≤(k, · )
Require: k in the binary form of the length `.
1: procedure encleq(k)
2: T ← encless(k) . Call Algorithm 2
3: T ← T ∪ {k} . Add k to T
4: return T
5: end procedure
Algorithm 4 Encoding for P>(k, · )
Require: k in the binary form of the length `.
1: procedure encgreater(k)
2: T ← ∅ . T is initialised as an empty set
3: t← “” . t is initialised as an empty binary string
4: for i = 1 to ` do
5: if ki = 0 then . ki means the ith bit of k
6: T ← T ∪ {t||1} . Append 1 to t and add the result to T
7: end if




Algorithm 5 Encoding for P≥(k, · )
Require: k in the binary form of the length `.
1: procedure encgeq(k)
2: T ← encgreater(k) . Call Algorithm 4
3: T ← T ∪ {k} . Add k to T
4: return T
5: end procedure
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In addition, we prove that our encoding scheme is correct. Let CODEX = {(<,
ENCLESS), (≤,ENCLEQ), (≥,ENCGEQ), (>,ENCGREATER)}.
Theorem 3.1. Let a, b ∈ Zn, (,ENC) ∈ CODEX, A = ENCODE(a), and B =
ENC(b). We have a  b ⇐⇒ A ∩B 6= ∅.
Proof. We prove this theorem in two steps.
– a  b =⇒ A∩B 6= ∅: From Algorithm 2, the set B contains all shortest-size
prefixes of all binary strings x such that the prefixes represent x  k. Thus if
a  b, the B contains a prefix of a of some size. Since A contains its prefixes
of all sizes (Algorithm 1), we have A ∩B 6= ∅.
– A ∩ B 6= ∅ =⇒ a  b: Since the set B contains all shortest-size prefixes of
all binary strings x such that the prefixes represent x  k and one of the prefix
of a exists in B, we immediately have a  b.
Some readers may try to take intersection or union of encoded sets to achieve
conjunctive or disjunctive expressions. However, that may not work. For ex-
ample, T>3 = ENCGREATER(3) = {1, 01, 001, 0001} and T<5 = ENCLESS(5) =
{0000, 000100}, we have T>3 ∩ T<5 = ∅ instead of T=4 = {000100}. Moreover, as
an extension of our encoding technique, we still can take unions of encoded sets if
the intended sets have no intersection.
3.3.4 Inner Product Evaluation
Definition 3.14 (Functional Encryption for Inner Products). Let K = X = V be
the same vector space. Functional Encryption for Inner Products (FE-IP) [ABDCP15]
is a subclass of FE with the functionality
f(~k ∈ V, ~x ∈ V) = 〈~k, ~x〉 = ~k · ~x.
Differing from IPE, which invokes inner product evaluation for the predicate,
FE-IP computes the inner product as the decryption result. The detailed definition
of FE-IP is available in Section 6.2. As mentioned by Abdalla et al. [ABDCP15],
the main practical application for FE-IP is to calculate the weighted mean or the
weighted sum in descriptive statistics.
In this thesis, we propose a FE-IP with enhanced security in Chapter 6 and
generalise the functionality of inner product evaluation to matrix product evaluation
in Chapter 7.
CHAPTER 3. EXPLORATION OF PRACTICAL FE 33
Definition 3.15 (Functional Encryption for Matrix Products). Let K = X = M be
the same matrix space, and K ∈ M, X ∈ M be two matrices such that the number
of columns in K is equal to the number of rows in K. Functional Encryption for
Matrix Products is a subclass of FE with the functionality
f(K ∈M,X ∈M) = KX.
3.4 Chapter Summary
In chapter, we reviewed the history of Functional Encryption in the literature. Be-
sides, we also reviewed the definition of FE and its IND-CPA security model. For the
main part, we pointed out the practical functionalities as the subclasses of FE, in-
cluding Predicate Encryption, Functional Encryption for Equality Tests, Functional
Encryption for Inequality Tests, and Functional Encryption for Inner Products.
As a minor contribution, we introduced an encoding technique that can be used
in the inequality tests, enhancing the efficiency of CP-ABE from O(log n) to O(1)
secret-sharing reconstructions in decryption.
Part II




Threshold Broadcast Encryption with
Keyword Search
Many users store their data in an untrusted cloud for the purpose of convenient
data access and sharing. For convenience, keyword search can be performed by
the cloud remotely with a single query from the user. However, the cloud cannot
directly search the data if it is encrypted for security purposes. In order to avoid
local searches by downloading all data from the cloud, causing a huge amount of
network bandwidth and computation power consumption of local devices, keyword
search on encrypted data has been proposed. Searchable encryption schemes make
outsourcing the search operation with privacy possible. In this chapter, a special
variant of searchable encryption with threshold access is studied. Unlike some previ-
ous proposals which have a fixed group and a fixed threshold value, we define a new
notion named Threshold Broadcast Encryption with Keyword Search (TBEKS) for
dynamic groups and flexible threshold values. We formalise the security of a TBEKS
scheme via a new security model named Indistinguishability in the threshold setting
under Chosen Keyword Attacks (IND-T-CKA). We also propose the first practical
TBEKS scheme with provable security in our IND-T-CKA security model, assuming
the hardness of the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem. Parts of
this work appeared in [ZMY16].
4.1 Introduction
Cloud computing [MG11] provides flexible computing resources, including data stor-
age, to end users. Users are able to upload their data to the cloud for later access
by themselves or by other users (i.e., data sharing) via the Internet. In other words,
on-demand data access is available via the Internet where users can search and then
download what they need. To prevent a huge amount of network bandwidth con-
sumption, the search operations are usually done by the cloud instead of letting
users download all the data and search locally.
Meanwhile, to ensure the privacy of the users, some sensitive data should be
protected against the cloud server while the keyword search functionality is main-
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tained. Specifically, the data to be searched and the keyword used in the search
operation should be inaccessible by any non-authorised parties, including the cloud.
With such a demand, various searchable encryption schemes [ABC+08, BSNS06,
BDCOP04, HL07, SWP00] have been proposed to enable secure searching over en-
crypted data. In a public key searchable encryption scheme, Bob encrypts both the
data and the keywords under Alice’s public key and uploads the ciphertexts to the
cloud. As both the data and the keywords are protected, it is hard for the cloud
to gain any information about the data. To perform search operations, Alice gener-
ates a trapdoor for a keyword [ABC+08, BSNS06, BDCOP04] or multiple keywords
[HL07] and transfers it to the cloud via a secure communication channel. Upon re-
ceiving Alice’s trapdoor of the keyword, the cloud searches the whole database and
returns the search results back to Alice. Finally, Alice downloads the ciphertexts
from the cloud based on the search results, and decrypts them to get the original
data.
In the normal searchable encryption schemes, the accessibility to the data and
its search operation is authorised to a user [ABC+08, BDCOP04] or a set of users
[SYL+14, ZXA14] where any single user in the authorised user set can perform
the search and the decryption operations. However, a single identity may not be
trustful in some scenarios. For instance, a research team of a company is devel-
oping a new product and needs to access the company database. The head of the
research department does not trust any single member of the research team to ac-
cess the database, since an individual member may leak the secrets of the company
for monetary purposes. To reduce the risk of a single point failure, a threshold
searchable encryption scheme is more suitable where the accessibility to the data is
decentralised from a single member to n members of the team where searching the
database and decrypting a ciphertext both require at least t members to work to-
gether. To be more precise, in order to perform a search operation successfully, the
cloud needs to obtain for a keyword at least t trapdoors from the n authorised users.
If such a threshold searchable encryption also supports dynamic groups and flexible
threshold values, the company can specify different classifications for different data
by changing the authorised user set and the threshold value t. This chapter aims to
provide a practical solution for this problem.
4.1.1 Related Work
Boneh et al. [BDCOP04] introduced the searchable encryption, namely Public-key
Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS), and defined the security model that the
adversary cannot identify the keyword from the ciphertext without a trapdoor. Xu
et al. [XJWW13] argued that PEKS is insecure under Keyword Guessing Attack
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(KGA) since the remote server can always create a ciphertext of a keyword and
test it with the target trapdoor. If the keyword space is in polynomial size, the
adversary can get the keyword from the target trapdoor in polynomial time. Xu
et al. [XJWW13] also proposed a method to enhance the security under KGA by
encrypting and searching for the fuzzy keyword instead of the exact keyword.
Besides, Boneh et al. [BDCOP04] showed that PEKS implies Identity-Based En-
cryption (IBE) but not vice versa. Nevertheless, Abdalla et al. [ABC+08] proposed
a PEKS scheme generically constructed using Anonymous Identity-Based Encryp-
tion (AnonIBE). They also proposed Identity-Based Searchable Encryption (IBKS)
from a 2-leveled Anonymous Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption (AnonHIBE).
Similarly, searchable broadcasting encryption, namely Broadcast Encryption with
Keyword Search (BEKS), can be constructed using 2-leveled Anonymous Hierarchi-
cal Identity-Coupling Broadcast Encryption (AnonHICBE) [AFI06].
Searchable encryption can be divided into the single user setting (e.g. PEKS)
and the multi-user setting. Broadcast Encryption with Keyword Search [AFI06]
and Attribute-Based Encryption with Keyword Search (ABKS) [SYL+14, ZXA14]
are in the multi-user setting. In BEKS, the keyword is encrypted for a set of users.
If a user is in the target set, the user can generate the trapdoor for testing the
ciphertext. In ABKS, the keyword is encrypted under a policy or with attributes.
Only the user who has a match of the policy and the attributes can generate the
trapdoor for testing the ciphertext.
However, in both BEKS and ABKS, the individual target user has the full ability
to generate the trapdoor. Wang et al. [WWP08] decentralised the ability of trapdoor
generation to multi-user in a threshold manner, which requires at least k of n user to
generate the trapdoor. Siad [Sia12] gave a formal definition of Threshold Public-key
Encryption with Keyword Search (TPEKS), and generically constructed a TPEKS
scheme with threshold (n, t)-IBE but no concrete scheme is provided. In Wang et
al.’s scheme [WWP08], a trusted centralised manager is required to generate the
private keys for all users. To enhance the security, Siad’s scheme [Sia12] leverages a
distributed protocol in private keys generation instead of a trusted third party.
We find that both schemes [Sia12, WWP08] are limited to a fixed number of
users and a fixed threshold value at the key generation stage. It makes adding or
removing a user impossible, and changing the threshold value for individual cipher-
text impossible. To encrypt a keyword for different set of users or with different
threshold value, we have to generate the private keys for all the users in the tar-
get set. If it is an (n, t)-TPEKS scheme where t is the threshold value such that
0 < t ≤ n and n is the maximum number of users, the users have to store O(n · 2n)
private-public key pairs for the possible ciphertexts, although they may share the
same global public parameters.
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4.1.2 Our Contribution
In this chapter, we introduce a new notion named Threshold Broadcast Encryption
with Keyword Search (TBEKS). We provide a formal definition of TBEKS and a
formal security model, named Indistinguishability in the threshold setting under
Chosen Keyword Attacks (IND-T-CKA), to capture its security. Moreover, we con-
struct a practical TBEKS scheme and prove that it is IND-T-CKA secure under the
Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption in random oracle model.
In our TBEKS definition and scheme, users are ad hoc, i.e., they can generate
their own private-public key pair individually. The data owner selects a target set
of users and threshold value t to encrypt a keyword, and then uploads the full
ciphertext to the remote server. To search the files containing a certain keyword, at
least t users of the target user set need to generate their trapdoor shares for that
keyword, and transfer those trapdoor shares to the remote server, in order to enable
the remote server to perform the search operation. Our scheme does not fix the
user group and the threshold value at the system setup, and only one private-public
key pair is required for each user. Thus we solve Wang et al.’s open problem for
dynamic group [WWP08].
4.1.3 Chapter Organisation
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. We define TBEKS and its security
model in Section 4.2. Then we propose our TBEKS scheme in Section 4.3 and prove
it is secure under the security model defined in Section 4.2.2. Finally, a summary is
addressed in Section 4.5.
4.2 Formal Definitions
Generally speaking, a Threshold Broadcast Encryption with Keyword Search (TBEKS)1
scheme is used along with a Threshold Broadcast Encryption (TBE) scheme [DHMR07],
where the former encrypts the keywords and the latter encrypts the message2. In-
dependent private-public key pairs are suggested for the combination of the above
mentioned system. In TBEKS, there are three roles involved, including the data
owner who encrypts the message and the keywords, the server who stores the ci-
phertexts and performs the requested search, and the user who has the access to
the decryption of the message and generates search queries. TBEKS works as fol-
lows. The data owner chooses a set of users and a threshold value t, and encrypts
the message under TBE and the keyword under TBEKS. Then the data owner
1We choose the name TBEKS in order to separate it from TPEKS.
2In a storage system, messages are actually files.
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combines the ciphertexts and uploads them to the server. To perform a search
operation, at least t users generate their individual trapdoors for the same target
keyword W and upload the trapdoors to the server via a secure communication
channel. After that, the server searches the whole database of ciphertexts with the
given trapdoors and returns the result message indices back. Upon receiving the
indices, the users retrieve the corresponding ciphertexts and decrypt them with at
least t users working together. Note that only the trapdoors are required to be
transferred via a secure communication channel.
4.2.1 Syntax
Formally, we present the definition of TBEKS as follows.
Definition 4.1 (Threshold Broadcast Encryption with Keyword Search). A Thresh-
old Broadcast Encryption with Keyword Search (TBEKS) scheme, involving the data
users, the servers and the users Ui, consists of the following five possibly probabilistic
polynomial time algorithms:
– param ← Setup(1λ): The randomised system setup algorithm takes a security
parameter 1λ, and outputs a set of parameters used in the system widely. This
algorithm can be run by anyone whereas all users are required to agree on the
same parameters.
– (PKi, SKi) ← KeyGen(param): The randomised user key generation algorithm
takes a system parameter param, and outputs a pair of secret key SKi and
public key PKi of a user Ui. This algorithm is run by the users individually.
– C ← TBEKS({PK1, . . . ,PKn}, t,W ): The randomised keyword encryption al-
gorithm takes a set of public keys {PK1, . . . ,PKn} of n target users, a threshold
value t and a keyword W , and outputs a ciphertext C of the keyword W . This
algorithm is run by the data owner.
– T ← Trapdoor(SKi,W ): The possibly randomised trapdoor generation algo-
rithm takes the secret key SKi of a user Ui and a keyword W , and outputs a
user trapdoor T of the keyword W . This algorithm is run by the users indi-
vidually.
– 1/0← Test({T1, . . . , Tt}, C): The deterministic test algorithm takes t trapdoors
Ti ← Trapdoor(SKi,W ) and a keyword ciphertext C ← TBEKS({PK′1, . . . ,PK′n},
t′,W ′), and outputs1 if W = W ′ ∧ t ≥ t′ ∧ {PK1, . . . ,PKn} ⊂ {PK
′
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where (PKi, SKi) ← KeyGen(params). This algorithm is run by the servers
and the results will be sent back to each user involved.
In addition, we require the scheme to be correct.
Definition 4.2 (Correctness). A TBEKS scheme is correct if the following state-
ment is always true:
∀param← Setup(1λ), ∀(SK,PK)← KeyGen(param),
∀n, t ∈ Z+ ∧ t ≤ n, ∀W ∈ {0, 1}∗, ∀C ← TBEKS({PK1, . . . ,PKn}, t,W ),
∀S ⊂ {1, . . . , n} ∧ t ≤ |S| ≤ n, Test({T | T ← Trapdoor(SKi,W ) ∧ i ∈ S}, C) = 1.
4.2.2 Security Model
In Definition 4.1, we implicitly allow the server to combine the trapdoors for a
keyword freely without any interaction with related users. For instance, the data
owner creates C1 ← TBEKS({PK1,PK2}, 2,W ). To search for C1, the users U1,
U2 generate Ti ← Trapdoor(SKi,W ) for i = 1, 2. Later, the data owner creates
C2 ← TBEKS({PK2,PK3}, 2,W ) for the same keyword W . Similarly, to search for
C2, the users U2, U3 generate T
′
i ← Trapdoor(SKi,W ) for i = 2, 3. If Trapdoor is
a deterministic algorithm, the server can easily link T1, T2 and T
′
3 together that
they are created for the same keyword since T2 = T
′
2. As a result, if the data
owner creates C3 ← TBEKS({PK1,PK2,PK3}, 3,W ), the server can search C3 by
Test({T1, T2, T ′3}, C3) = 1. However, the server gains no information, especially
the keyword encrypted in the trapdoors, other than the test result. Instead, this
provides a feature that the server can cache the uploaded trapdoors from the users.
Because of this feature, we consider that the server is honest but curious. Im-
portantly, we do not allow the server to collude with any users. Otherwise, the user
U1 and the server can learn the keyword in the ciphertext. For example, the server
gets T1, T2 and T3 from the users to test C3. Then the server can use T2 and T3 to
test C2, and return the result to the user U1. Now, the user U1 knows the keyword
of a ciphertext while U1 is not in the target user set.
We also do not consider the Keyword Guessing Attack (KGA) [XJWW13], since
the server can always create a ciphertext C = TBEKS({PK}, 1,W ) for all the key-
words W with the user’s trapdoor T . Commonly, if the keyword space is polynomial
sized, the server can get the corresponding keyword W of C in polynomial time.
However, this kind of attack can be prevented by Xu et al.’s method [XJWW13].
Boneh et al.’s scheme [BDCOP04] also does not consider this attack.
In TBEKS schemes, many users are involved. We consider that all users are reg-
istered before creating the ciphertexts, as the adversary may be able to register the
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GameλIND-T-CKA
U , C,W ← ∅
param← Setup(1λ)
(S, t,W0,W1)← AOKeyGen,OCorrupt,OTrapdoor(param)
b ∈R {0, 1}




U ← U ∪ {Ui}
return PKi
OCorrupt
C ← C ∪ {Ui} ⊂ U
return SKi
OTrapdoor
T ← Trapdoor(SKi,W )
W ←W ∪ {W}
return T
AdvIND-T-CKAA =
∣∣∣∣Pr [b = b′ ∧ |S ∩ C| < t ∧W0,W1 /∈ W ]− 12
∣∣∣∣
Figure 4.1: IND-T-CKA Game
private-public key pair of the target user. Now we define the Indistinguishability in
the threshold setting under Chosen Keyword Attacks (IND-T-CKA) game (Fig. 4.1)
where an active adversary A tries to distinguish two encryptions of keywords W0
and W1 with the security parameter λ:
1. The challenger runs the Setup(1λ) algorithm to generate a set of system-wide
parameters and passes them to the adversary A.
2. The adversary can adaptively ask the challenger to register a user and obtain
the public key of that user by querying the key generation oracle OKeyGen. At
the same time, the challenger records the requested user Ui in the user list U .
3. The adversary can adaptively ask the challenger to obtain the secret key of a
registered user Ui ∈ U by querying the collusion oracle OCorrupt. At the same
time, the challenger records the requested user Ui in the collusion list C.
4. The adversary can adaptively ask the challenger to obtain the user Ui’s trap-
door of a keyword W by querying the trapdoor generation oracle OTrapdoor. At
the same time, the challenger records the requested keyword W in the key-
word list W . For the corrupted users Ui ∈ C, the adversary can compute the
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trapdoor by itself using the users Ui’s secret key SKi. Hence, the keyword list
W only contains the requested keywords of uncorrupted users.
5. At some point, the adversary A outputs a set S of users, a threshold value t
and two keywords W0 and W1 to be challenged. The adversary is restricted
that W0 and W1 are not in the listW as they are not queried to OTrapdoor. The
adversary is also restricted that it cannot corrupt t users or more in the user
set S.
6. The challenger randomly selects b to be 0 or 1, and gives a ciphertext C =
TBEKS({PKi}i∈S , t,Wb) to the adversary A.
7. The adversary can continue to query all three oraclesOKeyGen, OCorrupt, OTrapdoor
with the same restrictions.
8. Eventually, the adversary A outputs a bit b′. If b = b′, the adversary wins the
game.
We define the advantage of winning the IND-T-CKA game (Fig. 4.1) as
AdvIND-T-CKAA =
∣∣∣∣Pr [b = b′ ∧ |S ∩ C| < t ∧W0,W1 /∈ W ]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
Definition 4.3 (IND-T-CKA Security). A TBEKS scheme is indistinguishable in
the threshold setting against chosen keyword attack (IND-T-CKA) if AdvIND-T-CKAA
is a negligible function for all adversary A winning the the IND-T-CKA game
(Fig. 4.1) in polynomial time.
4.3 The Construction
We build our TBEKS scheme based on Daza et al.’s TBE scheme [DHMR07] using
the idea similar to Boneh et al.’s PEKS scheme [BDCOP04]. The main idea of the
construction is to use the secret keys of users as the shares of a shared secret in an
(n, 2n − t) threshold secret sharing scheme. The shared secret works as the secret
key of a dummy user in [BDCOP04]. Since all computations are done with points
on the elliptic curve and due to the hardness of Discrete Logarithm (DL) problem,
the secret shares are computationally secure.
Our TBEKS scheme works as follows.
– param ← Setup(1λ): Given a security parameter 1λ, this algorithm generates
a prime number of q bits and multiplicative groups G1 and G2 of order q
where there is a bilinear map e : G1 × G1 → G2. This algorithm also picks a
random generator g of G1. After that, the algorithm picks two hash functions
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H : {0, 1}∗ → G1 and H ′ : G1 → Zq. Note that the hash function H is used to
hash a keyword W into an element in G1, and the hash function H ′ is used to
hash the public key PKi of a user Ui to an domain input ui = H
′(PKi) used in
the threshold secret sharing scheme. Hence, it is required H ′ to be a collision
resistant hash function. Alternatively, instead of using a hash function H ′, a
user Ui can select its own unique ui and then register along with its public key
PKi to a certification authority. Thus each user Ui has a unique public key
PKi associated with a unique public value ui. For the system simplicity, we
use the hash function H ′.
G1 = 〈g〉 , e : G1 ×G1 → G2, H : {0, 1}∗ → G1, H ′ : G1 → Zq.
return param = (q,G1,G2, g, e,H,H ′).
– (PKi, SKi) ← KeyGen(param): With the system wide parameters param, each
user Ui randomly chooses a secret key SKi = xi ∈R Zq. Then its public key
can be computed as PKi = g
xi .
SKi = xi ∈ Zq, PKi = gxi .
return (PKi, SKi).
– C ← TBEKS({PK1, . . . ,PKn}, t,W ): To encrypt a keyword W , the data owner
first obtains all the public keys of the target users S = {U1, . . . , Un}. Then the
data owner obtains the associated input values U = {ui = H ′(PKi) | Ui ∈ S}.
Having n input values ui and PKi = g





i . To form an (n, 2n − t) threshold secret sharing scheme,
the data owner chooses n − t unique domain input values D ← Zn−tq , where
U ∩D = ∅, for n− t dummy users. Given the n− t dummy users as a dummy
user set D, the data owner can compute the public keys of the dummy users
by computing PKj = g
p(uj) for all uj ∈ D. The detail of this algorithm works
as follows.




i , s ∈R Zq, C1 = gs, C2 = e(H(W ), Q)s,






i , Kj = e(H(W )
s,PKj).
return C = (S, t,D,C1, C2, {Kj}Uj∈D).
To improve computational efficiency, it is possible to reuse Q and PKj for
the same user set S and different keywords, since these two variables are
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irrelevant to the keyword W and the randomness s. When calculating Kj, we
can calculate H(W )s before the loop so that all we need is a pairing operation.
For the ciphertext C, it is not necessary to include all the public keys and the
associated domain input values for both real users and dummy users since we
only need the domain input values later. For better efficiency, this algorithm
can return the ciphertext as C = (U , t,D, C1, C2, {Kj}Uj∈D). As the values
in D are not required to be chosen uniformly, the data owner can choose a
continuous interval that D = {r, r+ 1, r+ 2, . . . , r+n− t− 1} where r ∈R Zq.
Thus D can be represented in two numbers in Zq. Hence, for the best result,
the ciphertext size is (n+ 3)Zq + (n− t+ 2)G1.
– T ← Trapdoor(SKi,W ): The user Ui generates the trapdoor T for the keyword
W simply using its secret key. Then the user Ui uploads the trapdoor to the
server via a secure communication channel.
T = H(W )xi .
return T .
– 1/0 ← Test({T1, . . . , Tt}, C): Upon receiving t trapdoors from the users A =
{U1, . . . , Ut} where |A ⊂ S| = t, the server can run the following algorithm.
If more than t target trapdoors are uploaded, the server only picks the first t
trapdoors.
For each user Ui ∈ A, Ki = e(Ti, C1),









Theorem 4.1. The proposed TBEKS scheme is correct.
Proof. Correctness is verified as following. First, Ki can be calculated as
Ki = e(H(W )
s,PKi) = e(H(W )
s, gxi) = e(H(W )xi , gs) = e(Ti, C1).
















Since the (n, 2n− t) threshold secret sharing scheme is constructed by n real users
S, distributing shares to n− t dummy users D, any n users in S ∪D can recover the
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polynomial p used in the TBEKS algorithm. Having |D| = n−t and S∩D = ∅ and
|A ⊂ S| = t, we conclude that A∩D = ∅ and further |B = (A∪D) ⊂ (S ∪D)| = n.








K = e(H(W ), Q)s = C2.
4.4 Security Proof
Theorem 4.2. The proposed TBEKS scheme is IND-T-CKA secure. If an adver-
sary A can win the IND-T-CKA game (Fig. 4.1) with the advantage ε, an algorithm
S can be constructed to solve Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem
in polynomial time with the advantage ε′ ≥ ε
2e2(qC+1)(qT+1)
, querying OCorrupt for at
most qC times and OTrapdoor for at most qT times.
Proof. Let δ = (g, ga, gb, gc, Z) be an instance of DBDH problem (recall Defini-
tion 2.11) that a simulator S is challenged to distinguish that δ ∈ DDBDH or δ ∈ DR.
From the DBDH instance D, the simulator S is also given two groups G1 and G2 of
the same order q, a generator g of G1 and a bilinear map e : G1 × G1 → G2. The
simulator S further choose two hash functions H : {0, 1}∗ → G1 and H ′ : G1 → Zq.
Then the simulator S packs those parameters as param = (q,G1,G2, g, e,H,H ′) and
passes param to the adversary A.
At the same time, the simulator S simulates the three oracles as follows.
– OH : The hash function H is viewed as a random oracle for the adversary A
simulated by the simulator S. Upon requesting the hash value of the keyword
Wi, the simulator S randomly tosses a coin ci ∈ {0, 1} such that Pr[ci = 0] = α
where α is determined later. The simulator S also chooses a random value
ai ∈R Zq. Then the simulator S computes the hash value hi as
hi =
ga·ai if ci = 0,gai if ci = 1.
The distribution of {hi} is indistinguishable with a random distribution of G1.
After that, the simulator S returns hi to the adversary A. In addition, the
simulator S maintains a hash list H = {Wi, ci, ai.hi}. If the requested keyword
W is on the list H, the simulator S returns hi directly.
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– OKeyGen: To create a user Ui, the simulator S randomly tosses a coin di ∈ {0, 1}
such that Pr[di = 0] = β where β is determined later. The simulator also
chooses a random value xi ∈ Zq. Then the simulator S computes the secret
key SKi and the public key PKi as follows.
SKi =
unknown if di = 0,xi if di = 1. PKi =
gb·xi if di = 0,gxi if di = 1.
In the case of di = 0, the secret key SKi = b ·xi cannot be computed by and is
unknown to the simulator S since it is computational hard to compute b from
gb. The distribution of {PKi} is indistinguishable with a random distribution
of G1. After that, the simulator S returns PKi to the adversary A. In addition,
the simulator S maintains a user key list K = {Ui, di, SKi,PKi}.
– OCorrupt: Upon requesting the secret key SKi of a created user Ui, the simulator
S searches the user key list K and checks the corresponding di value. If di = 0,
the simulator S aborts since the secret key SKi is unknown to S. Otherwise,
the simulator S returns SKi to the adversary A.
– OTrapdoor: To create a created user Ui’s trapdoor of a keyword Wj, the simulator
S first looks up the hash list H for Wj. If cj = 0, the simulator S simply
aborts. Otherwise, the simulator S computes the trapdoor T = PKaji and







SKi if di = 0,
gxiaj = hxii = H(Wj)
SKi if di = 1.
Although the trapdoor is still able to be simulated in the case of cj = 1∧di = 0
as T = H(Wj)
SKi = hxij = g
a·ajxi , the simulator S still aborts for the simplicity
of this proof. In other words, the probability ε′ of solving the DBDH problem
is greater if the simulator S does not abort in the above case but makes the
proof harder. As long as ε′ is not negligible, it is still acceptable.
At some point, the adversary A outputs a target user set S, a target threshold
value t and two target keyword W0 and W1. The simulator looks up the hash list
H for W0 and W1. If the keyword is not on the list H, the simulator asks the OH
oracle for its hash value and then the keyword is on the list. If the corresponding
values c0 and c1 of the keywords W0 and W1 is equals to 1, the simulator S aborts.
Otherwise, the simulator S randomly picks b ∈ {0, 1} such that cb = 0. If there is
only one c = 0, the simulator S has no choice and the value b is fixed. Then we
have H(Wb) = g
a·ab . Due to the restrictions to the adversary A, at least one user
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Uσ in S has not been corrupted. The simulator S looks up the user key list K for
that user. If the corresponding value dσ = 1, the simulator S aborts. Otherwise,
the simulator S divides the user set S into two sets S0 = {Ui ∈ S | di = 0} and
S1 = {Ui ∈ S | di = 1}. Intuitively, S0 6= ∅ because of the existence of Uσ. After
that, the simulator S sets C1 = gc. Before simulating C2, we first seek how the
genuine ciphertext is computed:
C2 = e(H(W ), Q)

















= e(ga·ab , gb·
∑
Ui∈S0




















After that, the simulator S selects a set D of n − t dummy users with the same
restrictions in the normal construction (i.e. U ∩D = ∅). Similar to C2, the simulator









Finally, the simulator S packs the ciphertext C = (S, t,D,C1, C2, {Kj}Uj∈D) and
sends to the adversary A. Note that the resulted ciphertext C is consistent if and
only if Z = e(g, g)abc.
Eventually, the adversary A outputs a guess b′. If b = b′, it means the ciphertext
is consistent and it is believed that Z = e(g, g)abc. Hence, the simulator S outputs
δ ∈ DDBDH. Otherwise, the simulator S outputs δ ∈ DR.
Lemma 4.1. Let ρ be the probability of the simulator S not aborting. The advan-
tage ε′ of the simulator S solving the DBDH problem is at least ρε
2
, assuming the
probability of δ ∈ DDBDH is 12 and the adversary A wins the IND-T-CKA game
(Fig. 4.1) with the advantage ε.
Proof. We prove this lemma by calculating the probability of the simulator S suc-
ceeding. If δ ∈ DR, the behaviour of the adversary A is unpredictable. Thus, the
simulator A succeeds at least better than a random guess with succeeding prob-
ability of 1
2
. Similarly, if the simulator S aborts, we just have a random guess.
Otherwise, we take the result of the adversary A with the correct probability of
1
2
+ ε. Let ER be the event that the simulator S succeeds with a random guess. We






Pr[S succeeds | δ ∈ DDBDH ] +
1
2
Pr[S succeeds | δ ∈ DR]
≥ 1
2








Pr[S does not abort] · (1
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Lemma 4.2. The simulator S does not abort with the probability ρ at least 1
e2(qC+1)(qT+1)
,
querying OCorrupt for at most qC times and OTrapdoor for at most qT times.
Proof. There are 4 possible points that the simulator S may abort.
1. The simulator S aborts in answering OCorrupt queries if di = 0. The single
abort probability is β. The probability of not aborting for all OCorrupt queries
is Pr[E1] = (1− β)qC .
2. The simulator S aborts in answering OTrapdoor queries if ci = 0. The single
abort probability is α. The probability of not aborting for all OTrapdoor queries
is Pr[E2] = (1− α)qT .
3. The simulator S aborts in the challenge phase if c0 = c1 = 1. The probability
of not aborting for this event is Pr[E3] = 1 − (1 − α)2 = 2α − α2. Since
α ∈ [0, 1], we have
α ≤ 1 =⇒ α2 ≤ α =⇒ 0 ≤ α− α2 =⇒ α ≤ 2α− α2 = Pr[E3].
4. The simulator S aborts in the challenge phase if dδ = 1. The probability of
not aborting for this event is Pr[E4] = β.
Since all the events are independent, we have
ρ = Pr[E1] · Pr[E2] · Pr[E3] · Pr[E4] ≥ α(1− α)qTβ(1− β)qC .
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The function α(1−α)qTβ(1−β)qC is maximised when α = 1
qT+1

































e2(qC + 1)(qT + 1)
.





qT is always true for








ε′ = AdvDBDHS ≥
ε
2e2(qC + 1)(qT + 1)
.
4.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we defined Threshold Broadcast Encryption with Keyword Search
(TBEKS) scheme and its IND-T-CKA security model. We proposed the first TBEKS
scheme and proved it is IND-T-CKA secure, assuming the hardness of the DBDH
problem. In our TBEKS scheme, we consider the server to be honest but curious
and we do not allow the server to collude with the users. It is an open problem to
build a scheme that is secure against a malicious server that may collude with other
users.
Chapter 5
Linear Encryption with Keyword Search
Nowadays an increasing amount of data stored in the public cloud need to be
searched remotely for fast accessing. For the sake of privacy, the remote files are
usually encrypted, which makes them difficult to be searched by remote servers. It
is also harder to efficiently share encrypted data in the cloud than those in plaintext.
In this chapter, we develop a searchable encryption framework called Linear Encryp-
tion with Keyword Search (LEKS) that can semi-generically convert some existing
encryption schemes meeting our Linear Encryption Template (LET) to be search-
able without re-encrypting all the data. For allowing easy data sharing, we con-
vert a Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE) scheme to a Key-Policy
Attribute-Based Encryption with Keyword Search (KP-ABKS) scheme as a concrete
instance of our LEKS framework, making both the encrypted data and the search
functionality under fine-grained access control. Notably, the resulting KP-ABKS is
the first proven secure Attribute-Based Encryption with Keyword Search (ABKS)
scheme with the security of Indistinguishability under Selective-ID Adaptive Chosen
Keyword Attacks (IND-sCKA) in the random oracle model, assuming the hardness
of the Decisional `-Combined Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (`-DCBDH) problem derived
from the Decisional Bilinear (P, f)-Diffie-Hellman ((P, f)-DBDH) problem family.
Parts of this work appeared in [ZYM16].
5.1 Introduction
Cloud computing [MG11] provides on-demand computing resources that are acces-
sible via the Internet, including computing power and data storage. With the con-
venient cloud services, users can outsource their computing resources to the cloud,
and access them through terminals with low computing capabilities, such as mobile
devices. Usually, those terminals also have low network connectivity due to the
transmission technology, signal strength, access cost, and other factors.
In terms of data storage, one important function for cloud data storage is data
search. Since all the user data are stored on the cloud server, users have to send
search queries to the server to search for the data containing certain keywords.
50
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However, the normal search operation for plaintext is no longer working when data
privacy is considered, since all the data are encrypted and cannot be read by the
server.
To perform search on encrypted data, it is impractical for the user to do the
search locally with all the data downloaded from the server, due to the high demand
on the bandwidth. It is also impractical to give the server the user secret key due
to privacy concerns. Thus searchable encryption has been introduced such that the
search operation is performed by the server, but the server cannot get any meaningful
information from the search query or the encrypted data. In searchable encryption,
all the data files and their associated keywords are encrypted. To search for the data
with certain keyword, the user generates a trapdoor for the keyword and enquires
the server with the trapdoor. The server searches the whole database to locate the
data where the encrypted keyword matches the keyword embedded in the trapdoor.
During the searching process, the server only knows whether an encrypted keyword
matches the user trapdoor or not, and nothing else. After that, the server returns
the search result to the user who can download the ciphertexts and decrypt the
data.
In Public-key Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS) [BDCOP04], the data
and the keywords are encrypted for only one user (i.e., the intended receiver of
the data). Hence, only that particular user can do the search and decryption. In
contrast, in Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) [SW05], data can be encrypted with
certain attributes. For instance, Alice can encrypt some data with attributes “full-
time” and “student”. Later, any user can decrypt the resulting ciphertext if the
attributes in the ciphertext match the policy associated with the user. Thus Bob
associated with a policy “(full time AND student) OR staff” can decrypt the above
ciphertext. The corresponding searchable encryption for ABE is named Attribute-
Based Encryption with Keyword Search (ABKS) [SYL+14, ZXA14]. As in ABE,
Alice can now encrypt the data and its associated keywords using certain attributes.
After uploading the ciphertexts to the server, Bob can do the search and decryption
since the attributes used by Alice in the encryption matches Bob’s policy. This
feature is very important in the cloud environment where a user can share data
with multiple users by encrypting the data only once. However, to the best of our
knowledge, no ABKS scheme proposed in the literature is proven secure. Hence,
one of our goals is to construct ABKS schemes with provable security.
In addition, keyword search functionality is usually associated with an encryp-
tion scheme where both the data and the keywords are encrypted for the same
receiver(s). This chapter also aims to provide a universal construction of search-
able encryption schemes from some existing encryption schemes. This enables us to
add a compatible keyword search functionality to an existing cryptosystem without
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re-encrypting all the data.
5.1.1 Related Work
Diffie and Hellman introduced the notion of Public Key Encryption (PKE) [DH76]
where Alice encrypts a message with Bob’s public key, and Bob decrypts the cipher-
text with his secret key. Based on the idea of using the user identity as the public key
[Sha85], Boneh and Franklin proposed a practical Identity-Based Encryption (IBE)
scheme [BF01] where Alice encrypts the message with Bob’s identity. In 2005, Sa-
hai and Waters introduced Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption which can be treated
as the first ABE [SW05], an instance of Functional Encryption (FE) [BSW11]. In
ABE, the decryption keys of the users and the ciphertexts are associated with ac-
cess policies and attributes, respectively. If and only if the attributes match the
policy, the ciphertext can be successfully decrypted. Depending on how the iden-
tity and the ciphertext are associated, ABE schemes are classified into Key-Policy
Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE) [ALdP11, GPSW06, PTMW06, SW05] and
Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) [BSW07]. In KP-ABE,
Bob’s secret key is associated with a policy. After receiving the ciphertext encrypted
with some attributes from Alice, Bob can decrypt it if and only if the attributes
match his policy. In CP-ABE, the ciphertexts are associated with policies, and the
secret keys are associated with attributes.
To enable the search functionality for encrypted data, various searchable en-
cryption schemes [ABC+08, BDCOP04, BW06, HL07, SYL+14, ZXA14] have been
proposed under different settings. Boneh et al. [BDCOP04] introduced Public-key
Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS), which is used with a conventional pub-
lic key encryption scheme. Later, Identity-Based Searchable Encryption (IBKS)
schemes were also proposed [ABC+08, BW06]. Recently, due to the popularity of
ABE, there have been some research works on Attribute-Based Encryption with
Keyword Search (ABKS) [SYL+14, ZXA14]. In addition, there are also keyword
search schemes for other encryption variants, such as Broadcast Encryption (BE)
[AFI06].
To the best of our knowledge, [SYL+14, ZXA14] are the only ABKS schemes
proposed in the literature. However, neither of those schemes is proven secure. In
particular, after analysing the ABKS scheme in [SYL+14], we found the scheme is
flawed (details are given in Appendix A) where a malicious adversary can always
distinguish keywords from a ciphertext. For the Key-Policy Attribute-Based En-
cryption with Keyword Search (KP-ABKS) scheme in [ZXA14], the security proof
is not valid (details are given in Section 5.7.3) and thus the security of this scheme
remains unknown. For the Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption with Key-
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word Search (CP-ABKS) scheme in [ZXA14], no formal security proof has been
provided.
In terms of provable security, it depends on the hardness of some computational
problems (e.g. Discrete Logarithm (DL) problem, Computational Diffie-Hellman
(CDH) problem, Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem [DH76], etc.). Shoup
[Sho97] introduced the generic group model which was used to obtain the complexity
lower bound regarding the hardness of DL, CDH, and DDH problems. Later, in order
to deal with bilinear maps, Boneh et al. [BBG05] introduced the generic bilinear
group model and the general Diffie-Hellman Exponent Problem. Besides, the generic
bilinear group model is also used in [BB07, BBS04] for analysing the Decision Linear
(DLIN) problem and q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) problem.
5.1.2 Our Contribution
In this chapter, we introduce a new problem family named Decisional Bilinear (P, f)-
Diffie-Hellman ((P, f)-DBDH). We prove the (P, f)-DBDH problem is computation-
ally hard in generic bilinear group model if the polynomial f is not dependent on the
polynomial set P . Based on the (P, f)-DBDH problem, we derive a hard computa-
tional problem named Decisional `-Combined Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (`-DCBDH)
problem.
As the main contribution of this work, we introduce two new notions named
Linear Encryption Template (LET) and Linear Encryption with Keyword Search
(LEKS), and provide their formal definitions. LET can model different asymmetric
encryption schemes, including but not limited to PKE schemes, IBE schemes and
ABE schemes, which have the property of linearity. The linearity property requires
a sub-algorithm e(g, g)αs ← D(SK, C1, . . . ) in the decryption algorithm where SK is
the secret key involved, (C1, . . . ) are the ciphertext components and for all t ∈ Zp,
D(SKt, C1, . . . ) = D(SK, C1, . . . )t. Given an encryption fitting LET, we provide a
semi-generic conversion from the encryption scheme to a LEKS scheme where the
construction is generic but we require security proofs for individual conversions.
We also define two security models for LEKS schemes: Indistinguishability under
Selective-ID Adaptive Chosen Keyword Attacks (IND-sCKA) and Indistinguisha-
bility under Adaptive Chosen Keyword Attacks (IND-CKA). With LET and our
conversion from LET to LEKS, we can construct PEKS from PKE, IBKS from IBE,
ABKS from ABE, and so on.
To illustrate the feasibility of our semi-generic framework, we give an instance of
LET and then apply our conversion to produce a LEKS scheme. We first show that
a variant [PTMW06] of Goyal et al.’s ABE scheme [GPSW06] fits LET by proving
it has the property of linearity. Then we apply our LEKS conversion to convert
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the KP-ABE scheme into a KP-ABKS scheme. After that, we prove the resulting
KP-ABKS scheme is IND-sCKA secure in the random oracle model, assuming the
hardness of the `-DCBDH problem. It is worth noting that to the best of our
knowledge, our KP-ABKS scheme converted from the KP-ABE scheme is the first
proven secure KP-ABKS scheme.
5.1.3 Chapter Organisation
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Beginning with Section 5.2, we de-
fine (P, f)-DBDH problem family and `-DCBDH problem, and prove the hardness
of those problems. In Section 5.3, we define LEKS and its security model, followed
by the definition of LET and the LEKS conversion from LET. At a glance, we
show a simple LEKS conversion that converts a PKE scheme to a PEKS scheme in
Section 5.6. After that, an instance of LEKS conversion is given in Section 5.7, con-
verting a KP-ABE scheme to a KP-ABKS scheme. The resulted KP-ABKS scheme
is proven secure in Section 5.7.3 under the security model defined in Section 5.3.2.
Finally, this chapter is summarised in Section 5.8.
5.2 Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem Family
There is a family of Diffie-Hellman problems, which could be used for constructing
our cryptographic schemes.
Definition 5.1. Let P = (p1, . . . , ps) ∈ Fp[X1, . . . , Xn]s be a s-tuples of n-variate
polynomial over Fp. We define that a polynomial f ∈ Fp[X1, . . . , Xn]s is dependent
































where at least one of bk or c is non-zero.
Let gP (x1,...,xn) = (gp1(x1,...,xn), . . . , gps(x1,...,xn)), df denote the total degree of f ∈
Fp[X1, . . . , Xn], and dP = max{df | f ∈ P ∈ Fp[X1, . . . , Xn]s}. We present the
family of Diffie-Hellman problems as follows.
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Definition 5.2 (Decisional Bilinear (P, f)-Diffie-Hellman problem). Let P = (p1,
. . . , ps) ∈ Fp[X1, . . . , Xn]s be a s-tuples of n-variate polynomial over Fp, f ∈ Fp[X1,
. . . , Xn] be a n-variate polynomial over Fp. Let (x1, . . . , xn) be uniformly and in-
dependently chosen from Zp, and Z be uniformly and independently chosen from
G1. Giving two probability distributions Dtarget = (gP (x1,...xn), gf(x1,...xn)) and Drand =







|Pr [1← A(D ∈R Dtarget)]− Pr [1← A(D ∈R Drand)]|
where D ∈R D represents that D is uniformly and independently chosen from D.
Alternatively, the problem can be represented as




∣∣∣∣Pr [b = b′ ← A(gP (x1,...xn), Z0, Z1)]− 12
∣∣∣∣
As from the definition above, Decisional Bilinear (P, f)-Diffie-Hellman ((P, f)-
DBDH) problem family is an enhanced DDH problem on the group G1 where
the adversary A is now able to conduct bilinear pairing operations on G1. The
(P, f)-DBDH problem family is computational hard if and only if the advantage
Adv
(P,f)−DBDH
A is negligible. Since there is no any known proof of the hardness of
this problem family, we show the complexity lower bound in the generic bilinear
group model [BBG05]. As in [BBG05], we emphasise that a lower bound in generic
groups does not imply a lower bound in any specific group.
Theorem 5.1. Let ε1, ε2 : Z+p → {0, 1}m be two random encodings (injective maps)
where G1 = {ε1(x) | x ∈ Z+p }, G2 = {ε2(x) | x ∈ Z+p }. Let d = 2 ·max(dP , df ). If
f is not dependent on P , the lower bound of the advantage Adv(P,f)−DBDH of solving
the (P, f)-Diffie-Hellman problem (Definition 5.2) for the adversary A is stated as
follows with at most q1,×, q2,× queries to the group operation oracles O1×, O2× and qe




(q1,× + q2,× + qe + s+ 2)
2d
2p
Proof. Let S be the simulator that simulates the (P, f)-DBDH problem environment
for the adversary A. The simulator S maintains two polynomial-sized dynamic lists:
L1 = {(pi, ε1,i)}, L2 = {(qi, ε2,i)},
where i = 1 to the size of the list, pi, qi ∈ Fp[X1, . . . Xn, Y0, Y1]. Initially, the
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simulator B uniformly chooses ε1,i ∈R {0, 1}m for each pi ∈ P , and set all s pairs
of (pi, ε1,i) as L1. Then the simulator B sets ps+1 = Y1, ps+2 = Y2, and uniformly
chooses ε1,s+1, ε1,s+2 ∈R {0, 1}m. After adding the pairs (ps+1, ε1,s+1), (ps+2, ε1,s+2)
to the list L1, the two lists are initialised as
L1 = {(pi, ε1,i)}i=1...s+2, L2 = ∅.
Since the simulator B can increase m to increase the hardness of the adversary A
guessing the elements in G1 and G2, we assume that the adversary A can only query
the encoded strings obtained from the simulator B.
At the beginning of the game from Definition 5.2, B sends {ε1,i}i=1...s+2 to the
adversary A as (gP (x1,...xn), Z0, Z1). After that, the simulator B simulates the group
operation oracles O1×, O2× and the bilinear pairing oracle Oe as follows.
– Oϕ×: The group operation involves two operands εϕ,a and εϕ,b. Based on these
operands, the simulator B searches the list Lϕ for the corresponding polynomi-
als pa and pb. Then the simulator B performs a polynomial addition pc = pa+pb
for multiplication or a polynomial subtraction pc = pa−pb for division. If pc is
in the list Lϕ, the simulator B returns the corresponding εϕ,c to the adversary
A. Otherwise, the simulator B uniformly chooses εϕ,c ∈R {0, 1}m, where εϕ,c
is unique among the encoding strings in Lϕ, and appends the pair (pc, εϕ,c)
into the list Lϕ. Finally, the simulator B returns εϕ,c to the adversary A.
– Oe: The bilinear pairing operation involves two operands ε1,a and ε1,b. Based
on these operands, the simulator B searches the list L1 for the corresponding
polynomials pa and pb. Then the simulator B performs a polynomial mul-
tiplication pc = pa · pb. If pc is in the list L2, the simulator B returns the
corresponding ε2,c to the adversary A. Otherwise, the simulator B uniformly
chooses ε2,c ∈R {0, 1}m, where ε2,c is unique among the encoding strings in
L2, and appends the pair (pc, ε2,c) into the list L2. Finally, the simulator B
returns ε2,c to the adversary A.
After querying at most q1,×, q2,×, qe times of corresponding oracles, the adversary A
returns a bit b′. Finally, the simulator B chooses x1, . . . , xn, y ∈R Fp, b ∈R {0, 1},
and sets yb = f(x1, . . . , xn), y1−b = y, Y0 = y0, Y1 = y1, Xi = xi for i = 1, . . . , n.
The simulation of B is perfect if the following statements hold:
∀(pi, ε1,i), (pj, ε1,j) ∈ L1 ∧ i 6= j, pi(x1, . . . xn, y0, y1) 6= pj(x1, . . . xn, y0, y1)
∀(qi, ε2,i), (qj, ε2,j) ∈ L2 ∧ i 6= j, qi(x1, . . . xn, y0, y1) 6= qj(x1, . . . xn, y0, y1)
If the above statements do not hold, the adversary A will find that some encoding
strings are mapped from the same values, and thus deviate B’s simulation from
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the real oracles. Let the event abort be any statement above being false. The
event abort occurs when pi − pj = 0, qi − qj = 0, (pi − pj)(x1, . . . xn, y0, y1) = 0
or (qi − qj)(x1, . . . xn, y0, y1) = 0. Hence, we bound the probability that the event
abort occurs by analysing the following three cases:
1. pi − pj = 0: In this case, the polynomial pi − pj falls into the form of
s∑
k=1
akpk + bY0 + cY1 (5.1)
for some constants ak, b, c ∈ Fp after group operations. Assuming that setting
Yb = f(X1, . . . , Xn) makes pi − pj = 0, we have
∑s
k=1 akpk + b
′Yb = 0 since









kpk, then pi−pj 6=
0. As f is not dependent on P , which is not in the above form, this case never
occurs.





















for some constants ak,l, bu, cv, d, e, f ∈ Fp after group operations and bilinear










′Y 2b = 0 (5.2)


















By contraposition, if f(X1, . . . , Xn) is not in the above form, then qi− qj 6= 0.
As f is not dependent on P , which is not in the above form, this case never
occurs.
3. (pi − pj)(x1, . . . xn, y0, y1) = 0 or (qi − qj)(x1, . . . xn, y0, y1) = 0: Since we have
set Yb = f(X1, . . . , Xn) and proved that it will not make pi − pj = 0 or
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qi− qj = 0 in above two cases, we simplify this case as (pi−pj)(x1, . . . xn, y) =
0 or (qi − qj)(x1, . . . xn, y) = 0. By group operations and bilinear pairing
operations (see Eqs. (5.1) and (5.2)), the maximum total degree of (pi − pj)
and (qi− qj) is d = 2 ·max(dP , df ). Hence, the probability of randomly chosen
X1, . . . , Xn, Y1−b ∈R Fp being the root of pi−pj or qi−qj, as shown in Eqs. (5.1)
and (5.2), is at most d
p





pairs of (pi, pj)
and qi, qj, we have
Pr[abort] ≤ 2 ·
(









If the event abort does not occur, the simulation by B is perfect. Therefore, the
adversary A outputs b′ with random guess with Pr[b = b′ | ¬abort] = 1
2
, since b is
independent from A’s view. Furthermore, we have
Pr[b = b′] ≥ Pr[b = b′ ∧ ¬abort]
Pr[b = b′] = Pr[b = b′ ∧ ¬abort] + Pr[b = b′ ∧ abort]
≤ Pr[b = b′ ∧ ¬abort] + Pr[abort]
=⇒ 0 ≤ Pr[b = b′]− Pr[b = b′ ∧ ¬abort] ≤ Pr[abort]
=⇒ 0 ≤ Pr[b = b′]− Pr[b = b′ | ¬abort] · Pr[¬abort] ≤ Pr[abort]
=⇒ 0 ≤ Pr[b = b′]− 1
2
(1− Pr[abort]) ≤ Pr[abort]
=⇒
∣∣∣∣Pr[b = b′]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 12 Pr[abort]
=⇒ Adv(P,f)−DBDHA =
∣∣∣∣Pr[b = b′]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ (q1,× + q2,× + qe + s+ 2)2d2p
Our schemes are based on a dynamic version of the above (P, f)-DBDH problem.
To describe and show the hardness of the problem, we begin with the following
lemma.
Lemma 5.1. Let P = (p1, . . . , ps), Q = (q1, . . . , qs) ∈ Fp[X1, . . . , Xn]s be two s-tuple
of n-variate polynomials over Fp, f ∈ Fp[X1, . . . , Xn], O = (P,Q) = (p1, . . . , ps,
q1, . . . , qs) be a 2s-tuple of n-variate polynomial. Let T be a variate, R = (P,QT ) =
(p1, . . . , ps, q1T, . . . , qsT ) = (r1, . . . , r2s) be a 2s-tuple of (n + 1)-variate polynomial.
If f is not dependent on O, f is not dependent on R.





j=1 ai,jrirj 6= 0 for any constants ai,j, bk and c that at least one of bk or c is
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non-zero. From the construction of R, we have






































































j=1 ai,jpipj. Since f is not dependent on
O = (P,Q), f is not dependent on P , that is, P 6= 0 where at least one of c or
b1, . . . , bs is non-zero. In this case, if R = 0, we have the non-zero polynomial P
involving an extra variate T , which is not possible. Hence, by contradiction, R 6= 0.




















j=1(ai,j+s + aj+s,i)piqj 6= 0. By observing the polynomial O,














involves an extra variate T . Hence, by contradiction, R 6= 0 in all cases. Thus f is
not dependent on R by definition.
Lemma 5.2. Let P = (p1, . . . , ps), Q = (q1, . . . , qs) ∈ Fp[X1, . . . , Xn]s be two s-tuple
of n-variate polynomials over Fp, f ∈ Fp[X1, . . . , Xn], O = (P,Q) = (p1, . . . , ps,
q1, . . . , qs) be a 2s-tuple of n-variate polynomial. Let T1, . . . , T` be ` variates, R =
(P,QT1, . . . , QT`) = (p1, . . . , ps, q1T1, . . . , qsT1, . . . , q1T`, . . . , qsT`) be an (`+1)s-tuple
of (n+ `)-variate polynomial. If f is not dependent on O, f is not dependent on R.
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Proof. Let R0 = (P,Q, . . . , Q︸ ︷︷ ︸
`
), R1 = (P,QT1, Q, . . . , Q︸ ︷︷ ︸
`−1
), . . . , R` = (P,QT1, . . . ,
QT`) = R. We prove f is not dependent on R by induction.
For the basis n = 0, Rn = R0 is equivalent to O, and thus f is not dependent
on R0.
For the inductive step, it is obvious to obtain the result that f is not dependent
on Rn+1 if f is not dependent on Rn by Lemma 5.1.
Hence, by induction, f is not dependent on R = R`.
Definition 5.3 (Decisional `-Combined Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem). Let a, b, c,
d, e, f1, . . . , f` be uniformly and independently chosen from Zp, h = ge, and Z
be uniformly and independently chosen from G1. Giving two probability distribu-
tions DDCBDH = (g, ga, gb, h, hc, hd, {(gfi , gafi , hfi , hafi)}i=1...`, gabhcd) and Drand =
(g, ga, gb, h, hc, hd, {(gfi , gafi , hfi , hafi)}i=1...`, Z), there is an algorithm A can distin-




|Pr [1← A(D ∈R DDCBDH)]− Pr [1← A(D ∈R Drand)]|
Alternatively, the problem can be represented as




b = b′ ← A
(
g, ga, gb, h, hc, hd,





The `-DCBDH problem belongs to the (P, f)-DBDH problem family. Then we
prove that the `-DCBDH problem is hard by showing the advantage Adv`−DCBDHA is
negligible, using the bilinear group model.
Theorem 5.2. The lower bound of the advantage Adv`−DCBDHA of solving the `-
DCBDH problem (Definition 5.3) for the adversary A is stated as follows with at
most q queries to group operations and bilinear pairing operations.
Adv`−DCBDHA ≤
3 · (q + 4`+ 8)2
p
Proof. Since the `-DCBDH problem belongs to the (P, f)-DBDH problem family,
we rewrite the problem into the problem family by setting
P = (1, a, b, ce, de, e, {(fi, afi, efi, aefi)}i=1...`),
f = ab+ cde.
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Before proving f is not dependent on P , we first prove that f is not dependent on
Q = (q1, . . . , q9) = (1, a, b, ce, de, e, f0, af0, ef0, aef0)
where f0 independently chosen from Zp. Then we prove f is not dependent on P
by Lemma 5.2. Finally, we finish the proof by Theorem 5.1.
To prove f is not dependent on Q, we assume f is dependent on Q that by
definition there exists 111 constants ai,j, bk and c such that









where at least one of bk or c is non-zero. Furthermore, it falls into two cases.
1. c 6= 0: In this case, Q has a term f 2 = (ab + cde)2 = a2b2 + 2abcde + c2d2e2.
Notably, the term c2d2e2 is not involved in qkf or qiqj for any conbination so
that f 2 cannot be canceled to make Q = 0. Hence, Q 6= 0 if c 6= 0.






j=1 ai,jqiqj where at least one bk
is non-zero. Thus Q has at least one term qkf = qk(ab+ cde) = qkab+ qkcde.
Stepping in, we focus on the term qkcde. To cancel out the term qkcde to make
Q = 0, we have to construct qkcde from qk′f or qiqj where k 6= k′.
(a) To construct from qk′f , we have qk′f = qk′(ab + cde) = qk′ab + qk′cde.
There are two possible cases:
i. The first case is qk′ab = qkcde, and thus qk′ = cde and qk = ab.
However, there is no such a pair found in Q.
ii. The second case is q′kcde = qkcde. This case is impossible since
k 6= k′.
Thus it is impossible to construct qkcde from qk′f .
(b) To construct from qiqj, we analyse the elements in qkcde. Since qkcde =
qiqj, the variate c is involved in qk, qi or qj. By observing Q, the only
polynomial in Q containing c is q4 = ce. Thus qkcde = qiq4 and further
implies qkd = qi. Similarly, since qkd = qi, the variate d is involved in qk
or qi. Since the only polynomial in Q containing d is q5 = de, we have
qkd = q5 and further qk = e = q6.
Hence, the only constructible term qkcde is cde
2 where qk = q6 = e. Based on
the above result, the only possible constructible qkf is q6f = e(ab + cde) =
abe + cde2. To cancel out the term q6f to make Q = 0, we have to construct
abe from qk′f or qiqj where k
′ 6= 6, that is, qk′ 6= e.
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(a) To construct from qk′f , we have qk′f = qk′(ab + cde) = qk′ab + qk′cde.
There are two possible cases:
i. The first case is qk′ab = abe and is impossible since qk′ 6= e.
ii. The second case is q′kcde = abe, and thus qk′ =
ab
cd
. However, there is
no such element found in Q.
Thus it is impossible to construct abe from qk′f .
(b) To construct from qiqj, we analyse the elements in abe. Since abe = qiqj,
the variate b is involved in qi or qj. By observing Q, the only polynomial
in Q containing b is q3 = b. Thus abe = qiq3 and further implies qi = ae.
However, there is no such element ae found in Q.
Hence, it is impossible to derive any qkf from qk′f or qiqj where k 6= k′ to
make Q = 0. In conclusion, Q 6= 0 if c = 0.
Combining all the cases above, Q 6= 0 and it violates the assumption we made.
Therefore, by contradiction, f is not dependent on Q.
In the step 2 of this proof, let P ′ = (1, a, b, ce, de, e), Q′ = (f0, af0, ef0, aef0), and
note thatQ = (P ′, Q′). Since f is not dependent onQ, by Lemma 5.2, f is not depen-
dent onR = (P,QT1, . . . , QT`) = (1, a, b, ce, de, e, {(f0Ti, af0Ti, ef0Ti, aef0Ti)}i=1...`).
As f0 and Ti are chosen uniformly and independently, f0Ti is equivalent to f`. There-
fore, P is equivalent to R so that f is not dependent on P .
Finally, we calculate the lower bound of the advantage Adv`−DCBDHA by Theo-
rem 5.1 since f is not dependent on P . By observing P and f , we have s = 6 + 4`,
dP = 3, df = 3, d = 2 ·max(dP , df ) = 6, and the advantage
Adv`−DCBDHA ≤
(q + s+ 2)2d
2p
=
3 · (q + 4`+ 8)2
p
By Theorem 5.2, the `-DCBDH problem is hard as long as ` is in polynomial
size.
5.3 Formal Definitions
In general, a searchable encryption scheme involves three roles and consists of two
encryption parts. In details, the roles are contributor, server and user, and
the encryption parts are the message encryption part and the keyword encryption
part. A general purpose searchable encryption scheme works as follows. Alice,
as a contributor, encrypts a file using the message encryption scheme and the
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keywords related to that file using the keyword encryption part for the target users,
including Bob. Let header denote the keyword ciphertext, and payload denote the
file ciphertext. Since a file may be associated with multiple keywords, Alice may
generate multiple headers for the payload. After that, Alice assembles the headers
and the payload as a single ciphertext, and sends the ciphertext to the server.
Bob, as one of the target user, can ask the server to search the ciphertext with
certain keywords. To carry out secured search, Bob generates a trapdoor for each
keyword to be searched, and then uploads the trapdoors to the server via a secure
communication channel. Once the server receives the query with the trapdoors from
Bob, the server begins to test whether the keywords in the headers match those in
the trapdoors. Note that the keywords are not visible to the server, and the headers
and trapdoors match only when the corresponding keywords are the same and Bob
is one of the intended users that the headers are encrypted for. After searching for
all related ciphertexts, the server allows Bob to download the matching payloads.
Finally, Bob can download the payloads with matching headers. In addition, a
trusted authority is required in the identity or attribute-based setting.
5.3.1 Syntax
Formally, we define Linear Encryption with Keyword Search (LEKS) as follows,
focusing on the keyword encryption part in a general searchable encryption scheme.
Definition 5.4 (Linear Encryption with Keyword Search). A Linear Encryption
with Keyword Search (LEKS) scheme, involving the contributors, the servers, the
users and the trusted authority, consists of the following five probabilistic polynomial
time algorithms:
– (MSK,PK) ← Setup(1λ): The randomised system setup algorithm is run by
the trusted authority. It takes a security parameter 1λ, and outputs a pair of
master secret key MSK and public key PK for the trusted authority. In the
public key scenario where users are identified using public keys generated by
themselves, the trusted authority is not required. Thus this algorithm is run
by individual users, and outputs a pair of secret key SK and public key PK for
the user.
– SK ← KeyGen(MSK, IS): The randomised user key generation algorithm is
run by the trusted authority. It takes a master secret key MSK and a user
identity IS, and generates a user secret key SK for the user associated with
that identity. In the public key scenario where users are identified using public
keys generated by themselves, this algorithm is not used.
CHAPTER 5. LINEAR ENCRYPTION WITH KEYWORD SEARCH 64
– C ← LEKS(PK, IC ,W ): The randomised keyword encryption algorithm is run
by the contributor. It takes a public key PK, a target identity IC and a keyword
W , and outputs a ciphertext C of the keyword W . To maximum the generality,
the target identity IC is viewed as a set that the user IS can access the ciphertext
only if IS is in the target identity IC. For instance, the notation IS ∈ IC is
equivalent to P (IS, IC) = 1 in Predicate Encryption (PE) with the predicate
function P .
– T ← Trapdoor(SK,W ): The randomised trapdoor generation algorithm is run
by the user. It takes a secret key SK and a keyword W , and generates a
trapdoor T of the keyword W .
– 1/0 ← Test(C, T ): The deterministic test algorithm is run by the server. It
takes a ciphertext C ← LEKS(PK, IC ,W ) and a trapdoor T ← Trapdoor(SK,W )
where SK← KeyGen(MSK, IS), and outputs1 if W = W ′ ∧ IS ∈ IC ,0 otherwise.
In addition, the scheme is required to be correct.
Definition 5.5 (Correctness). A LEKS scheme is correct if the following statement
is always true:
∀(MSK,PK)← Setup(1λ), ∀IC , ∀IS ∈ IC , ∀SK← KeyGen(MSK, IS),
∀W ∈ {0, 1}∗, ∀C ← LEKS(PK, IC ,W ), ∀T ← Trapdoor(SK,W ),
Test(C, T ) = 1.
5.3.2 Security Model
In LEKS, we consider that the server is honest but curious. In addition, we do not
consider the Keyword Guessing Attack (KGA), since the server can always generate
ciphertexts with certain keywords to test with the trapdoor legitimately. However,
we can prevent anyone from extracting the keyword directly from the trapdoor by
applying an one-way function such as a preimage-resistant hash function.
We present security under two versions of attacks: Indistinguishability under
Selective-ID Adaptive Chosen Keyword Attacks (IND-sCKA) and Indistinguisha-
bility under Adaptive Chosen Keyword Attacks (IND-CKA). We first define the
IND-sCKA game (Fig. 5.1) where an adaptive adversary A tries to distinguish a
ciphertext generated from keywords either W0 or W1:
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1. The adversary selects a target identity set IT and submits it to the challenger.
2. The challenger runs the Setup(1λ) to generate a pair of master secret key MSK
and public key PK. Then the challenger passes the public key PK to the
adversary A.
3. The adversary can adaptively ask the challenger the secret key SK of the user
with identity I by querying the key generation oracle OKeyGen. At the same
point, the challenger records the queried identity I in the identity list I. The
restriction is that the queried identity I must not be in the target identity set
IT .
4. The adversary can adaptively ask the challenger the trapdoor T of the user
identity I with the keyword W by querying the trapdoor generation oracle
OTrapdoor. If the queried identity I is not in the target identity set IT , it can
be resolved that the adversary queries the oracle OKeyGen to obtain the secret
key SK of the identity I. After that, the adversary obtains the trapdoor T
by running the algorithm Trapdoor using the secret key SK. Otherwise, the
challenger runs the algorithm KeyGen and then the algorithm Trapdoor to get
the trapdoor, and passes it to the adversary. At the same point, the challenger
records the queried keyword W in the keyword list W .
5. At some point, the adversary A outputs two keywords W0 and W1 to be
challenged where those two keywords must not be in the keyword list W .
6. The challenger randomly selects b to be either 0 or 1 uniformly. Then it
generates a ciphertext C ← LEKS(PK, IT ,Wb) and passes it to the adversary.
7. The adversary can continue to query all oracles with the same restriction.
Note that the adversary cannot query the target keywords W0 and W1 to the
oracle OTrapdoor.
8. Eventually, the adversary outputs a bit b′. The adversary wins the game if
b = b′.
We define the advantage of winning the IND-sCKA game (Fig. 5.1) as follows
AdvIND-sCKAA =
∣∣∣∣Pr [b = b′ ∧ I ∩ IT = ∅ ∧W0,W1 /∈ W ]− 12
∣∣∣∣
Definition 5.6 (IND-sCKA Security). A LEKS scheme is Indistinguishable un-
der Selective-ID Adaptive Chosen Keyword Attack (IND-sCKA) if AdvIND-sCKAA is a
negligible function for all adversary A winning the IND-sCKA game (Fig. 5.1) in
polynomial time.






b ∈R {0, 1}
C ← LEKS(PK, IT ,Wb)
b′ ← AOKeyGen,OTrapdoor(C)
OKeyGen
I ← I ∪ {I}
return SK← KeyGen(MSK, I)
OTrapdoor
W ←W ∪ {W}
return T ← Trapdoor(SK,W )
AdvIND-sCKAA =
∣∣∣∣Pr [b = b′ ∧ I ∩ IT = ∅ ∧W0,W1 /∈ W ]− 12
∣∣∣∣





b ∈R {0, 1}
C ← LEKS(PK, IT ,Wb)
b′ ← AOKeyGen,OTrapdoor(C)
OKeyGen
I ← I ∪ {I}
return SK← KeyGen(MSK, I)
OTrapdoor
W ←W ∪ {W}
return T ← Trapdoor(SK,W )
AdvIND-CKAA =
∣∣∣∣Pr [b = b′ ∧ I ∩ IT = ∅ ∧W0,W1 /∈ W ]− 12
∣∣∣∣
Figure 5.2: IND-CKA Game
Next, we define the IND-CKA game (Fig. 5.2), which is similar as the IND-
sCKA game Fig. 5.1. The difference between IND-sCKA and IND-CKA is that
the adversary is given the public key PK in IND-CKA before submitting the target
identity set IT . Similarly, we define the IND-CKA security for LEKS schemes.
Definition 5.7 (IND-CKA Security). A LEKS scheme is Indistinguishable under
Adaptive Chosen Keyword Attack (IND-CKA) if AdvIND-CKAA is a negligible function
for all adversary A winning the IND-CKA game (Fig. 5.2) in polynomial time.
5.4 Linear Encryption Template
In this section, we define the Linear Encryption Template (LET). Informally, a LET
models an asymmetric encryption scheme, consisting of the senders, the recipients
and the trusted authority. In LET, Alice, as the recipient, gets her secret key
from the trusted authority using her identity where her identity is her public key.
If LET is modelling a PKE scheme, Alice’s secret/public key pair is generated by
herself. Thus the trusted authority is not required. To securely send a message
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to a set of recipients, including Alice, Bob, as the sender, encrypts the message
into a ciphertext, and sends it to Alice. Once Alice receives the ciphertext, she can
decrypts and obtains the original message if and only if she is one of the target
recipients. Furthermore, if an encryption scheme fits in the LET, we can use it
to construct the corresponding LEKS in Section 5.5. Formally, we describe the
definition of LET as follows.
Definition 5.8 (Linear Encryption Template). A Linear Encryption Template (LET),
involving the senders, the recipients, and the trusted authority, consists of the fol-
lowing four probabilistic polynomial algorithms:
– (MSK,PK) ← Setup(param, α): The randomised system setup is run by the
trusted authority. It takes a set of system parameters, such as the description
of groups, security parameters and randomnesses, and it reuses these param-
eters. The algorithm also takes a component α, which is used to create the
ciphertext. The output of this algorithm is a pair of master secret key MSK
and public key PK of the trusted authority. If there is no trusted authority that
users generate their key pairs by themselves, this algorithm is run by the user,
and outputs a pair of user secret key SK and public key SK.
– SK ← KeyGen(MSK, IS): The randomised user key generation algorithm is
run by the trusted authority. It takes a master secret key MSK and a user
identity IS, and generates a user secret key SK for the user associated with
that identity. If there is no trusted authority that users generate their key
pairs by themselves, this algorithm is not used.
– C ← Encrypt(PK, IC ,M, s): The randomised encryption algorithm is run by
the sender. It takes a public key PK, a target identity set IC, a message M
and a randomness s, and outputs a ciphertext C of the message M . The
randomness s is used to bind the ciphertext parts in C and further to bind
other ciphertext parts when constructing LEKS schemes. It is required that the
ciphertext must be in the form of C = (C0, C1, . . . ) where C0 = M · e(g, g)αs.
– M ← Decrypt(SK,C): The deterministic decryption algorithm is run by the
recipient. It takes a secret key SK and a ciphertext C, and outputs the original
message M . The decryption process is required to be two steps. The first step
is to run the sub-decryption algorithm D to get e(g, g)αs ← D(SK, C1, . . . ).
Then the second step is to extract the message M = C0
e(g,g)αs
. Importantly, the
sub algorithm D is required to have linearity:
∀t ∈ Zp, D(SKt, C1, . . . ) = D(SK, C1, . . . )t
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2, . . . ).
In addition, the scheme is required to be correct.
Definition 5.9 (Correctness). A LET scheme is correct if the following statement
is always true:
∀(MSK,PK)← Setup(param, α), ∀IC , ∀IS ∈ IC , ∀SK← KeyGen(MSK, IS),
∀M ∈ G2, ∀s ∈ Zp, ∀C ← Encrypt(PK, IC ,M, s), Decrypt(SK, C) = M.
5.5 Generic Construction from Linear Encryption
Template
In this section, we build our LEKS scheme with from a LET scheme as the keyword
encryption part. To construct a fully searchable encryption scheme, we can reuse
the LET scheme as the message encryption part, and combine with the LEKS.
Alternatively, we also can use other encryption schemes as the message encryption
part. The main idea of the construction is to use the LET part for authentication
and combine it with a keyword equality test with the same randomness.
Let Π = (Setup,KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt) be a LET modelled encryption scheme.
Our LEKS scheme works as follows.
– (MSK,PK) ← Setup(1λ): Given a security parameter 1λ, the algorithm gen-
erates two groups G1, G2 of prime order p, and specifies a bilinear map
e : G1×G1 → G2. the algorithm also selects a random generator g of the group
G1, and a preimage resistant hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G1, which may be
modelled as an random oracle. After that, the algorithm randomly chooses
two randomness x1, x2 ∈R Zp, and calculates g1 = gx1 and g2 = gx2 . Then
the algorithm packs all above elements into param, sets α = x1x2, and passes
to the algorithm Π.Setup to obtain the key pair Π.MSK and Π.PK. Finally,
the algorithm keeps the master secret key MSK = Π.MSK, and publishes the
public key PK = (G1,G2, e, g, g1, g2,Π.PK).
G1 = 〈g〉, e : G1 ×G1 → G2, H : {0, 1}∗ → G1,
x1, x2 ∈R Z+p , g1 = gx1 , g2 = gx2 ,
param = (G1,G2, e, g,H, x1, x2),
(Π.MSK,Π.PK)← Π.Setup(param, x1x2)
return (MSK,PK) = (Π.MSK, (G1,G2, e, g, g1, g2, H,Π.PK)).
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– SK ← KeyGen(MSK, IS): For key generation, the algorithm Π.KeyGen is di-
rectly invoked. Note that MSK = Π.MSK.
return SK← Π.KeyGen(MSK, IS).
– C ← LEKS(PK, IC ,W ): To encrypt a keyword W for a target identity set IC ,
the algorithm randomly chooses two randomness r1, r2 ∈R Zp. Then it com-
putes C ′1 = g
r2
2 H(W )
r1 and C ′2 = g
r1
1 to encrypt the keyword W . After that,
the algorithm invokes Π.Encrypt with the randomness r2 to get the ciphertext
(C0, C1, . . . ) to assure the target identity set IC . Finally, the algorithm as-
sembles two parts together C = (C ′1, C
′
2, C1, . . . ) as the full ciphertext bound
using r2 where C0 = M · e(g, g)x1x2r2 is dropped. Since C0 is not used in C,
we can safely setting the message M to 0 when invoking Π.Encrypt.
r1, r2 ∈R Z+p , C ′1 = g
r2
2 H(W )
r1 , C ′2 = g
r1
1
(C0, C1, . . . )← Π.Encrypt(PK, IC , 0, r2)
return C = (C ′1, C
′
2, C1, . . . ).
– T ← Trapdoor(SK,W ): To generate a trapdoor of the keyword W , the al-
gorithm randomly selects a randomness s ∈R Z+p . Then it calculates T =
(T1, T2, T3) where T1 = g
s
1, T2 = H(W )
s and T3 = SK
s. For SKs, the operation
works the same as in Definition 5.8.
s ∈R Z+p , T1 = gs1, T2 = H(W )s, T3 = SKs
return T = (T1, T2, T3).
– 1/0← Test(C, T ): For equality test of both the keyword and the identity, the
algorithm tests the equality of the following return statement.




= Π.D(T3, C1, . . . ).
We verify that our LEKS conversion is correct.
Theorem 5.3. The proposed conversion from the LET scheme to the LEKS scheme
is correct if the corresponding encryption scheme modelled by the LET scheme is
correct.
Proof. The correctness is verified as follows. First, we calculate the left hand side
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1) · e(H(W )r1 , gs1)




Then we calculate the right hand side of the test equation.
E2 = Π.D(T3, C1, . . . )
= Π.D(SKs, C1, . . . )




As E1 = E2, the correctness is proved.
However, we are uncertain for the security of the above construction, since some
components are shared outside the encryption Π that may break the security of Π
in its original model. Therefore, we require an individual security proof for each
conversion to ensure the security. For this reason, we provide the related security
proof for each conversion in the following sections.
5.6 Public-Key Encryption with Keyword Search
In this section, we show a simple instance of our LEKS conversion that we convert a
PKE scheme into a PEKS scheme. Af first, we propose a simple variant of ElGamal
encryption [ElG85]. Then we convert it into a LEKS scheme by the method in
Section 5.5. Finally, we prove the resulted LEKS scheme is IND-CKA secure in
random oracle model.
5.6.1 Base Scheme
In this variant of ElGamal Encryption scheme, users generates their key pairs by
themselves so that there is no trusted authority. Thus the algorithm KeyGen in LET
is not used. The encryption scheme works as follows, modelled by LET.
– (SK,PK) ← Setup(param, α): The key generation algorithm reuses the pa-
rameters param and sets gα as the secret key. It also publish the public key
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PK = e(g, g)α.
return (SK,PK) = (gα, e(g, g)α).
– C ← Encrypt(PK,M, t): Since there is no second level of the identity, the target
identity set IC is not used. Instead, the public key PK is used as the target
identity. As the same as ElGamal encryption, the ciphertext is computed as
C = (C0, C1) where C0 = M · PKt = M · e(g, g)αt and C1 = gt, reusing the
randomness t from the upper level.
return C = (C0, C1) = (M · e(g, g)αt, gt).
– M ← Decrypt(SK, C): To decrypt, the algorithm computes M = C0
e(SK,C1)
where D(SK, C1) = e(SK, C1). Notably, the sub-algorithm D has linearity
that
∀s ∈ Zp, D(SKs, C1) = e(SKs, C1) = e(SK, C1)s = D(SK, C1)s
We show that this variant is correct.






M · e(g, g)αt
e(gα, gt)
=
M · e(g, g)αt
e(g, g)αt
= M,
we have proved the correctness.
5.6.2 Construction from the Base Scheme
In this subsection, we apply the LEKS conversion as follows with some key notes.
– (SK,PK) ← Setup(1λ): The public key of LET is e(g, g)x1x2 , which can be
calculated by e(gx1 , gx2) = e(g1, g2). Thus this element is removed for optimi-
sation.
G1 = 〈g〉, e : G1 ×G1 → G2, H : {0, 1}∗ → G1,
x1, x2 ∈R Zp, g1 = gx1 , g2 = gx2 ,
SK = gx1x2 , PK = (G1,G2, e, g, g1, g2, H)
return (SK,PK).
– C ← LEKS(PK,W ):
r1, r2 ∈R Zp, C1 = gr22 H(W )r1 , C2 = gr11 , C3 = gr2
return C = (C1, C2, C3).
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– T ← Trapdoor(SK,W ):
s ∈R Zp, T1 = gs1, T2 = H(W )s, T3 = gx1x2s
return T = (T1, T2, T3).
– 1/0 ← Test(C, T ): Original, the converted equation is e(C1, T1)/e(C2, T2)
?
=




= e(C2, T2) · e(C3, T3).
5.6.3 Security Proof
Theorem 5.5. The proposed PEKS scheme is IND-CKA (Definition 5.7) secure.
If an adversary A can win the IND-CKA game (Fig. 5.2) with the advantage ε,
an algorithm S can be constructed to solve `-DCBDH problem (Definition 5.3) in
polynomial time the advantage ε′ ≥ ε
2e(q+2)
, querying OTrapdoor for at most ` times.
Proof. Let δ = (g, ga, gb, h, hc, hd, {(gfi , gafi , hfi , hafi)}i=1...`, Z) be an `-DCBDH in-
stance (Definition 5.3) to be challenged to the simulator S for distinguishing that
δ ∈ DDCBDH or δ ∈ Drand. Note that the simulator S does not make use of all
tree elements in the tuple (gfi , gafi , hfi , hafi). Instead, only (hfi , hafi) is used. In
other words, the proposed PEKS can be reduced to a weaker version of `-DCBDH
assumption. In addition, the simulator S gets two groups G1, G2 with a bilinear
map e from the instance δ. The simulator S sets g1 = h, g2 = ga, and passes
PK = (G1,G2, e, g, g1, g2) to the adversary A. Besides that, the simulator S simu-
lates the following two oracles.
– OH : The hash function H is viewed as a random oracle. Upon requesting
the hash value of the keyword Wi, the simulator S randomly tosses a coin
ci ∈R {0, 1} such that Pr[ci = 0] = α where the value of α is determined later.
The simulator S also randomly chooses ai ∈R Z+p , and computes the hash
value
hi =
hchai if ci = 0hai if ci = 1
Due to the randomness ai, the distribution of {hi} is indistinguishable with
a random distribution of G1. Finally, the simulator S returns the hash value
hi to the adversary A. At the same time, the simulator S maintains hash list
H = {Wi, ci, ai, hi}. If the requested keyword Wi is already in the list H, the
simulator S returns the corresponding hi to the adversary A.
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– OTrapdoor: To generate a trapdoor for the keyword Wi, the simulator S invokes
OH with the keyword Wi. If the corresponding ci = 0, the simulator S aborts.
Otherwise, the simulator S obtains hi = hai from the list H. Then the sim-
ulator S gets a tuple (hfq , hafq) from the instance δ for the q-th query. After
that, the simulator S computes the trapdoor T = (T1, T2, T3). Let fq be the





T2 = H(W )
s = (hai)fq = (hfq)ai
T3 = g
x1x2s = gx2s1 = h
afq .
Finally, the simulator S returns T to the adversary A.
Since the PEKS scheme does not have a KeyGen algorithm, the oracle OKeyGen is not
provided, and the target identity set IT is not required.
At some point, the adversary A outputs two target keywords W0 and W1. Then
the simulator S invokes OH for the hash value of W0 and W1. If the corresponding
c0, c1 to the keywords W0 and W1 is equal to 1, the simulator S aborts. Otherwise,
the simulator S randomly selects b ∈R {0, 1} such that cb = 0. In other words,
the simulator S always has H(Wb) = hchai . Before computing the ciphertext C =
(C1, C2, C3), we observe the genuine LEKS algorithm. Let (d, b) be the randomnesses











The simulator S replaces gabhcd with Z in the instance δ:
C1 = Z · (hd)ai , C2 = hd, C3 = gb.
The resulted ciphertext C is consistent only if Z = gabhcd. After received the ci-
phertext C from the simulator S, the adversary A can continue to query all the
oracles as before with defined restrictions in IND-CKA game. Eventually, the ad-
versary A outputs a bit b′. If b = b′, the ciphertext C is believed consistent that
Z = gabhcd, and the simulator S outputs δ ∈ DDCBDH. Otherwise, the simulator S
outputs δ ∈ Drand.
Lemma 5.3. Let ρ be the probability that the simulator S does not abort. Assuming
the probability of δ ∈ DDCBDH is 12 and the advantage of the adversary A winning
the IND-CKA game (Fig. 5.2) is ε, the advantage ε′ of the simulator S solving the
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`-DCBDH problem is at least ρε
2
.
Proof. Let Es be the event that the simulator S successfully solves the `-DCBDH




+ ε, Ea be the event that S aborts, and Er be the event that S
solves the problem with random guess that Pr[Er] =
1
2
. If δ ∈ Drand, the behaviour
of the adversary A is unpredictable. Therefore, the adversary A wins the IND-CKA
game (Fig. 5.2) better than a random guess that Pr[Ew] ≥ Pr[Er]. Thus we have




Pr[Es | δ ∈ DDCBDH] +
1
2
Pr[Es | δ ∈ Drand]
≥ 1
2































Lemma 5.4. The probability ρ that the simulator S does not abort is at least 1
e(q+2)
with q times of OTrapdoor queries.
Proof. There are two possible points that the simulator S may abort.
1. The simulator S aborts in answering OTrapdoor if ci = 0. The probability Pr[E1]
of S not aborting is Pr[E1] = (1− α)q.
2. The simulator S aborts in the challenge phase if c0 = c1 = 1. The probability
Pr[E2] of S not aborting if Pr[E2] = 1− (1− α)2 = α(1− α).
Since all events are independent, we have
ρ = Pr[E1] · Pr[E2] = (1− α)q · α(1− α) = α(1− α)q+1.
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The value of ρ is maximised when α = 1
q+2
























5.7 Key-Policy Attribute-Based Keyword Search
In this section, we show a useful instance of our LEKS conversion by converting
a Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE) into a Key-Policy Attribute-
Based Encryption with Keyword Search (KP-ABKS) scheme. We starts with a
KP-ABE scheme [PTMW06] which is a variant of Goyal et al.’s scheme [GPSW06]
while the function T defined in [GPSW06] is replaced with a random oracle. Then
we convert it into a KP-ABKS scheme by the method in Section 5.5. Finally, we
prove the resulted KP-ABKS scheme is IND-sCKA secure in random oracle model.
5.7.1 Base Scheme
The variant scheme [PTMW06] of Goyal et al.’s scheme [GPSW06] modelled by
LET works as follows.
– (MSK,PK) ← Setup(param, α): The key generation algorithm reuses the pa-
rameters param, g1 = g
x1 , and g2 = g
x2 . Then master secret key is y = x1.
Since the function T is replaced with a random oracle, the algorithm is re-
quired to choose a cryptographic hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G1.
return (MSK,PK) = (x1, (g1, g2, H)).
– SK ← KeyGen(MSK, IS): In KP-ABE, the user identity set IS is the policy
modelled as an access tree T (details can be found in [GPSW06]). The al-
gorithm chooses a random polynomial qx for each non-leaf node x ∈ T in a
top-down manner. For each non-leaf node x, the degree dx of the polynomial
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qx is dx = kx − 1 where kx is the threshold value of that node. For the root
node, the algorithm sets qroot(0) = x1. For other nodes, the algorithm sets
qx(0) = qparent(x)(index(x)). With polynomials for the access tree T is decided,
the algorithm generates the secret key components for the user. For each leaf







return SK = (T , {(Dx, Rx)}x∈leaves(T )).
– C ← Encrypt(PK, IC ,M, t): In KP-ABE, the target identity set IC is the
attributes γ. To encrypt, the algorithm calculates C0 = M · e(g1, g2)t, C1 =
gt, C2 = γ. For each attribute attri ∈ γ, the algorithm computes Ci =
H(attri)
t. As required by LET, we note that C0 = M ·e(g1, g2)t = e(gx1 , gx2)t =
e(g, g)x1x2t = e(g, g)αt. Return C = (C0, C1, C2, {Ci}attri∈γ).
– M ← Decrypt(SK, C): At first, the algorithm checks whether T (γ) = 1 or
not. If the attributes do not match the policy that T (γ) = 0, the algorithms
returns ⊥. Otherwise, the algorithm proceeds the sub-algorithm D as follows.
For those matching attributes attri = attr(x), where attri ∈ γ and leaf node












Then the algorithm can decrypt the non-leaf node x ∈ T by using polynomial


















Since T (γ) = 1, the algorithm can decrypt the root node that
Froot = e(g, g2)
t·qx(0) = e(g, g2)
x1t = e(g, g)x1x2t = e(g, g)αt
The algorithm sets Froot as the output of sub-algorithm D. Finally, the algo-
rithm computes the message M = C0/Froot and return M .
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As shown above, the correctness has been shown in the description of the decryption
algorithm.
Theorem 5.6 (Correctness). The above KP-ABE scheme is correct.
We also show that the above scheme has the linearity property required by LET.
Theorem 5.7 (Linearity). The sub-algorithm D has linearity that
∀s ∈ Zp,D(SKs, C1, C2, {Ci}attri∈γ) = D(SK, C1, C2, {Ci}attri∈γ)s









= F sx .















Thus F ′root = F
s
root.
5.7.2 Construction from the Base Scheme
In this subsection, we apply the LEKS conversion as follows with some key notes.
– (MSK,PK) ← Setup(1λ): Although the hash functions in the LEKS scheme
and the KP-ABE scheme have the same domain and the same codomain,
those hash functions cannot be merged since they will be programmed into
two different random oracles.
G1 = 〈g〉, e : G1 ×G1 → G2, H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1, H2 : {0, 1}∗ → G1,
x1, x2 ∈R Zp, g1 = gx1 , g2 = gx2 ,
SK = x1, PK = (G1,G2, e, g, g1, g2, H1, H2)
return (SK,PK).
– SK← KeyGen(MSK, IS): The key generation algorithm is exactly the same as
in the KP-ABE scheme.
∀x ∈ leaves(T ), rx ∈R Zp, Dx = gqx(0)2 H2(attr(x))rx , Rx = grx
return SK = (T , {(Dx, Rx)}x∈leaves(T )).
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– C ← LEKS(PK, IC ,W ):
r1, r2 ∈R Zp, C1 = gr22 H1(W )r1 , C2 = gr11 , C3 = gr2 ,
∀attri ∈ γ, Ci = H2(attri)r2
return C = (C1, C2, C3, γ, {Ci}attri∈γ).
– T ← Trapdoor(SK,W ):
s ∈R Z+p , T1 = gs1, T2 = H1(W )s,
∀x ∈ leaves(T ), Tx,1 = Dsx, Tx,2 = Rsx
return T = (T1, T2, T , {(Tx,1, Tx,2)}x∈leaves(T )).
– 1/0← Test(C, T ): The algorithm follows the decryption algorithm in the KP-
ABE scheme. It checks whether T (γ) = 1 or not. If T (γ) = 0, the algorithm
returns ⊥. Otherwise, it continue to compute as in the decryption algorithm.




For non-leaf node, it computes exactly the same as in the decryption algorithm
using polynomial interpolation. Eventually, the algorithm computes Froot and
returns e(C1, T1)
?
= e(C2, T2) · Froot.
5.7.3 Security Proof
The above converted KP-ABKS scheme is similar to Zheng et al.’s KP-ABKS scheme
[ZXA14]. The only difference between two schemes is that they use g2g
b·H(W ) as the
hash function for the attributes while we use H2 : {0, 1}∗ → G1.
However, there are some issues in the security proof given in [ZXA14]. Before the
simulation provided by the challenger, the adversary selects a target set of attributes
Attr∗. In the simulation, the adversary is allowed to query the token generation ora-
cle OTokenGen(T,W ) with any keyword W other than the target keywords w0, w1 and
any policy T that F (Attr∗, T ) = 1 (i.e. T accepts Attr∗). Stepping into the oracle
OTokenGen(T,W ), the challenger always runs the key generation oracle OKeyGen(T ) to
get the secret key sk, and then uses it to generate the requested trapdoor. Since the
oracle OKeyGen(T ) always aborts when F (Attr∗, T ) = 1, the oracle OTokenGen(T,W )
always aborts when the adversary does the queries mentioned above. This ren-
ders the proof invalid and thus the security of Zheng et al.’s KP-ABKS scheme is
unknown.
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We prove our KP-ABKS is secure under the `-DCBDH assumption instead of
the standard DLIN assumption.
Theorem 5.8. The proposed KP-ABKS scheme is IND-sCKA (Definition 5.6) se-
cure. If an adversary A can win the IND-sCKA game (Fig. 5.1) with the advantage
ε, an algorithm S can be constructed to solve `-DCBDH problem (Definition 5.3)
in polynomial time with the advantage ε′ ≥ ε
2e(q+2)
, querying OTrapdoor for at most q
times where q ≤ `.
Proof. Let δ = (g, ga, gb, h, hc, hd, {(gfi , gafi , hfi , hafi)}i=1...`, Z) be an `-DCBDH in-
stance (Definition 5.3) to be challenged to the simulator S for distinguishing that
δ ∈ DDCBDH or δ ∈ Drand. The simulator S gets two groups G1, G2 with a bilinear
map e from the instance δ, and sets g1 = h, g2 = g
a. Before the simulator passes
PK = (G1,G2, e, g, g1, g2, H1, H2) to the adversary A, it receives a target attribute
set Γ from the adversary A. Besides that, the simulator S simulates the following
four oracles.
– OH1 : The hash function H1 is viewed as a random oracle. Upon requesting the
hash value of a keywordWi, the simulator S randomly tosses a coin ci ∈R {0, 1}
such that Pr[ci = 0] = α where the value of α is determined later. The
simulator S also randomly chooses ai ∈R Z+p , and computes the hash value
hi =
hchai if ci = 0hai if ci = 1
Due to the randomness ai, the distribution of {hi} is indistinguishable from
a random distribution of G1. Finally, the simulator S returns the hash value
hi to the adversary A. At the same time, the simulator S maintains hash list
H = {Wi, ci, ai, hi}. If the requested keyword Wi is already in the list H1, the
simulator S returns the corresponding hi to the adversary A directly.
– OH2 : The hash function H2 is viewed as a random oracle. Upon requesting the
hash value of an attribute attri, the simulator S randomly chooses ui, vi ∈R Zp,
and computes the hash value
h′i =
gvi if attri ∈ Γgui2 gvi if attri /∈ Γ
For attri ∈ Γ, the hash value can be viewed as h′i = g
ui
2 g
vi where ui = 0. Due
to the randomness ui and vi, the distribution of {h′i} is indistinguishable from
a random distribution of G1. Finally, the simulator S returns the hash value
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h′i to the adversary A. At the same time, the simulator S maintains hash list
H2 = {attri, ui, vi, h′i}. If the requested attribute attri is already in the list H2,
the simulator S returns the corresponding h′i to the adversary A directly.
– OKeyGen: Upon requesting the secret key of the identity with the access tree
T , the simulator S checks whether T (Γ) = 1. If T (Γ) = 1, the simulator S
aborts since the adversary A is not allowed to do so. Otherwise, the simulator
S prepares the following two procedures:
> PolySat(Tx, γ, λx): This procedure is to set up polynomials for the access
tree Tx with the secret λx where Tx(γ) = 1. As the same as the KeyGen
algorithm, the simulator S sets qx(0) = λx and randomly chooses other
kx − 1 coefficients to complete the polynomial where kx is the threshold
value for that node. To set up polynomials for each child node z of the
node x, the simulator calls PolySat(Tz, γ, qx(index(z))).
> PolyUnsat(Tx, γ, gλx): This procedure is to set up polynomial for the ac-
cess tree Tx with the element gλx where Tx(γ) = 0 and λx is unknown.
The simulator S implicitly defines the polynomial qx of degree dx by
defining gqx . At first, the simulator S sets gqx(0) = gλx . To complete the
definition of the polynomial qx, dx more points are required. For the child
node z of the node x that Tz(γ) = 1, the simulator S randomly chooses
λz ∈R Zp and sets qx(index(z)) = λz. Let hx be the total number of the
child node z that Tz(γ) = 1. Since Tx(γ) = 0, we have hx ≤ dx. Then the
simulator S randomly chooses dx−hx points to complete the polynomial
qx. Finally, the simulator can compute g
qx(index(z)) for any child node z by
polynomial interpolation. To set up polynomials for each child node z of
the node x, the simulator calls PolySat(Tz, γ, qx(index(z))) if Tz(γ) = 1,
and PolyUnsat(Tz, γ, gqx(index(z))) if Tz(γ) = 0.
The simulator S calls the procedure PolyUnsat(T ,Γ, h). For each leaf node x
of T , the simulator S gets qx(0) if attr(x) ∈ Γ, or gqx(0) if attr(x) /∈ Γ. Finally,
the simulator S computes the secret value for each leaf node x:








> If attr(x) /∈ Γ, the simulator S queries OH2 for the entry (attri, ui, vi, h′i)
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From above expansion, we can find that the value pair (Dx, Rx) is valid
where the randomness is rx − qx(0)ui instead of rx.
– OTrapdoor: Since the adversary A can always query OKeyGen for the secret key
of T , which T (Γ) = 0, and invoke the real Trapdoor algorithm to generate
trapdoors, we assume that the adversary A only ask the oracle OTrapdoor when
T (Γ) = 1. To generate a trapdoor for the keyword Wi, the simulator S invokes
OH1 with the keyword Wi. If the corresponding ci = 0, the simulator S
aborts. Otherwise, the simulator S obtains hi = hai from the list H1. Then
the simulator S gets a tuple (gfq , gafq , hfq , hafq) from the instance δ for the
q-th query where q ≤ `. After that, the simulator S computes the trapdoor
T . Since the trapdoor generation requires the secret key part, we first review
the real key generation algorithm KeyGen.








The components qx(0) are the shares of the secret key x1 that qroot(0) = x1.
However, the simulator S cannot computes those shares since S does not know
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x1 (recall that g1 = g
x1 = h). Instead, the simulator S calls the procedure
PolySat(T ,Γ, 1) to get the shares q′x(0) where q′root(0) = 1. Due to the linear
property, we have x1q
′
x(0) = qx(0). Let fq be the randomness s used in the
algorithm Trapdoor. The simulator S queriesOH2 for the entry (attri, ui, vi, h′i)





T2 = H1(W )
s = (hai)fq = (hfq)ai













































Finally, the simulator S returns T = (T1, T2, T , {(Tx,1, Tx,2)}x∈leaves(T )) to the
adversary A.
At some point, the adversary A outputs two target keywords W0 and W1. Then
the simulator S invokes OH1 for the hash value of W0 and W1. If the corresponding
c0, c1 to the keywords W0 and W1 is equal to 1, the simulator S aborts. Otherwise,
the simulator S randomly selects b ∈R {0, 1} such that cb = 0. In other words,
the simulator S always has H(Wb) = hchai . Before computing the ciphertext C =
(C1, C2, C3), we observe the genuine LEKS algorithm. Let (d, b) be the randomnesses











∀attri ∈ Γ, Ci = H2(attri)r2 = (gvi)b = (gb)vi
CHAPTER 5. LINEAR ENCRYPTION WITH KEYWORD SEARCH 83
The simulator S replaces gabhcd with Z in the instance δ: C1 = Z · (hd)ai . The
resulted ciphertext C is consistent if and only if Z = gabhcd. After received the
ciphertext C from the simulator S, the adversary A can continue to query all the
oracles as before with defined restrictions in IND-sCKA game. Eventually, the
adversary A outputs a bit b′. If b = b′, the ciphertext C is believed consistent that
Z = gabhcd, and the simulator S outputs δ ∈ DDCBDH. Otherwise, the simulator S
outputs δ ∈ Drand.
Lemma 5.5. Let ρ be the probability that the simulator S does not abort. Assuming
the probability of δ ∈ DDCBDH is 12 and the advantage of the adversary A winning
the IND-sCKA game (Fig. 5.1) is ε, the advantage ε′ of the simulator S solving the
`-DCBDH problem is at least ρε
2
.
Proof. Let Es be the event that the simulator S successfully solves the `-DCBDH
problem, Ew be the event that the adversary A wins in the IND-sCKA game
(Fig. 5.1) that Pr[Ew] =
1
2
+ ε, Ea be the event that S aborts, and Er be the
event that S solves the problem with random guess that Pr[Er] = 12 . If δ ∈ Drand,
the behaviour of the adversary A is unpredictable. Therefore, the adversary A wins
the IND-sCKA game (Fig. 5.1) better than a random guess that Pr[Ew] ≥ Pr[Er].




Pr[Es | δ ∈ DDCBDH] +
1
2
Pr[Es | δ ∈ Drand]
≥ 1
2































Lemma 5.6. The probability ρ that the simulator S does not abort is at least 1
e(q+2)
with q times of OTrapdoor queries.
Proof. There are two possible points that the simulator S may abort.
1. The simulator S aborts in answering OTrapdoor if ci = 0. The probability Pr[E1]
of S not aborting is Pr[E1] = (1− α)q.
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2. The simulator S aborts in the challenge phase if c0 = c1 = 1. The probability
Pr[E2] of S not aborting if Pr[E2] = 1− (1− α)2 = α(1− α).
Since all events are independent, we have
ρ = Pr[E1] · Pr[E2] = (1− α)q · α(1− α) = α(1− α)q+1.
The value of ρ is maximised when α = 1
q+2

























In this chapter, we introduced a Decisional Bilinear (P, f)-Diffie-Hellman problem
family and demonstrated its hardness under the generic bilinear group model. We
also derived a hard computational problem named Decisional `-Combined Bilinear
Diffie-Hellman problem from the (P, f)-DBDH problem family. As the main contri-
bution of this chapter, we proposed Linear Encryption with Keyword Search and its
security model, and defined Linear Encryption Template which can be used to con-
vert encryption schemes into the corresponding LEKS schemes. To show concrete
instances of our LEKS conversion framework, we converted a PKE scheme into a
PEKS scheme, a KP-ABE scheme into a KP-ABKS scheme and proved their security
in the random oracle model, assuming the hardness of the `-DCBDH problem.
Our future work will be finding more LET-compatible encryption schemes, con-





Achieving IND-CCA Security for
Functional Encryption for Inner Products
Functional Encryption (FE) allows the authorised parties to reveal partial infor-
mation of the plaintext hidden in a ciphertext while in conventional encryption
decryption is all-or-nothing. Focusing on the functionality of inner product eval-
uation (i.e. given vectors ~x and ~y, calculate 〈~x, ~y〉), Abdalla et al. [ABDCP15]
proposed a Functional Encryption for Inner Products (FE-IP) scheme with Selec-
tive Security against Chosen Plaintext Attacks (s-IND-CPA). In some recent works
by Abdalla et al. [ABCP16] and Agrawal et al. [ALS16], FE-IP schemes with the
security of Indistinguishability under Chosen Plaintext Attacks (IND-CPA) have
also been proposed. In order to achieve Indistinguishability under adaptive Chosen
Ciphertext Attacks (IND-CCA) for FE-IP, in this chapter, we propose a generic
construction of FE-IP from Hash Proof System (HPS). We prove the constructed
FE-IP scheme is IND-CCA secure, assuming the hardness of the Subset Membership
Problem (SMP). In addition, we give two instantiations of our generic construction
from the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) and Decisional Composite Residuosity
(DCR) assumptions. Parts of this work appeared in [ZMY17].
6.1 Introduction
Encryption provides information confidentiality such that messages are hidden and
can only be revealed by authorised parties. In traditional encryption, accessing
to the plaintext is in an all-or-nothing manner. Precisely, Alice encrypts a mes-
sage using Bob’s encryption key and sends the ciphertext to Bob. Later, Bob can
decrypt the ciphertext to read the message using his decryption key while a mali-
cious interceptor Eve gets no information about the encrypted message. Whereas in
Functional Encryption (FE), it is possible for different authorised parties to reveal
different partial information of the plaintext from a ciphertext by granting them
different secret keys. It is also possible to control the information leaked from the
ciphertexts. In detail, a FE enables the authorised receivers to reveal the output of
a functionality f(k, x) from a ciphertext containing the plaintext x and a secret key
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associated with a function key value k.
In this chapter, we focus on the functional encryption for the functionality of
inner product evaluation where f(~x, ~y) = 〈~x, ~y〉. A direct application of such a FE
scheme is privacy-preserving descriptive statistics such as calculating the weighted
mean or sum of a list of integers. For instance, suppose in a high school the subject
grades of each student are stored in a vector ~y which is encrypted under the school
manager Alice’s public key. As a university admission officer, Bob wants to offer
scholarship to those students who are excellent at mathematics, physics, English,
and good at other subjects. To ensure good students can get the scholarship, Alice
decides to assist Bob in identifying the candidates. At the same time, Alice does
not want to reveal the grades of all the students to Bob for privacy reasons. With
Functional Encryption for Inner Products (FE-IP), Alice can generate a secret key
for Bob, which is associated with a vector ~x = (10, 8, 8, 5, 5) that represents the
weight for different subjects (i.e. 10 for mathematics, 8 for physics and English,
and 5 for other subjects). Later, Bob can run the decryption algorithm to get
the weighted sum of each student’s subject grades, and nothing else. For example,
Charlie has a grade vector ~y = (90, 70, 80, 50, 60). The function f(~x, ~y) gives 〈~x, ~y〉 =
10× 90 + 8× 70 + 8× 80 + 5× 50 + 5× 60 = 2650. In this case, Bob can only learn
the result 2650 but nothing else about ~y.
The security of FE-IP is defined by the notion of Indistinguishability under
Chosen Plaintext Attacks (IND-CPA) in [ABDCP15]. However, such a security
notion is not strong enough to cover the following variation of the above scenario. In
order to restrict Bob’s ability to calculate the weighted sum of each student, Alice
gives the security key for the vector ~x to her colleague David instead of directly
giving it to Bob. Consequently, Bob can only get the result of f(~x, ~y) from David
by sending the ciphertext to him, and David can reject any queries related to those
students whose grades are below a threshold. If the scheme is malleable, then Bob
can modify a rejected ciphertext such that it can pass the threshold.
In this chapter, we aim to build FE-IP schemes with the security of Indis-
tinguishability under adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attacks (IND-CCA), which is
stronger than IND-CPA and can withstand the attack described above.
6.1.1 Related Work
The notion of Functional Encryption is introduced by Lewko et al. [LOS+10]
and later formally defined by Boneh et al. [BSW11]. In [BSW11], the security
of functional encryption is naturally defined via indistinguishability-based security
(IND-security) where an adversary cannot distinguish which message x0 or x1 is
encrypted in the ciphertext with oracles provided according to the attacking model.
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However, the IND-security is not sufficient for the general functional encryption
[BSW11, O’N10], and thus simulation-based security (SIM-security) has been pro-
posed. However, the SIM-security is only achievable in the programmable random
oracle model.
For generic functionality, Goldwasser et al. [GKP+13] proposed a FE scheme
for circuits. Later in [GGG+14], the functionality is further extended to accept mul-
tiple inputs such that it is able to compute f(k, x1, . . . , xn) instead of f(k, x). Since
the construction for generic functionalities is very inefficient for practical use, the
construction for specific functionality has been the main focus. It is worth noting
there is a subclass of FE named Predicate Encryption (PE) [KSW08]. Its message
space X consists of two subspaces, index space I and payload space M . For a pred-
icate P : K × I → {0, 1}, the functionality f : K × X → M ∪ {⊥} is defined as
f(k, (ind,m)) = m if P (k, ind) = 1 or f(k, (ind,m)) = ⊥ otherwise. More sub-
classes of the functionalities can be derived from the PE class, including but not
limited to Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) [BF01], Key-Policy Attribute-Based En-
cryption (KP-ABE) [OT12, SW05], Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
(CP-ABE) [BSW07], Hidden Vector Encryption (HVE) [BW07], Inner Product En-
cryption (IPE) [LOS+10, OT12], and Deterministic Finite Automata (DFA) Based
Encryption (Functional Encryption for Regular Languages) [TCL14, Wat12]. An-
other notable FE is searchable encryption [BDCOP04] where f(k, x) = 1 if k = x
or f(k, x) = 0 otherwise where k and x are the keywords embedded in the trapdoor
and ciphertext, respectively. For further discussions on the functionalities, we refer
the reader to Section 3.3.
Recently, Abdalla et al. [ABDCP15] investigated a new functionality f(~x, ~y) =
〈~x, ~y〉, i.e. to calculate the inner product of two vectors ~x and ~y where ~x is embed-
ded in the secret key and ~y is embedded in the ciphertext. Unlike Inner Product
Encryption [LOS+10, OT12] where inner product is used for access control, the new
functionality here is to compute the actual inner product value. In [ABDCP15],
Abdalla et al. proposed a FE-IP scheme, which has Selective Security against Cho-
sen Plaintext Attacks (s-IND-CPA). The scheme is generic as it can be constructed
from any s-IND-CPA secure public key encryption, which is secure under randomness
reuse and has linear key homomorphism and linear ciphertext homomorphism under
shared randomness. Based on the generic construction, two instantiations are given
from Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption and Learning With Error (LEW)
assumption respectively. In some recent works [ABCP16, ALS16], FE-IP schemes
with IND-CPA security were also proposed. Specifically, Abdalla et al.[ABCP16]
proposed another generic construction with IND-CPA security from any s-IND-CPA
secure public key encryption with the same requirements as in [ABDCP15]. They
also showed that the IND-CPA security and Non-Adaptive Simulation (NA-SIM)
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security are equivalent for inner product functionality. Furthermore, an instantia-
tion from Decisional Composite Residuosity (DCR) assumption is also proposed in
[ABCP16].
In addition to the confidentiality, a notion called function privacy has also been
investigated for FE which means an adversary should not be able to distinguish
k (or fk as f(k, x) = fk(x)) from a secret key SKk. For DFA-based encryption,
Tseng et al. [TCL14] proposed a version with function privacy. For FE-IP, Bishop
et al. [BJK15] proposed a scheme with function privacy. However, the schemes
[BJK15, TCL14] with function privacy are proposed in the private/symmetric key
setting while normal FE schemes [ABCP16, ABDCP15, Wat12] are in the public
key setting.
6.1.2 Our Contribution
In this chapter, we define the notion of Indistinguishability under adaptive Chosen
Ciphertext Attacks (i.e. IND-CCA, or more precisely IND-CCA2 security) for the
general Functional Encryption. We also present the precise definition of Functional
Encryption for Inner Products. In particular, we show that the secret keys for the
functions 〈~x1, · 〉, · · · , 〈~xn, · 〉 implies the secret key for the function 〈~x′, · 〉 where
~x′ ∈ span(~x1, . . . , ~xn).
As the main contribution of this chapter, we propose under certain conditions
an IND-CCA secure Functional Encryption for Inner Products (FE-IP) scheme from
Hash Proof System (HPS), assuming the hardness of the Subset Membership Prob-
lem (SMP). In the generic construction, we require two HPSs Ξ1 and Ξ2 with some
special properties as the building blocks. In detail, Ξ1 is required to be diverse (Defi-
nition 6.5) and have key linearity (Definition 6.3) and hash linearity (Definition 6.4).
For Ξ2, we require it to be universal2 (Definition 2.21) and have hash linearity. We
show that those special properties are not hard to achieve. In [CS02], Cramer and
Shoup constructed HPSs from a diverse group system G = (H, X, L,Π). We show
that their constructions have the key linearity and the hash linearity. If the hash
codomain Π of the underlying diverse group system has prime order, the constructed
HPS has the property of diversity. In other words, we can generically construct an
IND-CCA secure FE-IP scheme from a diverse group system G = (H, X, L,Π) when
|Π| is prime.
In addition, we propose a concrete IND-CCA secure FE-IP scheme from DDH
assumption as an instantiation of our generic construction. Note that if we remove
the Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge (NIZK) proof part of construction 6.7, the
resulting scheme is exactly the same as the schemes in [ABCP16, ALS16]. Thus
the efficiency is the same as [ABCP16, ALS16]. Furthermore, we also instantiate a
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IND-CCA secure FE-IP scheme from DCR assumption where the computation of
discrete logarithm is easy.
6.1.3 Chapter Organisation
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Beginning with Section 6.2, we give
out a precise definition of FE-IP and introduce the IND-CCA security model. In
Section 6.3, we define new properties of HPS, review the constructions of the HPS,
and show that the existing construction has the new defined properties. After that,
we propose a generic construction of IND-CCA secure FE-IP with security proof in
Section 6.4. In addition, instantiations of our generic construction from DDH and




Let Gx, Gy, Gz be three abelian groups where there exists an efficient inner product
computation 〈·, ·〉 : Gx × Gy → Gz. The FE-IP is associated with a functionality
f : Gδx×Gδy → Gz, mapping two δ-dimension vectors into a single group Gz such that
f(~x, ~y) = 〈~x, ~y〉 =
∑δ
i=1〈xi, yi〉 for all ~x = (x1, . . . , xδ) ∈ Gδx and ~y = (y1, . . . , yδ) ∈
Gδy. Based on the functionality f , we derive the syntax of the functional encryption
from Definition 3.1.
Definition 6.1 (Functional Encryption for Inner Products). A Functional Encryp-
tion for Inner Products (FE-IP) scheme for a functionality f : Gδx × Gδy → Gz
consists of the following four polynomial time algorithms:
– (PK,MSK) ← Setup(1λ, 1δ): The randomised system setup algorithm takes a
security parameter 1λ and a unary value 1δ that specifies the maximum vector
dimension as input. Then it generates system-wide parameters and a key pair
(PK,MSK).
– SK← KeyGen(MSK, ~x): The randomised secret key generation algorithm takes
a master secret key MSK and a vector ~x ∈ Gdx with dimension d. If d > δ, the
extra dimensions of ~x is discarded. If d < δ, the vector ~x is reconstructed to the
dimension δ by filling an additive identity element 0 (i.e. ~x′ = (~x, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
δ−d
)).
After that, the algorithm generates a secret key SK for the (modified) vector ~x
with dimension δ.




b ∈R {0, 1}
C ← Encrypt(PK, xb)
b′ ← AOKeyGen,ODecrypt(C)
OKeyGen(k)
K ← K ∪ {k}
return SK← KeyGen(MSK, k)
ODecrypt(k, C ′)
C ← C ∪ {C ′}
SK← KeyGen(MSK, k)
return D ← Decrypt(SK, C ′)
AdvIND-CCAA =
∣∣∣∣Pr [b = b′ ∣∣C /∈ C ∧ (∀k ∈ K, fk(x0) = fk(x1))]− 12
∣∣∣∣
Figure 6.1: IND-CCA Game
– C ← Encrypt(PK, ~y): The randomised encryption takes a public key PK and
a vector ~y ∈ Gdy with dimension d. If d 6= δ, the ciphertext may still be
constructed. However, it may not be decrypted properly. Hence, the same
modification to ~x in the algorithm KeyGen is applied to ~y. After that, the
algorithm generates a ciphertext C for the (modified) vector ~y with dimension
δ.
– D ← Decrypt(SK, C): The deterministic decryption algorithm takes a secret
key SK for ~x and a ciphertext C of ~y, and computes D = 〈~x, ~y〉 ∈ Gz. If the
decryption fails, the algorithm outputs a special symbol ⊥.
6.2.2 Enhanced Security Model
In this chapter, we consider the indistinguishability-based security and enhance the
IND-CPA security model (Definition 3.2) defined in [BSW11] to the Indistinguisha-
bility under adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attacks (IND-CCA) as the generalisation
of the IND-CCA2 security [RS92] for Public Key Encryption (PKE) schemes [CS98].
The difference is that the decryption oracle ODecrypt is not allowed in the IND-CPA
game at any stage. The IND-CCA game (Fig. 6.1) is defined as follows where an
adaptive adversary A tries to distinguish a ciphertext from two chosen plaintexts x0
and x1.
Setup phase The challenger S runs Setup(1λ) to generate a key pair (MSK,PK),
and passes the public key PK to the adversary A.
Pre-challenge phase The adversary A can adaptively query the key generation
oracle OKeyGen for the secret key SK of a function fk from the challenger S.
The restriction is that A can only query the secret keys for the functionality
fk such that fk(x0) = fk(x1) where x0 and x1 are the target plaintexts in the
challenge phase. Otherwise, the game is trivial since A can simply win the
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game by testing Decrypt(SKk, C)
?
= fk(x0). Besides that, the adversary A can
also ask the challenger S for decrypting a ciphertext C ′ of x to obtain the
output of fk(x) for any k ∈ K via the decryption oracle ODecrypt.
Challenge phase At some point, the adversary A outputs two target plaintexts
x0 and x1. The challenger S randomly selects a bit b ∈R {0, 1}, and generates
a target ciphertext C ← Encrypt(PK, xb). Then S passes C to the adversary
A.
Post-challenge phase The adversary A can continue to query the oracle OKeyGen
with the same restriction as before, and the oracle ODecrypt with the restriction
that A cannot query the target ciphertext C since A can win the game trivially
by testing ODecrypt(k, C)
?
= fk(x0) for some k ∈ K such that fk(x0) 6= fk(x1).
Guessing phase Eventually, the adversary A outputs a bit b′, and A wins if b = b′.
The advantage of A winning the IND-CCA game (Fig. 6.1) is
AdvIND-CCAA =
∣∣∣∣Pr [b = b′ ∣∣C /∈ C ∧ (∀k ∈ K, fk(x0) = fk(x1))]− 12
∣∣∣∣
Definition 6.2 (IND-CCA Security). A FE scheme is Indistinguishable under adap-
tive Chosen Ciphertext Attacks (IND-CCA) if AdvIND-CCAA is a negligible function for
all adversary A winning the the IND-CCA game (Fig. 6.1) in polynomial time.
Before introducing the security model of FE-IP, we review the inner product
functionality along with the vector space first.
Due to the linearity that 〈x0 + x1, y〉 = 〈x0, y〉 + 〈x1, y〉 for all x0, x1 ∈ Gx and
y ∈ Gy, we have µ〈~x, ~y〉 = 〈µ~x, ~y〉 for all µ ∈ Z, ~x ∈ Gδx, and ~y ∈ Gδy. Thus the
ability of the secret key for a vector ~x is not only to calculate f(~x, ~y) but also to
compute f(µ~x, ~y) = 〈µ~x, ~y〉 = µ〈~x, ~y〉 = µf(~x, ~y), which is equivalent to the ability
of the secret key for the vector µ~x for all µ ∈ Z. In other words, the key generation
algorithm KeyGen actually generates a secret key for a vector space span(~x) linearly
spanned by ~x instead of a single vector ~x. Generally, given multiple secret keys for
a vector set S = {~x1, . . . , ~xn}, we are able to compute f(~x, ~y) for all ~x ∈ span(S).
It is possible since f(~x, ~y) =
∑n
i=1 µif(~xi, ~y) where ~x =
∑n
i=1 µi~xi. Notably, if we
obtain secret keys for a vector set S such that span(S) = Gx (e.g. S contains
δ linearly dependent vectors), we have the same ability of the master secret key
without compromising it.
Since δ secret keys for linearly independent vectors are equivalent to the master
secret key, the function key space K (recall Definition 3.1) is reduced to the size
of δ, which is polynomial bounded. Let ~v1, . . . , ~vδ be a basis of Gx. Intuitively,
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one may think that the “brute force” construction in [BSW11] becomes practical
by encrypting the output of f(~v1, ~y), . . . , f(~vδ, ~y) instead of the vector ~y where the
resulting ciphertext size is Θ(δ). However, it is not true since span(~v1 + ~v2) 6=
span(~v1, ~v2) where ~v1 and ~v2 are independent. Hence, a proper construction is still
required.
Besides that, if Gx = Gy = Gz = F are the same field, it is impossible to hide
~x in the public key setting, given the secret key for the vector ~x. Since it is in
the public key setting, δ linearly independent vectors ~y1, . . . , ~yδ can be chosen and
encrypted freely. By decrypting the above ciphertexts with the secret key for the
vector ~x = (x1, . . . , xδ), we can obtain the results {Di = f(~x, ~yi)}i=1...δ. After that,










Hence, it is impossible to achieve function privacy. As a side effect, it is “safe” to
provide ~x along with the secret key in the key generation algorithm KeyGen.
For the security model, the definition of the IND-CPA security and the IND-
CCA security can be derived from the security model of the general functional en-
cryption. The difference is that the setup algorithm is required to take an additional
parameter 1δ.
6.3 Extended Hash Proof Systems
In this section, we extend Hash Proof System (HPS) (see Definition 2.18 in Sec-
tion 2.5.3) introduced by Cramer and Shoup [CS02] with some extra properties so
that we can use it to construct our scheme.
6.3.1 Extra Properties
The original definition of HPS from [CS02] is not sufficient for our schemes, and the
following extended properties are required.
Definition 6.3 (Key Linearity). A HPS is linear key homomorphic if K and S are
additive abelian groups and
∀a, b ∈ K, PKGen(a) + PKGen(b) = PKGen(a+ b) ∈ S.
Particularly, if a HPS has key linearity, we have µ ·PKGen(SK) = PKGen(µ ·SK)
for all SK ∈ K and µ ∈ Z.
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Definition 6.4 (Hash Linearity). A HPS is linear hash homomorphic if K and Π
are additive abelian groups and
∀a, b ∈ K, ∀x ∈ X, Hash(a, x) + Hash(b, x) = Hash(a+ b, x) ∈ Π.
Similar to the key linearity, we have µ · Hash(SK, x) = Hash(µ · SK, x) for all
SK ∈ K, x ∈ X, and µ ∈ Z.
Definition 6.5 (Diversity). A HPS is diverse if there exists π ∈ Π such that π 6=
0 and for all x ∈ X \ L, there exists SK ∈ K such that PKGen(SK) = 0 and
Hash(SK, x) = π. Formally,
∃π ∈ Π \ {0}, ∀x ∈ X \ L, ∃SK ∈ K, PKGen(SK) = 0 ∧ Hash(SK, x) = π
We call such an element π as an element derived from the diversity.
The new properties of key linearity and hash linearity are easy to understand
while the diversity is tricky. Therefore, we discuss the relation between the diversity
and the smoothness (Definition 2.22).
Recalling the basic properties of HPS in Section 2.5.3, the universal2 property is
a generalisation of the universal property, and implies it. Informally, the universal
property requires that a public hash key PK does not leak any information on hashing
a word not in the language. Furthermore, the smoothness requires not only no
information leakage on PK as the universal property but also indistinguishability of
the hash value from a random element in the codomain. From [CS02], universal2
HPS and smooth HPS are constructible from universal HPS. The above properties
are important since the smooth property provides the IND-CPA security and the
universal2 property provides the IND-CCA security in the PKE construction from
HPSs.
The natural meaning of the diversity is that the secret hash keys are diverse
on the fixed public hash key, resulted in different hash values for the words not in
the language. In other words, the diversity enables that the partial information of
the hash value of a word x ∈ X \ L is uncertain with the public hash key provided.
Formally, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 6.1. Let Ξ be a HPS with diversity, key linearity, and hash linearity. Let
ξ ∈ Π \ {0} be an element derived from diversity such that ∀x ∈ X \ L,∃SK∗ ∈
K,PKGen(SK∗) = 0 ∧ Hash(SK∗, x) = ξ. Let x ∈R X \ L, SK ∈R K, PK =
PKGen(SK), π = Hash(SK, x), and π′ ∈R Π′ = {aξ | a ∈ Z}. Given two proba-
bility distributions DH = {(x,PK, π)} and DR = {(x,PK, π + π′)}, the adversary A
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has no advantage AdvA in distinguishing DH and DR.
AdvA = |Pr[1← A(D ∈R DH)]− Pr[1← A(D ∈R DR)]| = 0
Proof. Let r ∈ Z, and SK′ = SK + rSK∗. Since
PKGen(SK′) = PKGen(SK + rSK∗) = PKGen(SK) + rPKGen(SK∗) = PK, (6.1)
Hash(SK′, x) = Hash(SK + rSK∗, x) = Hash(SK, x) + rHash(SK∗, x) = π + rξ,
(6.2)
we have there are different secret hash keys SK′ corresponding to the same public
hash key PK while the hash value of x ranges over {π + rξ} = {π + π′ | π′ ∈ Π′}
uniformly. Hence, the information of hash value of x related to the group Π′ is
independent from the adversary A’s view.
From Theorem 6.1, we immediately have the following corollary.
Corollary 6.1. Let Ξ be a HPS with diversity, key linearity, and hash linearity.
If the derived element ξ from diversity is a generator of Π, the HPS Ξ is perfectly
smooth with AdvSmoothA = 0.
Furthermore, we also find that the prefect smoothness implies the diversity as
the proof of Theorem 6.1 is reversible. Thus we have that the prefect smoothness is
equivalent to the diversity.
Theorem 6.2. Let Ξ be a HPS with key linearity and hash linearity. The HPS Ξ is
perfectly smooth if and only if Ξ is diverse with derived element ξ being a generator
of Π.
Proof. We show that the HPS Ξ is diverse if it is perfectly smooth. Fixed on the
word x ∈ X \ L, the public hash key PK has no information of the hash value
of x due to the perfect smoothness. Let SK be the real secret hash key used in
hashing x that PK = PKGen(SK), which is unknown, and π = Hash(SK, x). Let ξ
be a generator of Π. A random element in Π can be represented as π′ = π + rξ
for some r ∈ Z|Π|. From Eq. (6.2) with the hash linearity, we have that π′ is a
hash value of x under the key SK′ = SK + rSK∗ for some SK∗ ∈ K such that
Hash(SK∗, x) = ξ. From Eq. (6.1) with the key linearity, we have PKGen(SK′) =
PK+rPKGen(SK∗). If PKGen(SK′) 6= PK, we have that r is fixed and thus π is fixed,
which contradicts with the perfect smoothness. Thus we have PKGen(SK′) = PK
and further PKGen(SK∗) = 0. Hence, we have that Ξ is diverse with the element ξ
such that ∀x ∈ X \ L,∃SK∗ ∈ K,PKGen(SK∗) = 0 ∧ Hash(SK∗, x) = ξ. Combined
with Corollary 6.1, it completes the proof.
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6.3.2 Generic Constructions of Hash Proof Systems from
Diverse Group Systems
In this subsection, we review the Cramer-Shoup constructions of HPS from universal
projective hashing derived from diverse group systems [CS02]. We start with the
definition of the group system, then the constructions of the universal projective
hashing. In the end, we show that the reviewed constructions have key linearity,
hash linearity, and diversity. For notational convenience, we use addition for the
group operations.
Definition 6.6 (Group System). Let X, Π be two finite abelian groups, and L be a
NP language with a witness space W and a binary relation R such that L = {x ∈
X | ∃w : (x,w) ∈ R}. Let Φ be a finite abelian group of homomorphism φ : X → Π
such that for all φ, φ′ ∈ Φ, x ∈ X, and a ∈ Z, we have (φ ± φ′)(x) = φ(x) ± φ′(x)
and (aφ)(x) = aφ(x) = φ(ax). If φ = 0 ∈ Φ, we have φ(x) = 0 ∈ Π for all x ∈ X.
Let H be a subgroup of Φ. Then G = (H, X, L,Π) is a group system.
Definition 6.7 (Diverse Group System). A group system G is diverse if there exists
φ ∈ Φ such that φ(L) = 〈0〉 and φ(x) 6= 0 for all x ∈ X \ L.
Construction 6.1 (Projective Hash Families from Group Systems). Let G =
(H, X, L,Π) be a group system and (g1, . . . , gd) ∈ L be a generator of L. A pro-
jective hash family H = (H,K,X,L,Π, S, α) defined in [CS02] can be constructed
from G by setting {φ = Hk | k ∈ K} = H with uniform distribution, S = Πd,
and α : K → S that α(k) = (φ(g1), . . . , φ(gd)) = (Hk(g1), . . . , Hk(gd)). To hash
x ∈ X, it simply calculates Hk(x) = φ(x) ∈ Π. If x ∈ L that x =
∑d
i=1wigi where





i=1wiφ(gi) ∈ Π, using α(k) and (w1, . . . , wd).
Construction 6.2 (HPS from Projective Hash Families). Let H = (H,K,X,L,Π,
S, α) be a projective hash family where L is a NP language with a witness space
W and a binary relation R such that L = {x ∈ X | ∃w : (x,w) ∈ R}. A HPS
Ξ = (Setup, SKGen,PKGen,Hash,PHash) can be constructed as follows.
– param← Setup(1λ): return param = (X,L,W,R,K, S,Π).
– SK← SKGen(param): return k ∈R K.
– PK← PKGen(SK): return α(k).
– π ← Hash(SK, x): return Hk(x).
– π ← PHash(PK, x, w): return Hk(x) computed using α(k) and a witness w of
x without the actual k.
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Let Ξ be a HPS constructed from a group system G by combining construc-
tion 6.1 and construction 6.2. From [CS02], Ξ is universal if G is diverse. Further-
more, we need a universal2 HPS, which can be derived from a universal projective
hash family.
Construction 6.3 (Universal2 Projective Hash Families). Let H = (H,K,X,L,Π,
S, α) be a universal projective hash family, p be the smallest prime dividing |X \L|,
and Γ : X × E → Znp be an injective map. A universal2 projective hash family Ĥ =
(Ĥ,Kn+1, X×E,L×E,Π, Sn+1, α̂) can be constructed that k̂ = (k0, . . . , kn) ∈ Kn+1,
α̂(k) = (α(k0), . . . , α(kn)) ∈ Sn+1, and Ĥk̂ = Hk0(x)+〈Γ(x, e), (Hk1(x), . . . , Hkn(x))〉
for all x ∈ X and e ∈ E.
Let Ξ2 be a HPS constructed from a group system G by combining construc-
tion 6.1, construction 6.3, and construction 6.2 in sequence. From [CS02], Ξ2 is
universal2 if G is diverse.
Besides the above security properties, we find that HPS from a group system
G = (H, X, L,Π) has some extra properties. Let K be a finite abelian group of
order |H|. Since Hk is uniformly distributed over H by randomly choosing k ∈ K
in construction 6.1, we have that H is a bijection for K and H. Thus we have
Hk1 +Hk2 = Hk1+k2 ∈ H for all k1, k2 ∈ K.
Theorem 6.3 (Key Linearity). Let Ξ be a universal HPS and Ξ2 be a universal2
HPS as constructed above from a group system G. The HPSs Ξ and Ξ2 have key
linearity.
Proof. As Ξ and Ξ2 share the same mapping α : K → Πd, we show the linearity of
α that for all k1, k2 ∈ K,
α(k1) + α(k2) = (Hk1(g1), . . . , Hk1(gd)) + (Hk2(g1), . . . , Hk2(gd))
= (Hk1(g1) +Hk2(g1), . . . , Hk1(gd) +Hk2(gd))
= ((Hk1 +Hk2)(g1), . . . , (Hk1 +Hk2)(gd))
= (Hk1+k2(g1), . . . , Hk1+k2(gd)) = α(k1 + k2)
From the linearity of α, we directly have the key linearity of Ξ.
PKGen(SK1) + PKGen(SK2)
= α(SK1) + α(SK2) = α(SK1 + SK2) = PKGen(SK1 + SK2)
For Ξ2, we show the key linearity as follows where SK1 = (k1,0, . . . , k1,n), SK2 =
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(k2,0, . . . , k2,n) ∈ Kn+1.
PKGen(SK1) + PKGen(SK2)
= (a(k1,0), . . . , a(k1,n)) + (a(k2,0), . . . , a(k2,n))
= (a(k1,0) + a(k2,0), . . . , a(k1,n) + a(k2,n)))
= (a(k1,0 + k2,0), . . . , a(k1,n + k2,n)) = PKGen(SK1 + SK2)
Theorem 6.4 (Hash Linearity). Let Ξ be a universal HPS and Ξ2 be a universal2
HPS as constructed above from a group system G. The HPSs Ξ and Ξ2 have hash
linearity.
Proof. Starting from Ξ, we show the hash linearity that
Hash(SK1, x) + Hash(SK2, x)
= HSK1(x) +HSK2(x) = HSK1+SK2(x) = Hash(SK1 + SK2, x)
Then we show the hash linearity of Ξ2 as follows where SK1 = (k1,0, . . . , k1,n) and
SK2 = (k2,0, . . . , k2,n) ∈ Kn+1.
Hash(SK1, (x, e)) + Hash(SK2, (x, e))
= Hk1,0(x) + 〈Γ(x, e), (Hk1,1(x), . . . , Hk1,n(x))〉
+Hk2,0(x) + 〈Γ(x, e), (Hk2,1(x), . . . , Hk2,n(x))〉
= (Hk1,0(x) +Hk2,0(x)) + 〈Γ(x, e), (Hk1,1(x) +Hk2,1(x), . . . , Hk1,n(x) +Hk2,n(x))〉
= Hk1,0+k2,0(x) + 〈Γ(x, e), (Hk1,1+k2,1(x), . . . , Hk1,n+k2,n(x))〉
= Hash(SK1 + SK2, (x, e))
Theorem 6.5 (Diversity). Let Ξ be a universal HPS as constructed above from a
group system G. The HPS Ξ is diverse if |Π| is prime and G is diverse.
Proof. Since G is diverse, we have that there exists k ∈ K such that Hash(k, x) = 0
for all x ∈ L and Hash(k, x∗) 6= 0 for all x∗ ∈ X \L. Let π = Hash(k, x∗) 6= 0. Since
Π is a prime order cyclic group, π is a generator of Π and thus for all π′ ∈ Π, π′ = µ·π
for some µ ∈ Z|Π|. By Theorem 6.4, we have that for all x′ ∈ X \ L,
π′ = Hash(k, x′) ⇐⇒ µ · π = Hash(k, x′)
⇐⇒ π = µ−1 · Hash(k, x′) ⇐⇒ π = Hash(µ−1 · k, x′)
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Hence, for a fixed π, there exists a secret key µ−1 · k that hashes x′ to π for all
x′ ∈ X. Let w be a witness of x ∈ L. Recall the construction of Ξ that Hash(k, x) =
Hk(x) and PKGen(k) = α(k) = (Hk(g1), . . . , Hk(gd)). Since g1, . . . , gd ∈ L and
Hk(x) = 0 for all x ∈ L, we have PKGen(k) = 0. Therefore, by Theorem 6.3, we
have PKGen(µ−1 · k) = µ−1 · PKGen(k) = 0 and complete the proof.
6.4 Generic Construction from Hash Proof Sys-
tems
In this section, we describe the key ideas to construct an IND-CCA secure FE-IP
scheme. Then we present our FE-IP scheme from HPSs and its security proof.
In a FE-IP scheme, the plaintext vector ~y should be encrypted in a raw form that
can be recovered instead of being encrypted as the output of the function f(~x, ~y) so
that it can be manipulated by arbitrary ~x to compute f(~x, ~y). In order to achieve
the IND-CCA security, the sender who encrypts the message shall provide a Non-
Interactive Zero Knowledge (NIZK) proof that it knows the decryption in terms of
the raw form of the plaintext vector ~y [RS92]. This is the essential idea of achieving
the IND-CCA security. On the other hand, the decryption of a FE involves two
parts: the function evaluation and the authorisation to that function evaluation.
Obviously, we have to do manipulation first then decryption instead of decryption
first then manipulation since the receiver should only be able to compute f(~x, ~y)
but not ~y itself. For inner product functionality, the ciphertext of the plaintext
vector ~y is manipulated into the ciphertext of f(~x, ~y) = 〈~x, ~y〉 by using the vector
~x and the ciphertext homomorphism. Later, the receiver can decrypt the resulted
ciphertext to obtain f(~x, ~y), given the authorisation to f(~x, · ). Before decryption,
the receiver also needs to verify the NIZK proof attached to the ciphertext. Using
the hash proof system as the NIZK proof system (with auxiliary input), the receiver
is required to use the secret key of the HPS to verify the proof. If we consider attacks
from outsiders only, it is safe to give the secret key to the end users. However, from
the IND-CCA game (Fig. 6.1), we allow attacks from insiders. Therefore, we cannot
give the secret key directly to the users. Otherwise, they can generate the proofs
without knowing the witnesses. To solve this problem, we limit the scheme to serve
at most η users and generate a vector ~β of secret keys for the proof system with
dimension η. For each user, we randomly pick a vector ~s and compute the inner
product 〈~s, ~β〉 as the secret key for the end user. When encrypting, the sender
generates the proof using the individual public keys directly derived for ~β as η proof
parts. To verify, the receiver assembles the proof parts using ~s and checks with
its secret key 〈~s, ~β〉. Since both ~β and ~s have the dimension η, it is impossible to
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compute ~β with η−1 pairs of (~s, 〈~s, ~β〉) (i.e. ~β is statistically indistinguishable with
a random vector). If all η users collude together, they can obtain ~β and generate
proofs without witnesses but it is meaningless to launch attacks against themselves.
6.4.1 The Construction
Unfortunately, we are not able to construct a generic FE-IP scheme for arbitrary Gx,
Gy, and Gz. Due to the definition of hash linearity (Definition 6.4) of HPS, we have
to make Gx = Gy = Gz = Zρ ⊂ Z. To build our FE-IP scheme, we need a diverse
HPS with key linearity and hash linearity, a universal2 HPS with hash linearity.
Note that the key linearity is used in the proof only. Formally, we present our
construction as follows, and recommend the readers to review the related notations
defined in Section 2.2.
Construction 6.4 (FE-IP from HPS). Let Ξ1 = (Setup, SKGen,PKGen,Hash,PHash)
be a diverse HPS associated with spaces (X,L,W,R,K, S,Π) and Ξ2 = (Setup,
SKGen,PKGen,Hash,PHash) be a universal2 HPS associated with space (X×Πδ, L×
Πδ,W,R,K ′, S ′,Π′) where δ is passed as the input of the algorithm Setup. Both Ξ1
and Ξ2 are required to have the hash linearity. Ξ1 is required to have the key linearity
for the security proof. Let ξ ∈ Π\{0} be an element derived from the diversity of the
HPS Ξ1. Our functional encryption scheme for the functionality f : Zδρ × Zδρ → Zρ
works as follows.
– (PK,MSK) ← Setup(1λ, 1δ, 1η): Given a security parameter 1λ, a maximum
vector size 1δ and a maximum user size 1η, the algorithm generates system-
wide parameters param1 ← Ξ1.Setup(1λ) and param2 ← Ξ2.Setup(1λ). The
algorithm generates two secret key vectors ~α = (α1, . . . , αδ) ∈ Kδ and ~β =
(β1, . . . , βη) ∈ K ′η where αi ← Ξ1.SKGen(param1), βi ← Ξ2.SKGen(param2).
After that, it generates corresponding public keys ~A = (A1, . . . , Aδ) ∈ Sδ and
~B = (B1, . . . , Bη) ∈ S ′η where Ai = Ξ1.PKGen(αi), Bi = Ξ2.PKGen(βi). Next,
the algorithm packs the public key PK = ( ~A, ~B) and the master secret key
MSK = (~α, ~β). Finally, the algorithm publishes PK and keeps MSK private.
param1 ← Ξ1.Setup(1λ), param2 ← Ξ2.Setup(1λ)
For i = 1 . . . δ, αi ← Ξ1.SKGen(param1), Ai = Ξ1.PKGen(αi)
For i = 1 . . . η, βi ← Ξ2.SKGen(param2), Bi = Ξ2.PKGen(βi)
return (PK,MSK) = (( ~A, ~B), (~α, ~β)).
– SK← KeyGen(MSK, ~x): To generate a secret key for the vector ~x, the algorithm
randomly selects a vector ~s = (s1, . . . , sη) ∈R Zηρ and calculates K1 and K2 as
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follows.
~s ∈R Zηρ, K1 = 〈~x, ~α〉, K2 = 〈~s, ~β〉.
return SK = (~x,~s,K1, K2).
– C ← Encrypt(PK, ~y): To encrypt a vector ~y, the algorithm randomly sam-
ples a word l ∈ L with a witness w ∈ W . Then the algorithm computes
the ciphertext part ~C = (C1, . . . , Cδ) where Ci = yiξ + Ξ1.PHash(Ai, l, w).
After that, the algorithm computes the proof part ~π = (π1, . . . , πη) where
πi = Ξ2.PHash(Bi, (l, ~C), w). Finally, the algorithm packs the word, the ci-
phertext part, and the proof part as one single ciphertext.
(l, w) ∈R R
For i = 1 . . . δ, Ci = yiξ + Ξ1.PHash(Ai, l, w)
For i = 1 . . . η, πi = Ξ2.PHash(Bi, (l, ~C), w)
return C = (l, ~C, ~π).
– D ← Decrypt(SK, C): To decrypt, the algorithm assembles the proof parts
D2 = 〈~s, ~π〉. If D2 6= Ξ2.Hash(K2, (l, ~C)), the algorithm outputs D = ⊥
to reject the ciphertext. Otherwise, the algorithm assembles the ciphertext
part D1 = 〈~x, ~C〉. Then the algorithm decrypts the resulted ciphertext D∗ =
D1 − Ξ1.Hash(K1, l). Finally, the algorithm extracts the result D = scaξ(D∗).
D2 = 〈~s, ~π〉, D2
?
= Ξ2.Hash(K2, (l, ~C)),
D1 = 〈~x, ~C〉, D∗ = D1 − Ξ1.Hash(K1, l).
return D = scaξ(D
∗).
Theorem 6.6. The construction 6.4 is correct.
Proof. We verify the correctness by verifying the decryption algorithm.













siβi, (l, ~C)) = Ξ2.Hash(〈~s, ~β〉, (l, ~C)) = Ξ2.Hash(K2, (l, ~C)).
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= 〈~x, ~y〉ξ + Ξ1.Hash(〈~x, ~α〉, l) = 〈~x, ~y〉ξ + Ξ1.Hash(K1, l).
After verifying D2 and computing D1, we compute D as follows and complete the
verification.
D∗ = D1 − Ξ1.Hash(K1, l) = 〈~x, ~y〉ξ, D = scaξ(D∗) = scaξ(〈~x, ~y〉ξ) = 〈~x, ~y〉.
In construction 6.4, we require the calculation of scaξ, which may not be com-
puted in polynomial time. If the decryption space |{〈~x, ~y〉}| is polynomial bounded,
we can do decryption in an alternative way. In this variation, D1, D2, and D
∗ are
computed and checked as normal. To calculate D, we check Dξ
?
= D∗ for each
possible D ∈ |{〈~x, ~y〉}|. Since |{〈~x, ~y〉}| is polynomial-sized, the checking algorithm
can be done in polynomial time.
In terms of the maximum number η of users, it is not a defect and the IND-CCA
model is still suitable for construction 6.4. Since the number of users is polynomial
sized, the value of η is also polynomial sized. By observing construction 6.4, we
have the size table (Table 6.1).
Table 6.1: Size of Elements in FE-IP (Construction 6.4)
Item PK MSK SK
Size δ|S|+ η|S ′| δ|K|+ η|K ′| (δ + η)|Zρ|+ |K|+ |K ′|
Item C D
Size |L|+ δ|Π|+ η|Π′| |Zρ|
As long as the value of η is polynomial sized, all the elements in construction 6.4
are polynomial sized. Hence, the limitation on the maximum user number is no
longer an issue.
6.4.2 Security Proof
Theorem 6.7. The proposed FE-IP scheme (construction 6.4), allowing at most η
users, is IND-CCA secure (Definition 6.2) if the language (X,L,W,R) associated
with both the underlying diverse HPS Ξ1 and universal2 HPS Ξ2 satisfies a hard
subset membership problem (Definition 2.13).
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Proof. Having a glance at the security proof, we leverage the diversity property of
the HPS Ξ1 to prove the ciphertext indistinguishability of our construction. At the
same time, we exploit the universal2 property of the HPS Ξ2 to finalise the IND-CCA
security in terms of dealing the decryption oracle.
In details, we show that an algorithm S (i.e. simulator) can be constructed to
solve SMP in polynomial time with non-negligible probability if an adversary A can
win the IND-CCA game (Fig. 6.1) with non-negligible probability, querying the key
generation oracle OKeyGen at most η− 1 times and the decryption oracle ODecrypt for
at most q times. As explained in Section 6.4, it is meaningless to obtain all secret
keys of η users and this is the reason why we let the adversary A query the key
generation oracle at most η − 1 times. Although we limit the maximum number of
the key generation queries, we do not limit the maximum number of the decryption
queries to a function of η. Therefore, the proof is still in a valid IND-CCA model.
Let (Λ = (X,L,W,R), x∗) be an instance of SMP challenged to the simula-
tor S for distinguishing whether x∗ ∈ L or x∗ ∈ X \ L where x∗ is sampled
from L or X \ L with equal probability. To simulate the the IND-CCA game
(Fig. 6.1), the simulator S runs the algorithm Setup as normal to generate a key
pair (PK,MSK) = (( ~A, ~B), (~α, ~β)), and passes the public key PK to the adversary
A. Since the simulator S has the master secret key MSK, it can answer the oracles
OKeyGen and ODecrypt as normal using the master secret key MSK. The adversary A is
restricted to query the secret keys for ~x toOKeyGen such that 〈~x, ~y0〉 6= 〈~x, ~y1〉 where ~y0
and ~y1 are the target vectors output by the adversary A in the next phase. In other
words, the adversary A can only ask the secret keys for ~x such that 〈~x, ~y0−~y1〉 = 0.
At some point, the adversary A outputs two target vectors ~y0 and ~y1. Then the
simulator S randomly chooses b ∈R {0, 1}. After that, the simulator S computes
the target ciphertext C∗ = (x∗, ~C∗, ~π∗) where
C∗i = yb,iξ + Ξ1.Hash(αi, x
∗), π∗i = Ξ2.Hash(βi, (x
∗, ~C∗)).
After receiving the target ciphertext C∗, the adversary A can continue to query
provided oracles as before with the restriction that A cannot query C∗ to the de-
cryption oracle ODecrypt. Eventually, the adversary A outputs a bit b′. If b = b′, the
simulator S outputs 1, indicating that A wins the Fig. 6.1. Otherwise, the simulator
S outputs 0. After that, the simulator S halts in order to complete the simulation.
Let EL be the event that S outputs 1 conditioned on x∗ ∈ L, and EX\L be the
event that S outputs 1 conditioned on x∗ ∈ X \ L. Thus we have the advantage
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AdvSMPS of solving the subset membership problem.
AdvSMPS = |Pr[1← S | x∗ ∈ L]− Pr[1← S | x∗ ∈ X \ L]|
=
∣∣Pr[EL]− Pr[EX\L]∣∣ (6.3)
For the case of x∗ ∈ L, the simulation is perfect since the algorithms (Ξ1.PHash,
Ξ2.PHash) and (Ξ1.Hash,Ξ2.Hash) are equivalent. Thus we have∣∣∣∣Pr[EL]− 12
∣∣∣∣ = AdvIND-CCAA . (6.4)
For the case of x∗ ∈ X \ L, we modify the game to a new game such that the
simulator S rejects all ciphertexts C = (l, ~C, ~π) where l ∈ X \ L in the decryption
oracle ODecrypt in addition to those words, which cannot pass the proof verification.
Let Em be the event that S outputs 1 conditioned on x∗ ∈ X \ L in this modified
game, and E⊥ be the event that l ∈ X \ L and 〈~s, ~π〉 = Ξ2.Hash(K2, (l, ~C)). In
other words, E⊥ is the event that a ciphertext is rejected in the modified game but
accepted in the original game. Since the original game and the modified game are
identical until event E⊥ occurs, we have∣∣Pr[Em]− Pr[EX\L]∣∣ ≤ Pr[E⊥]. (6.5)
Lemma 6.1. The event E⊥ occurs in negligible probability as long as Ξ2 is a
universal2 HPS. More precisely, letting A query ODecrypt for at most q times, we
have a upper bound of the probability that E⊥ occurs.
Pr[E⊥] ≤ q · AdvUniversal2 (6.6)
Proof. Let C = (l, ~C, ~π) be a ciphertext submitted to the decryption oracle ODecrypt.
– Suppose that (l, ~C) = (x∗, ~C∗), the adversary A tries to find a ~π 6= ~π∗ such
that 〈~s, ~π〉 = 〈~s, ~π∗〉. Let ~̂π = ~π − ~π∗ 6= ~0. Since ~s is independent from A’s
view, it is impossible to find a ~̂π such that 〈~s, ~̂π〉 = 0.
– Suppose that (l, ~C) 6= (x∗, ~C∗), the adversary A tries to find a ~π such that
〈~s, ~π〉 = Ξ2.Hash(K2, (l, ~C)). Let π̂i = Ξ2.Hash(βi, (l, ~C)). Since




siΞ2.Hash(βi, (l, ~C)) = 〈~s, ~̂π〉
and ~s is independent from A’s view, we have 〈~s, ~π〉 = 〈~s, ~̂π〉 ⇐⇒ ~π = ~̂π.
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As the scheme allows at most η users (i.e. A can query OKeyGen for at most
η − 1 times), the adversary can get at most η − 1 pairs of (~s, 〈~s, ~β〉) where all
~s are linearly independent. In the worst case, the vector ~β is collapsed into
a space of dimension 1 with size |K ′| but ~β is still uniformly distributed over
that space. Let ~̂s ∈ Zηρ such that ~̂s is linearly independent with all ~s obtained
by A. Thus k = 〈~̂s, ~β〉 is independent from A’s view and uniformly distributed
over K ′. If A find a ~π such that ~π = ~̂π, we immediately have attacked the
universal2 property of Ξ2 that 〈~̂s, ~π〉 = Ξ2.Hash(k, (l, ~C)). This completes the
proof of Eq. (6.6).





Proof. Thanks to the diversity property of Ξ1, there exists a r ∈ K such that
Ξ1.Hash(r, x) = ξ and Ξ1.PKGen(r) = 0. Note that we do not need to calculate
r. Since ξ 6= 0, we have r 6= 0. Let ~γ = r · (~yb − ~y1−b) ∈ Kδ. Thus we have
Ξ1.Hash(γi, x
∗) = (yb,i − y1−b,i) · Ξ1.Hash(r, x∗) = yb,iξ − y1−b,iξ. Recall the target
ciphertext ~C∗ where C∗i = yb,iξ + Ξ1.Hash(αi, x
∗). Although ~C∗ is a ciphertext for
~yb, it can also be a ciphertext for ~y1−b that
C∗i = y1−b,iξ + Ξ1.Hash(αi + γi, x
∗)
= y1−b,iξ + Ξ1.Hash(αi, x
∗) + Ξ1.Hash(γi, x
∗)
= y1−b,iξ + Ξ1.Hash(αi, x
∗) + yb,iξ − y1−b,iξ
= yb,iξ + Ξ1.Hash(αi, x
∗).
Thus ~C∗ is a ciphertext of ~yb for ~α or ~y1−b for ~α + ~γ where ~α 6= ~α + ~γ. Since the
adversary A can only request the secret keys for ~x such that 〈~x, ~y0〉 = 〈~x, ~y1〉, we
have
〈~x, ~α + ~γ〉 = 〈~x, ~α〉+ 〈~x,~γ〉 = 〈~x, ~α〉+ 〈~x, r · (~yb − ~y1−b)〉 = 〈~x, ~α〉
Hence, the adversary A cannot distinguish ~α and ~α+ ~γ from generated keys. Since
PKGen(αi + γi) = PKGen(αi) + (yb,i− y1−b,i) ·PKGen(r) = PKGen(αi), the adversary
A cannot distinguish ~α and ~α + ~γ from public keys. Therefore, the hidden bit b is
independent from A’s view.
Combining Eqs. (6.5) to (6.7), we have∣∣∣∣Pr[EX\L]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ q · AdvUniversal2 . (6.8)
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Combining Eqs. (6.3), (6.4) and (6.8), we have
AdvIND-CCAA ≤ AdvSMPS + q · AdvUniversal2 . (6.9)
From Eq. (6.9), we immediately have the theorem.
6.5 Instantiations
In this section, we show two instantiations of construction 6.4 from the Decisional
Diffie-Hellman (DDH) and Decisional Composite Residuosity (DCR) problems.
6.5.1 From Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption
We recall the universal projective hash family proposed by Cramer and Shoup [CS02]
derived from a diverse group system based on the DDH problem (Definition 2.14).
The key space is K = Z2p. For the hash key k = (s1, s2) ∈ K, the projection
key generation is α(k) = gs11 g
s2
2 ∈ S = Π = G. To compute the hash value of
x = (X1, X2) ∈ X = G2 with the hash key k, it computes Hk(x) = Xs11 Xs22 ∈ Π.
To compute the have value of x = (gw1 , g
w
2 ) ∈ L with the projection key α(k) and a
witness w ∈ W = Zp, it computes Hk(x) = α(k)w ∈ Π.
By applying construction 6.2, we obtain a HPS Ξ1 as follows.
Construction 6.5. A DDH-based HPS contains the following algorithms.
– param← Setup(1λ): g1, g2 ∈R G, return param = (G, g1, g2).
– SK← SKGen(param): return SK = (k1, k2) ∈R Z2p.
– PK← PKGen(SK): return PK = gk11 gk22 .
– π ← Hash(SK, x): (x1, x2)← x, return π = xk11 xk22 .
– π ← PHash(PK, x, w): return π = PKw.
From Theorems 6.3 to 6.5 and |Π| = |Zp| = p, we have that Ξ1 has key linearity
and hash linearity, and is diverse. To ensure that the underlying group system is
diverse, we show the existence of φ (or equivalent secret key k). Let r ∈ Z+p and




2 ) ∈ L, we have Hk(x) = (gw1 )r(gw2 )−r logg2 g1 =




2 ) ∈ X \L, we have Hk(x) = (gw11 )r(gw22 )−r logg2 g1 = g
r(w1−w2)
1 .
To simplify our instantiation, we choose r = 1 and x = (g21, g2), and computes
χ = Ξ1.Hash(k, x) = g1.
By applying constructions 6.2 and 6.3, we obtain another HPS Ξ2 as follows,
which is universal2.
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Construction 6.6. A DDH-based universal2 HPS contains the following algorithms.
– param← Setup(1λ): g1, g2 ∈R G, return param = (G, g1, g2).
– SK← SKGen(param): return SK = (k1, k2, k3, k4) ∈R Z4p.
– PK← PKGen(SK): return PK = (h1, h2) = (gk11 gk22 , gk31 gk42 ).
– π ← Hash(SK, x, e): (x1, x2)← x, return π = xk11 xk22 · (xk31 xk42 )H(x1,x2,e).
– π ← PHash(PK, x, e, w): return π = (h1hH(x1,x2,e)2 )w.
From Theorem 6.4, we have that Ξ2 has hash linearity. Note that we use a
Collision Resistant Hash Function (CRHF) H : G2×Gδ → Zp instead of an injective
map Γ when applying construction 6.3.
With Ξ1 and Ξ2, we apply construction 6.4 to construct a functional encryption
scheme for the inner product functionality f : Zδp × Zδp → Zp.
Construction 6.7. Our instantiation works as follows.
– (PK,MSK)← Setup(1λ, 1δ, 1η):
H : G2 ×Gδ → Zp, g1, g2 ∈R G.





For i = 1 . . . η, βi = (βi,1, βi,2, βi,3, βi,4) ∈R Z4p,









return (PK,MSK) = (( ~A, ~B), (~α, ~β)).
– SK← KeyGen(MSK, ~x):
























return SK = (~x,~s,K1, K2).
– C ← Encrypt(PK, ~y):
r ∈R Zp, l = (u1, u2) = (gr1, gr2), For i = 1 . . . δ, Ci = g
yi
1 · Ari
h = H(u1, u2, C1, . . . , Cδ), For i = 1 . . . η, πi = (Bi,1 ·Bhi,2)r
return C = (l, ~C, ~π).
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– D ← Decrypt(SK, C):




















return D = logg1 D
∗.
As mentioned in Section 6.4, we can decrypt D in an alternative manner instead
of calculating logg1 D
∗ if |{D}| is polynomial-sized.
6.5.2 From Decisional Composite Residuosity Assumption
The DCR problem (Definition 2.15) is to distinguish two probability distributions
DP = {(N, x)} andDZ∗
N2
\P = {(N, x′)} where P = GN ′G2GT ⊂ Z∗N2 = GNGN ′G2GT .
Slightly different from [CS02], we have the corresponding HPS construction as
follows with W = {0, . . . , bN/4c}, K = {0, . . . , bN2/2c}, S = L = GN ′ , and
Π = X = GNGN ′ .
Construction 6.8. A DCR-based HPS contains the following algorithms.
– param← Setup(1λ): µ ∈R Z∗N2 , g = µ2N (mod N2), return param = (N, g).
– SK← SKGen(param): return SK = k ∈R {0, . . . , bN2/2c}.
– PK← PKGen(SK): return PK = gk (mod N2).
– π ← Hash(SK, x): return π = xk (mod N2).
– π ← PHash(PK, x = gw, w): return π = PKw (mod N2).
Remark that the value N in Setup is generated as described in Definition 2.15
and g is a generator of L = GN ′ with overwhelming probability. As shown in [CS02],
the construction 6.5 is derived from a diverse group system where the homomorphism
HN ′ sends all elements in L and no elements in X \L to the group identity 1. More
precisely, let gN be a generator of GN , and gN ′ be a generator of GN ′ . Since N ′ and
N are co-prime and an element x ∈ X can be represented as gaNgbN ′ for some a ∈ ZN









N ′ = g
aN ′
N 6= 1 if a 6= 0. Hence, for
all x ∈ L that a = 0, we have xN ′ = 1. Again, for all x ∈ X \L that a 6= 0, we have
xN
′ 6= 1.
From Theorems 6.3 to 6.5, the HPS Ξ1 by construction 6.8 has key linearity and
hash linearity that can be easily verified as gk1gk2 = gk1+k2 and xk1xk2 = xk1+k2 .
However, since |Π| is not prime, we have to verify the diversity explicitly. Let
ξ = 1 + N (mod N2), which is a generator of GN of order N . It is worth noting
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that ξa = 1 + aN (mod N2) and logξ x =
x−1 mod N2
N
for all a ∈ ZN and x ∈ GN
where the division does not mean the multiplicative inverse but the division of
integers. We show that the above HPS has diversity and ξ is a derived element
such that ∀x ∈ X \ L,∃k ∈ K,PKGen(k) = 1 ∧ Hash(k, x) = ξ where 1 is the





mod N where xN
′ ∈ GN
and the multiplicative inverse is computable for all x ∈ GNGN ′ with overwhelming
probability. Let k = rN ′. Since g is a generator of GN ′ of order N ′, we have
PKGen(k) = gk = grN
′
= 1 (mod N2). Since r−1 = logξ x
N ′ ⇐⇒ xN ′ = ξr−1 , we






)r = ξ. Hence, the diversity is verified with
the derived element ξ = 1 +N (mod N2).
Similarly to the DDH instantiation, by applying constructions 6.2 and 6.3, we
obtain a universal2 HPS Ξ2 with key linearity and hash linearity as follows.
Construction 6.9. A DCR-based universal2 HPS contains the following algorithms.
– param← Setup(1λ): µ ∈R Z∗N2 , g = µ2N (mod N2), return param = (N, g).
– SK← SKGen(param): return SK = (k1, k2) ∈R {0, . . . , bN2/2c}2.
– PK← PKGen(SK): return PK = (h1, h2) = (gk1 , gk2) (mod N2).
– π ← Hash(SK, x, e): return π = xk1 · xk2·H(x,e) (mod N2).
– π ← PHash(PK, x = gw, e, w): return π = (h1hH(x,e)2 )w (mod N2).
With Ξ1 and Ξ2, we apply construction 6.4 to construct a functional encryption
scheme for the inner product functionality1 f : ZδN × ZδN → ZN . Let ξ = 1 + N
(mod N2).
Construction 6.10. Our instantiation works as follows.
– (PK,MSK)← Setup(1λ, 1δ, 1η):
H : ZN2 × ZδN2 → {0, . . . , 2λ − 1}, µ ∈R Z∗N2 , g = µ2N (mod N2).
For i = 1 . . . δ, αi ∈R {0, . . . , bN2/2c}, Ai = gαi (mod N2).
For i = 1 . . . η, βi = (βi,1, βi,2) ∈R {0, . . . , bN2/2c}2,
Bi = (Bi,1, Bi,2) = (g
βi,1 , gβi,2) (mod N2).
return (PK,MSK) = (( ~A, ~B), (~α, ~β)).
– SK← KeyGen(MSK, ~x): The elements K1 and K2 are computed over Z.
~s ∈R ZηN , K1 =
δ∑
i=1










1We do not fully use the key space (i.e. |K| = bN2/2c > N).
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return SK = (~x,~s,K1, K2).
– C ← Encrypt(PK, ~y):
w ∈R {0, . . . , bN/4c}, l = gw (mod N2),
For i = 1 . . . δ, Ci = ξ
yi · Awi (mod N2)
h = H(l, C1, . . . , Cδ), For i = 1 . . . η, πi = (Bi,1 ·Bhi,2)w
return C = (l, ~C, ~π).
– D ← Decrypt(SK, C):












(mod N2), D =





In this chapter, we defined new properties of Hash Proof System (HPS). We found
that the existing HPS constructions by [CS02] have those new properties. As the
main contribution of this chapter, we proposed an IND-CCA secure Functional
Encryption for Inner Products scheme, which can be generically constructed from a
diverse HPS with key linearity and hash linearity, and a universal2 HPS with hash
linearity. Moreover, we constructed two concrete schemes from DDH and DCR
assumptions via our proposed generic construction.
One of our future work will be relaxing the scheme without limiting the number
of user who can decrypt. Another future work will be finding new HPS, which has
our defined properties, from other SMPs so that we can construct new FE schemes
under new assumptions.
Chapter 7
Hierarchical Functional Encryption for
Linear Transformations
In contrast to the conventional all-or-nothing encryption, Functional Encryption
(FE) allows partial revelation of encrypted information based on the keys associated
with different functionalities. Extending FE with key delegation ability, Hierarchical
Functional Encryption (HFE) enables a secret key holder to delegate a portion of its
decryption ability to others and the delegation can be done hierarchically. All HFE
schemes in the literature are for general functionalities and not very practical. In this
chapter, we focus on the functionality of linear transformations (i.e. matrix product
evaluation). We refine the definition of HFE and further extend the delegation
to accept multiple keys. We also propose a generic HFE construction for linear
transformations with Indistinguishability under Chosen Plaintext Attacks (IND-
CPA) security in the standard model from Hash Proof System (HPS). In addition,
we give two instantiations from the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) and Decisional
Composite Residuosity (DCR) assumptions which to the best of our knowledge are
the first practical concrete HFE constructions.
7.1 Introduction
Encryption can provide confidentiality and privacy for our sensitive information in
a variety of ways. Typically, conventional encryption is in an all-or-nothing fashion
that an entity is able to either access all the encrypted information or nothing,
excepting the message length. In contrast, Functional Encryption (FE) [BSW11]
allows partial revelation of encrypted information based on the keys associated with
different functionalities. Precisely, Alice can encrypt some message m under Bob’s
public key, and send the ciphertext to a public domain where Charlie can access.
Later, Bob issues a secret key for a function f to Charlie using a master secret key
corresponding to Bob’s public key. As a result, Charlie is able to learn f(m) from
the ciphertext and the secret key received from Bob but nothing else. Usually, the
function f is a universal function for a function class F indexed by a function key
k from a key space K s.t. F = {fk | k ∈ K}. In this case, Bob sends a secret key
111
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m
f(m) f ′(f(m)) g(m)
Figure 7.1: Nested Information Hierarchy
for a function key k to Charlie who learns f(k,m) or simply fk(m).
When Bob can control the amount of the information that Charlie can reveal, it
leads to a natural question of whether Charlie is able to further let other people (e.g.
David) obtain a narrower portion of his decryption ability. Hierarchical Functional
Encryption (HFE) [ABG+13, BS15, CGJS15] gives an affirmative answer. In HFE,
Charlie with a secret key associated with a function f is able to generate a new
secret key associated with a composed function f ′ ◦ f for David without the help of
Bob. Upon receiving the key from Charlie, David can learn f ′(f(m)) but nothing
else of the original message m, as illustrated in the information hierarchy in Fig. 7.1.
It is worth noting that the above delegation process is repeatable that David can
delegate a portion of his decryption ability to other people, making the hierarchy
grow deeper and deeper.
In this chapter, we focus on HFE for the functionality of matrix product evalu-
ation, which implies the function class of linear transformation via transformation
matrices. More precisely, the functionality is defined as f(A,X) = fA(X) = AX
where the matrix A is the transformation matrix (i.e. the function key) and the
matrix X is the message to be encrypted. It is easy to see that such a function-
ality is a natural generalisation of the functionality of inner product evaluation
[ABCP16, ABDCP15, ALS16, ZMY17].
There are a few practical applications of HFE for the functionality of matrix
product evaluation, including but not limited to descriptive statistics. Differing
from the functional encryption for inner product evaluation [ABCP16, ABDCP15,
ALS16, ZMY17], our proposed HFE allows the evaluation to be done in a levelled
manner. We take the calculation of the weighted sum as an example. Suppose Alice
is a researcher in a consulting firm conducting marketing research on the demand
of various products and the company will sell Alice’s results to different clients.
Once the research results are ready, Alice encrypts the demand level of different
areas for each product (e.g. X =
[
2 1 9 0 6 2 5 6 1
]>
for the demand
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of coffee in different regions) under her company’s public key. As the manager of
Alice’s company, Bob has the master secret key and decides to sell Alice’s result
in different levels and at different prices. Suppose Charlie wants to buy from Bob
some information he is interested in. He does not want all the details but a overall
score for the demand of coffee, and he is more interested in the areas near his store,
i.e. those areas will have a higher weight. Hence, Charlie buys a secret key of a
weighted matrix (e.g. A =
[
0 1 2 3 4 3 2 1 0
]
) from Bob for a low price
so that he can learn a summary of the market demand (e.g. AX = 65 for coffee).
With HFE, Bob is also able to sell Alice’s result to some regional resellers (or
proxies), e.g. David. Unlike Charlie, David wants the details of some regions and




01,5 5 4 1 2
]
) from Bob for a higher price so that he learns
Alice’s partial result (e.g. AX =
[
2 1 9 0 6 38
]>
for coffee). Later, David
can resell what he obtained from Bob to other clients in his region. For example,
another store manager Eve in David’s region is interested in Alice’s result, and
decides to buy some market information for her nearby regions from David. In
the reselling process, David uses his secret key for A to generate a new secret key
for C = BA based on Eve’s demand (e.g. B =
[





20 15 10 5 2 0 0 0 0
]
). Once Eve gets the key, she can learn CX
from Alice’s research (e.g. CX = 157 for coffee). On the other hand, David can
also resell his data obtained from Bob to other resellers in different levels and at
different prices.
There are many potential applications of HFE for linear transformation, such
as those related to descriptive statistics as demonstrated above. In this chapter,
we introduce and formalise this useful cryptographic primitive and present a generic
construction of it. We also show two practical instantiations of the generic construc-
tion based on some standard assumptions.
7.1.1 Related Work
The formal study of Functional Encryption (FE) was initiated by Boneh et al.
[BSW11] with syntax and security model defined for general functionality. In this
chapter, we focus on the public-key FE. Other than Predicate Encryption (PE)
[KSW08] (a subclass of FE) and theoretical constructions [GGH+13] for arbitrary
functionality, Abdalla et al. [ABDCP15] focused on the functionality of inner prod-
uct evaluation that only the inner product 〈~x, ~y〉 of the encrypted vector ~y is revealed
with a secret key for the vector ~x. Furthermore, the authors challenged to construct
practical schemes with such a functionality, and proposed an s-IND-CPA secure
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generic construction from any s-IND-CPA Public Key Encryption (PKE) schemes
with the properties of randomness reuse, linear key homomorphism, and linear ci-
phertext homomorphism under shared randomness. Precisely, Selective Security
against Chosen Plaintext Attacks (s-IND-CPA) is a weaker notion of the standard
Indistinguishability under Chosen Plaintext Attacks (IND-CPA) where the adver-
sary is required to submit the target plaintexts before receiving the public key from
the challenger. Based on [ABDCP15], Abdalla et al. [ABCP16] enhanced their
previous generic construction [ABDCP15] to the standard IND-CPA security from
any s-IND-CPA PKE schemes with the properties of linear key homomorphism, lin-
ear ciphertext homomorphism under shared randomness, `-public-key reproducibil-
ity, and `-ciphertext reproducibility. The authors also showed several instantia-
tions from various s-IND-CPA PKE schemes based on Decisional Diffie-Hellman
(DDH) assumption [DH76], Decisional Composite Residuosity (DCR) assumption
[BCP03, Pai99], and Learning With Error (LEW) assumption [Reg05]. Independent
from [ABCP16], Agrawal et al. [ALS16] constructed FE schemes for inner products
directly from DDH, DCR, and LEW assumptions instead of a generic construction,
and obtained better efficiency. It is worth noting that the proofs of the DDH con-
struction and the DCR construction in [ALS16] are implicitly built on Hash Proof
System (HPS) [CS02] as the HPS makes the secret keys simulatable and IND-CPA
security achievable. In contrast to [ALS16], Zhang et al. [ZMY17] (see Chapter 6 for
details) recently provided another framework of constructing Functional Encryption
for Inner Products (FE-IP) explicitly from HPS with the properties of key linear-
ity, hash linearity and diversity. Also, the authors further improved the security
from IND-CPA to Indistinguishability under adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attacks
(IND-CCA).
There are several extension works [ARW16, ABG+13, BJK15] on Functional
Encryption. As one of those extensions, Hierarchical Functional Encryption (HFE)
enables delegation capability, which is initially mentioned in [ABG+13], generalis-
ing the notions of hierarchical identity-based encryption [BBG05] and hierarchical
predicate encryption [LOS+10] for more expressive access controls. In particular,
[ABG+13, BS15, CGJS15] define HFE as a normal FE with an extra delegation al-
gorithm that takes a function key SKf and a function f
′ and outputs a function key
SKf ′◦f . As mentioned before (Fig. 7.1), the newly generated key SKf ′◦f allows reve-
lation of f ′(f(m)) but nothing else from the encrypted message m. In the literature,
Ananth et al. [ABG+13] and Chandran et al. [CGJS15] purposed general purpose
HFE constructions direct from indistinguishable obfuscation (iO) with fixed depth
where the delegation process can only be proceeded for a fixed number of times. As
an improvement, Brakerski et al. [BS15] proposed a generic transformation from
any general purpose FE to a general purpose HFE with unbounded depth. The
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transformation requires a private-key encryption scheme and a puncturable pseudo-
random function family, and does not rely on iO. As far as we know, all the HFE
schemes in the literature are general purposed and not very practical.
7.1.2 Our Contribution
In this chapter, we refine and simplify the definition of Hierarchical Functional En-
cryption (HFE) originally from [ABG+13, BS15, CGJS15]. We merge the delegation
algorithm SKf ′◦f ← Delegate(SKf , f ′) with the key generation algorithm SKfk ←
KeyGen(MSK, k) to form a new key generation algorithm SKf ′◦f ← KeyGen(SKf , f ′),
making the master secret key equivalent to a secret key of an identity function
MSK
def
= SKid. As a result, our definition of HFE consists of four algorithms instead
of five algorithms, and it is compatible with the IND-CPA security model defined for
the normal FE, which is much simpler than the previously defined model for HFE.
In terms of the evolution of encryption, our definition of HFE is a more natural
generalisation of Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption (HIBE) [BBG05].
As an extension of HFE, we introduce the notion of extended Hierarchical Func-
tional Encryption (eHFE), allowing delegation from multiple secret keys. Precisely,
in eHFE, the key generation algorithm takes n secret keys SKf1 , . . . , SKfn for func-
tions f1, . . . , fn correspondingly and a delegation function f
′, and it generates a new
secret key SKf for a function f such that f(x) = f
′(f1(x), . . . , fn(x)).
We derive the definition of Hierarchical Functional Encryption for Linear Trans-
formations (HFE-LT) from HFE (similarly, extended Hierarchical Functional En-
cryption for Linear Transformations (eHFE-LT) from eHFE) for the functionality of
matrix product evaluation. Different from the previous general results which are of
theoretical interest, we propose a generic and practical construction of HFE-LT. It is
worth noting that our construction has unbounded depth in delegation (Table 7.1).
Since the HFE-LT scheme cannot be trivially constructed from function encryption
for inner products, our generic construction is explicitly built from HPS with key
linearity, hash linearity and diversity, and achieves IND-CPA security in the stan-
dard model. As an extension, we also adapt our generic HFE-LT construction to
a generic eHFE-LT construction. We provide two practical HFE-LT instantiations
based on the DDH assumption and the DCR assumption. In the DDH instantia-
tion, the decryption space is limited to be of polynomial size so that the decryption
can be done in polynomial time. However, in the DCR instantiation, there is no
such limitation. In addition, both instantiations can be extended to the eHFE-LT
setting.
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Table 7.1: Comparison of Different FE Schemes
Scheme Functionality Assumption Hierarchical Depth Multi-Key
[ABG+13] Generic iO Yes Constant No
[CGJS15] Generic iO + HIBE Yes Fixed No





[ALS16] Inner Product DDH/DCR/LWE No × No




Our eHFE-LT Matrix Product Diverse HPS Yes Unbounded Yes
7.1.3 Chapter Organisation
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. It is strongly suggested to read the
preliminaries in Chapter 2, especially the notations used in this thesis, the definition
of FE in Chapter 3, and the extended HPS in Section 6.3. As our main contribution,
we refine HFE and define HFE-LT in Section 7.2. The generic construction from
HPS is proposed in Section 7.3 with the security proof. In Section 7.4, we adapt
HFE to eHFE in terms of the definition, the generic construction, and the security
proof. After that, we propose our concrete HFE-LT constructions instantiated from
DDH and DCR assumptions in Section 7.5. Finally, this chapter is summarised in
Section 7.6.
7.2 Formal Definitions
In this section, we briefly review the definition of Hierarchical Functional Encryption
(HFE) in the literature. After that, we formalise our refined definition of HFE.
In [ABG+13, BS15, CGJS15], the HFE is defined as a normal FE with an ex-
tra delegation algorithm Delegate. The (probably) randomised algorithm SKf ′◦f ←
Delegate(SKf , f
′) takes a secret key SKf for a function f : X → Z ⊂ Y , and an
another function f ′ : Z → Z ′ ⊂ Y as inputs where Z,Z ′ are the images of the func-
tions f, f ′ correspondingly. It generates a new secret key SKf ′◦f for the composed
function f ′ ◦ f : X → Z ′ ⊂ Y . By observing the key generation algorithm SKfk ←
KeyGen(MSK, k) and the delegation algorithm SKf ′◦f ← Delegate(SKf , f ′), we find
that the algorithm KeyGen is actually a special case of the algorithm Delegate when
the master secret key MSK is considered as a secret key SKid of an identity function.
More precisely, we have KeyGen(MSK, k)
def
= Delegate(SKid, fk) → SKfk◦id = SKfk
with MSK
def
= SKid. Therefore, the duplicated algorithm can be removed, and it
becomes a more natural generalisation of Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption
(HIBE) [BBG05] as there is no Delegate algorithm in HIBE. The refined HFE is
formalised as follows.




b ∈R {0, 1}
C ← Encrypt(PK, xb)
b′ ← AOKeyGen(C)
OKeyGen(k)
K ← K ∪ {k}
return SK← KeyGen(MSK, k)
OKeyGen(f, f ′)
k ← K s.t. fk = f ′ ◦ f ∈ F
return SK← OKeyGen(k)
AdvIND-CPAA =
∣∣∣∣Pr [b = b′ | ∀k ∈ K, fk(x0) = fk(x1)]− 12
∣∣∣∣
Figure 7.2: IND-CPA Game resolved for HFE
Definition 7.1 (Hierarchical Functional Encryption). A Hierarchical Functional
Encryption (HFE) for a function class F = {fk : X → Y | k ∈ K} consists of the
following four polynomial time algorithms:
(PK,MSK)← Setup(1λ), SKf ′◦f ← KeyGen(SKf , f ′),
C ← Encrypt(PK, x), y = f(x)← Decrypt(SKf , C).
While other three algorithms work as in Definition 3.1, the refined key generation
algorithm KeyGen takes a secret key for function f ∈ F : X → Z ⊂ Y , and a
function f ′ : Z → Z ′ ⊂ Y as inputs such that fk = f ′ ◦ f ∈ F for some k ∈ K. The
algorithm KeyGen outputs a secret key for the function fk. The master secret key is
defined as a secret key for the identity function (MSK
def
= SKid) and thus it can be
directly used in the decryption algorithm Decrypt.
Remark 7.1. The secret key holders should be careful in the secret key generation.
If the delegation function f ′ is invertible, the newly generated secret key SKf ′◦f ←
KeyGen(SKf , f
′) is equivalent to the original secret key SKf since
KeyGen(SKf ′◦f , f
′−1) = SKf ′−1◦f ′◦f = SKid◦f = SKf .
As the above operations can be done in the ideal world, it is not considered as a
security issue in the real world, even with a secure scheme.
Since the syntax is similar to the normal FE, the definition of the IND-CPA
security (Definition 3.2) can be re-used for HFE. When the adversary A query the
key generation oracle OKeyGen for functions f and f ′ to obtain a new secret key
SKf ′◦f in HFE, it can be resolved by querying the original oracle OKeyGen with a
function key k since fk = f
′ ◦ f ∈ F for some k ∈ K. The resolved security model
is illustrated in Fig. 7.2. Using the security model of FE for HFE, we implicitly
require that the secret key and the delegated key have the same distribution.
With the refined definition of HFE, we derive the syntax of our HFE for Linear
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Transformations.
Definition 7.2 (Hierarchical Functional Encryption for Linear Transformations).
Let R be a ring, K = {A | A ∈ Ri×δ, i ∈ Z+}, X = Rδ×γ, and Y = {Y | Y ∈
Ri×γ, i ∈ Z+}. The universal function f : K ×X → Y is defined as fA : X 7→ AX.
In short, the transformation function fA is simply denoted by the internal transfor-
mation matrix A. A Hierarchical Functional Encryption for Linear Transformations
(HFE-LT) is an HFE for a function class F = {fk : X → Y | k ∈ K}, consisting of
the following four polynomial time algorithms:
(PK,MSK)← Setup(1λ, 1δ, 1γ), SKBA ← KeyGen(SKA,B),
C ← Encrypt(PK,X), Y = AX← Decrypt(SKA, C).
It is clear that the system setup algorithm Setup specifies the dimensions of K,
X, and Y by the extra inputs δ and γ. Again, the master secret key is a secret key
for the identity matrix that MSK
def
= SKI. Since the properties of ring are not fully
used in matrix multiplication, the above definition can be extended to any algebraic
structure (even different structures for K, X, and Y ) as long as (BA)X = B(AX)
with all operations valid. In addition to the key generation algorithm KeyGen, if
the delegation matrix B is invertible, the newly generated key is equivalent to the
original key since KeyGen(KeyGen(SKA,B),B
−1) = SKB−1BA = SKA.
7.3 Generic Construction from Hash Proof Sys-
tems
In this section, we propose a generic construction of HFE-LT from HPS and prove
its security. It is strongly recommended that the readers should read Section 2.2
in advance since our construction is based on the notations defined in Section 2.2.
We also suggest that the readers should review the extended HPS described in
Section 6.3.
7.3.1 The Construction
Let Ξ = (Setup, SKGen,PKGen,Hash,PHash) be a diverse HPS associated with an
Subset Membership Problem (SMP) instance Λ = (X,L,W,R) and further spaces
(K,S,Π). The HPS Ξ is required to have hash linearity for completeness and key
linearity for soundness. Let ξ ∈ Π \ {0} be an element derived from the diversity of
the HPS Ξ, and n be the order of the group Π′ = {aξ | a ∈ Z}. Our HFE-LT with
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R = Zn works as follows1.
– (PK,MSK) ← Setup(1λ, 1δ, 1γ): Given a security parameter 1λ and the size
δ×γ of message matrices, the system setup algorithm generates a system-wide
parameter param← Ξ.Setup(1λ). The algorithm generates a key matrix KI of
size δ×γ as the core part of the secret key of the identity matrix Iδ ∈ Zδ×δn by
invoking Ξ.SKGen(param) for δ× γ times. After that, the algorithm generates
the corresponding public keys P = Ξ.PKGen(KI). The full secret key for the
identity matrix is packed as SKI = (Iδ,KI). Finally, the algorithm publishes








kδ,1 · · · kδ,γ
 ∈ Kδ×γ s.t. ki,j ← Ξ.SKGen(param),
P = Ξ.PKGen(KI), SKI = (Iδ,KI).
return (PK,MSK) = (P, SKI).
– SKBA ← KeyGen(SKA,B): In the key generation algorithm, the algorithm
recognises the secret key SKA for the matrix A. If the secret key is not in
the form of SKA = (A,KA) ∈ Zm×δn ×Km×γ for some m ∈ Z+, the algorithm
returns ⊥ for failure indication. The algorithm also checks the validity of
the parameter B ∈ Zm′×mn for some m′ ∈ Z+. If all parameters are valid




′×γ for the matrix BA. Remark that BKA =
BAKI.
– C ← Encrypt(PK,X): To encrypt a matrix X ∈ Zδ×γn , the algorithm randomly
samples a word x in the language L with a witness w such that (x,w) ∈ R.
After that, the algorithm computes the core part of the ciphertext C = Xξ +
Ξ.PHash(P, x, w) ∈ Πδ×γ. The full ciphertext is C = (x,C).
(x,w) ∈R R, C = Xξ + Ξ.PHash(P, x, w).
return C = (x,C).
– Y ← Decrypt(SKA, C): To decrypt a ciphertext C = (x,C) ∈ X × Πδ×γ
with a secret key SKA = (A,KA) ∈ Zm×δn × Km×γ, the algorithm computes
1From the key linearity and hash linearity, we have that |K| ≥ |Π| ≥ |Π′| = n, and n could be
maximised by summing two or more elements derived from the diversity if those elements generate
different groups.
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an intermediate value D = AC − Ξ.Hash(KA, x) ∈ Πm×γ. After that, the
algorithm find the scalar of D with the base ξ as the final decryption result
Y = scaξ(D) ∈ Zm×γn .
D = AC− Ξ.Hash(KA, x).
return Y = scaξ(D).
We show that our construction is complete by verifying the decryption algorithm.
Starting from the intermediate value D, we have
D = AC− Ξ.Hash(KA, x)
= A(Xξ + Ξ.PHash(P, x, w))− Ξ.Hash(KA, x)
= AXξ + AΞ.PHash(P, x, w)− Ξ.Hash(KA, x)
= AXξ + AΞ.Hash(KI, x)− Ξ.Hash(KA, x)
= AXξ + Ξ.Hash(AKI, x)− Ξ.Hash(AKI, x)
= AXξ.
Then the completeness of our construction is verified by
Y = scaξ(D) = scaξ(AXξ) = AX.
7.3.2 Security Proof
Theorem 7.1. The proposed HFE-LT construction in Section 7.3.1 is IND-CPA
secure if the SMP instance Λ associated with the underlying diverse HPS Ξ is hard.
Proof. In this proof, we require the underlying HPS Ξ to have diversity instead of
smoothness introduced by Cramer and Shoup [CS02], which is used to prove the
security of an IND-CPA PKE scheme. The reason is that the smoothness only pre-
vents the information leakage of the hashing value from the public hash keys but not
from the secret hash keys. In other words, the adversary may be able to distinguish
ciphertexts via secret keys obtained from the key generation algorithm KeyGen of
the HFE-LT scheme. If we follow the proof in [CS02] that the hash values are re-
placed with random values, the adversary can recognise this game modification with
overwhelming probability by running the decryption algorithm since the adversary
finds that Decrypt(SKA, C) 6= AX0 and Decrypt(SKA, C) 6= AX1 where C is the
challenge ciphertext of X0 or X1. Moreover, we are still able to use a perfectly
smooth HPS since it implies diversity (see Section 6.3.1 for more details).
To prove the theorem, we show that an simulator S can be constructed to solve
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the SMP instance Λ = (X,L,W,R) in polynomial time with non-negligible proba-
bility if an adversary A can win the IND-CPA game with non-negligible probability.
Let (Λ, x∗) be the actual subset membership problem challenged to the simulator
S. The objective of the simulator S is to distinguish whether x∗ ∈ L or x∗ ∈ X \ L
with x∗ sampled from L or X \ L with equal probability. Following the IND-CPA
game (Fig. 3.1 defined in Section 3.2.2), the simulator S runs the system setup
algorithm Setup to generate a key pair (PK,MSK) = (P, SKI), and passes the public
key PK to the adversary A in the setup phase. During the pre-challenge phase, the
simulator S invokes the key generation algorithm KeyGen with the master secret key
MSK = SKI to answer the key generation oracle OKeyGen directly. The restriction for
the adversaryA is thatA can only query the secret keys for A such that AX0 = AX1
where X0 and X1 are the target message matrices output byA in the challenge phase.
At some point, the adversary A outputs two target message matrices X0 and X1,
changing the game state to the challenge phase. The simulator S tosses a random
coin b ∈R {0, 1}, and computes the target ciphertext C∗ = (x∗,C∗) different to the
encryption algorithm Encrypt where
C∗ = Xbξ + Ξ.Hash(KI, x
∗).
The target ciphertext C∗ is then sent to the adversary A. In the post-challenge
phase, the adversary A is allowed to access the oracle OKeyGen as before with the
same restriction. Eventually, the adversary A outputs a bit b′ in the guessing phase.
If b = b′, the adversary A wins, and the simulator S outputs 1. Otherwise, the
simulator S outputs 0 instead. Finally, the simulator S halts and completes the
simulation.
After the simulation, we analyse the probabilities in the style of [CS02, ZMY17].
Let EL be the event that S outputs 1 conditioned on x∗ ∈ L, and EX\L be the event
that S outputs 1 conditioned on x∗ ∈ X \ L. The advantage AdvSMPS of solving the
subset membership problem is
AdvSMPS ≥ |Pr[1← S | x∗ ∈ L]− Pr[1← S | x∗ ∈ X \ L]| =
∣∣Pr[EL]− Pr[EX\L]∣∣
(7.1)
For the case of x∗ ∈ L, the simulation is perfect since the algorithms Ξ.Hash and




For the case of x∗ ∈ X \ L, we show that the hidden bit b is independent from the
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Since the element ξ is an element derived from the the diversity of the HPS Ξ, we
have that there exists a k ∈ K such that PKGen(k) = 0 and Ξ.Hash(k, x∗) = ξ where
k is not required to be efficiently computable. Let Γ = (Xb−X1−b) · k ∈ Kδ×γ. We
have
Ξ.Hash(Γ, x∗) = Ξ.Hash((Xb −X1−b) · k, x∗)
= (Xb −X1−b) · Ξ.Hash(k, x∗)
= (Xb −X1−b)ξ
= Xbξ −X1−bξ.
Based on Ξ.Hash(Γ, x∗) = Xbξ −X1−bξ, we argue that the target ciphertext C∗ is
not only a valid ciphertext of the message Xb under the key KI but also a valid
ciphertext of the message X1−b under the key K
∗
I = KI +Γ. More precisely, we have
C∗ = X1−bξ + Ξ.Hash(KI + Γ, x
∗)
= X1−bξ + Ξ.Hash(KI, x
∗) + Ξ.Hash(Γ, x∗)
= X1−bξ + Ξ.Hash(KI, x
∗) + Xbξ −X1−bξ
= Xbξ + Ξ.Hash(KI, x
∗).
Furthermore, we show that it is impossible for the adversary A to distinguish KI and
K∗I from the public key P or the secret keys KA obtained from the key generation
oracle OKeyGen. Since Ξ.PKGen(k) = 0 from the diversity, the keys KI and K∗I have
the same public key
P = Ξ.PKGen(KI + Γ)
= Ξ.PKGen(KI) + Ξ.PKGen(Γ)
= Ξ.PKGen(KI) + Ξ.PKGen((Xb −X1−b) · k)
= Ξ.PKGen(KI) + (Xb −X1−b) · Ξ.PKGen(k)
= Ξ.PKGen(KI).
Since the adversary A is restricted that A can only query the secret keys for A such
that AX0 = AX1 ⇐⇒ A(X0 −X1) = 0, the keys KI and K∗I generate the same
secret key KA for such a matrix A for the adversary A as
KA = A(KI + Γ) = AKI + AΓ = AKI + A(Xb −X1−b) · k = AKI.
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Hence, the hidden bit b is independent from the adversary A’s view.
By combining Eqs. (7.1) to (7.3), we have the following inequality and complete
the proof.
AdvIND-CPAA ≤ AdvSMPS .
7.4 Extensions
In the Definition 7.1, the delegation is performed by one party with a secret key
SKf and a delegation function f
′ so that the delegated party can learn f ′(f(x)).
In order not to be restricted to nested hierarchy, the HFE can be extended to
allow delegation performed by multiple parties. Precisely, n secret key holders with
SKf1 , . . . , SKfn can work together to generate a secret key SKf∗ for a function f
∗
defined as f ∗(x) = f ′ (f1(x), . . . , fn(x)) where f
′ is a delegation function, which
takes n inputs. The extended HFE is formalised as follows.
Definition 7.3 (extended Hierarchical Functional Encryption). An extended Hier-
archical Functional Encryption (eHFE) for a function class F = {fk : X → Y | k ∈
K} consists of the following four polynomial time algorithms:
(PK,MSK)← Setup(1λ), SKfk ← KeyGen(SKfk1 , . . . SKfkn , f
′),
C ← Encrypt(PK, x), y = f(x)← Decrypt(SKf , C).
While all other components work as in Definition 7.1, the extended key generation al-
gorithm KeyGen takes n secret keys for function fki ∈ F : X → Zi ⊂ Y , and a func-
tion f ′ : Z1 × · · · × Zn → Z ′ ⊂ Y as inputs such that fk(x)
def
= f ′(fk1(x), . . . , fk2(x))
and fk ∈ F for some k ∈ K. The algorithm KeyGen outputs a secret key for the
function fk. It is worth noting the number n of parameters of the algorithm KeyGen
is not fixed by the system setup algorithm Setup.
Similar to HFE, the definition of the IND-CPA security (Definition 3.2) can
also be applied to eHFE with the same method to resolve the queries to the key
generation oracle OKeyGen. Based on Definitions 7.2 and 7.3, we derive the syntax of
our extended HFE-LT.
Definition 7.4 (extended Hierarchical Functional Encryption for Linear Trans-
formations). Let R be a ring, K = {A | A ∈ Ri×δ, i ∈ Z+}, X = Rδ×γ, and
Y = {Y | Y ∈ Ri×γ, i ∈ Z+}. The universal function f : K ×X → Y is defined as
fA : X 7→ AX. An extended Hierarchical Functional Encryption for Linear Trans-
formations (eHFE-LT) is an eHFE for a function class F = {fk : X → Y | k ∈ K},
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consisting of the following four polynomial time algorithms:
(PK,MSK)← Setup(1λ, 1δ, 1γ), SKB ← KeyGen(SKA1 , . . . , SKAn ,T),
C ← Encrypt(PK,X), Y = AX← Decrypt(SKA, C).





∣∣ · · · ∣∣A>n )> .
The construction of our eHFE-LT scheme is exactly the same as the HFE-LT
scheme in Section 7.3.1 except the key generation algorithm. The idea of con-
structing the new key generation algorithm is simple due to the special structure




∣∣ · · · ∣∣A>` )>, and then runs the original key generation algorithm
KeyGen(SKA,T) to obtain the final key SKB. More precisely, we have
– SKB ← KeyGen(SKA1 , . . . , SKA` ,T): Given ` secret keys for Ai ∈ Zmi×δn , the









∣∣ · · · ∣∣A>` )> , KB = T (K>A1 ∣∣ · · · ∣∣K>A`)> .




Theorem 7.2. The proposed eHFE-LT construction in Section 7.4 is IND-CPA
secure if the SMP instance Λ associated with the underlying diverse HPS Ξ is hard.
Proof. The proof follows the same lines as in Section 7.3.2 and is omitted.
7.5 Instantiations
In this section, we instantiate our generic HFE-LT construction from the DDH
problem and from the DCR problem. Remark that the HFE-LT instantiations can
be easily converted to eHFE-LT instantiations as discussed in Section 7.4. For better
readability, we use multiplication in this section instead of addition in the previous
sections for the group operations related to HPS. Therefore, all scalar multiplications
on groups related to HPS are replaced by exponentiations.
7.5.1 From Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption
We recall the DDH-based HPS construction (construction 6.5 in Section 6.5.1),
which has key linearity, hash linearity, and diversity with g1 as a derived element
2.
2All elements in G are elements derived from the diversity.
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Let ξ = g1. Our HFE-LT instantiation of R = Zp works as follows.
– (PK,MSK)← Setup(1λ, 1δ, 1γ):
g1, g2 ∈ G, KI =













Pδ,1 · · · Pδ,γ
 s.t. Pi,j = gki,j,11 gki,j,22 , SKI = (Iδ,KI).
return (PK,MSK) = ((g1, g2,P), SKI).
– SKBA ← KeyGen(SKA,B): return SKBA = (BA,BKA).
– C ← Encrypt(PK,X):
w ∈R Zp, x = (x1, x2) = (gw1 , gw2 ),





Xδ,1 · · · Xδ,γ
← X ∈ Zδ×γp ,
C =





Cδ,1 · · · Cδ,γ
 s.t. Ci,j = ξXi,jPwi,j = gXi,j1 Pwi,j.
return C = (x,C).
– Y ← Decrypt(SKA, C):




(km,1,1, km,1,2) · · · (km,γ,1, km,γ,2)
← KA ∈ (Z2p)m×γ,





Am,1 · · · Am,δ
← A ∈ Zm×δp ,
D =





Dm,1 · · · Dm,γ











return Y = logξ D = logg1 D.
Remark the calculation of logg1 D can be done in polynomial time if the decryption
space {Y} is polynomial sized.
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7.5.2 From Decisional Composite Residuosity Assumption
We recall the DCR-based HPS construction (construction 6.8 in Section 6.5.2),
which has key linearity, hash linearity, and diversity with a derived element 1 + N
(mod N2).
Let ξ = 1 + N (mod N2). Our HFE-LT instantiation of R = ZN works as
follows3.
– (PK,MSK)← Setup(1λ, 1δ, 1γ):
µ ∈R Z∗N2 , g = µ2N (mod N2),
KI =





kδ,1 · · · kδ,γ
 ∈R {0, . . . , bN2/2c}δ×γ,
P =





Pδ,1 · · · Pδ,γ
 s.t. Pi,j = gki,j (mod N2), SKI = (Iδ,KI).
return (PK,MSK) = ((N, g,P), SKI).
– SKBA ← KeyGen(SKA,B): return SKBA = (BA,BKA) where BKA is com-
puted over Z.
– C ← Encrypt(PK,X):
w ∈R {0, . . . , bN/4c}, x = gw (mod N2),




Xδ,1 · · · Xδ,γ
← X ∈ Zδ×γN ,
C =





Cδ,1 · · · Cδ,γ
 s.t. Ci,j = ξXi,jPwi,j = (1 +Xi,jN)Pwi,j (mod N2).
return C = (x,C).
3We do not fully use the key space (i.e. |K| = bN2/2c > N).
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– Y ← Decrypt(SKA, C):




Am,1 · · · Am,δ
← A ∈ Zm×δN ,





km,1 · · · km,γ
← KA ∈ Zm×γ,
D =





Dm,1 · · · Dm,γ







Y = logξ D =





Ym,1 · · · Ym,γ
 s.t. Yi,j = Di,j − 1 mod N2N .
return Y.
7.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we revisited and simplified the definition of HFE, and further ex-
tended it to eHFE. We derived the notion of HFE-LT from HFE (and eHFE-LT from
eHFE), allowing matrix product evaluation. Furthermore, we proposed a generic
construction of HFE-LT (and eHFE-LT) with IND-CPA security in the standard
model from HPS with key and hash linearity, and diversity. To illustrate that our
scheme is practical, we presented two concrete HFE-LT instantiations from the DDH
and DCR assumptions.
This chapter proposed a practical HFE construction for matrix product evalu-
ation. It is still an open problem whether we could build a practical HFE for other
functionalities and we leave it as our future work.
Part IV




In this chapter, we summarise the work presented in this thesis and present some
future research directions.
8.1 Conclusion
In this thesis, we reviewed the notion of functional encryption, which allows decryp-
tion of partial information and captures a large class of functionalities. Particularly,
we presented practical functional encryption schemes for two specific functionalities:
data search and data sharing.
For cryptosystems that can be applied to data search, we introduced a new prim-
itive named Threshold Broadcast Encryption with Keyword Search (TBEKS) and
a generic conversion from Linear Encryption Template (LET) to Linear Encryption
with Keyword Search (LEKS) that can be applied to various Public Key Encryp-
tion schemes. More specifically, we formally defined TBEKS and its security model
named Indistinguishability in the threshold setting under Chosen Keyword Attacks
(IND-T-CKA) and proposed the first TBEKS scheme with IND-T-CKA security un-
der the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption. For LEKS, we for-
malised the definition and its security models: Indistinguishability under Adaptive
Chosen Keyword Attacks (IND-CKA) and Indistinguishability under Selective-ID
Adaptive Chosen Keyword Attacks (IND-sCKA). We proposed a Public-key Encryp-
tion with Keyword Search (PEKS) scheme from a Public Key Encryption (PKE)
scheme via our LEKS conversion. Moreover, we proposed the first secure Key-Policy
Attribute-Based Encryption with Keyword Search (KP-ABKS) scheme converted
from a Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE) scheme. With our KP-
ABKS, we were able to do privacy-preserved keyword search with fine-grained access
control in the cloud. Our PEKS and KP-ABKS schemes were proven secure based
on the Decisional Bilinear (P, f)-Diffie-Hellman ((P, f)-DBDH) problem family and
Decisional `-Combined Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (`-DCBDH) problem, which we de-
fined and proved computationally hard in the generic group model.
For cryptosystems that can be applied to data sharing, we proposed a Func-
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tional Encryption for Inner Products (FE-IP) scheme and a Hierarchical Functional
Encryption for Linear Transformations (HFE-LT) scheme, which allow the user to
learn only partial information about the encrypted data from decryption. The FE-
IP we proposed is proven secure under an enhanced security model named Indis-
tinguishability under adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attacks (IND-CCA). In order to
construct an IND-CCA secure FE-IP, we extended the Hash Proof System (HPS)
with new properties, which is of independent interest. Using the extended HPS,
we constructed our HFE-LT based on a refined definition of Hierarchical Functional
Encryption (HFE). Notably in our proposed HFE-LT, the decryption ability is lev-
elled and a lower level secret key can be generated by the secret key holder of the
upper level. In addition, we extended HFE and HFE-LT to extended Hierarchical
Functional Encryption (eHFE) and extended Hierarchical Functional Encryption
for Linear Transformations (eHFE-LT) where the decryption ability is able to be
derived from multiple parties instead of a single one. Finally, we proposed instanti-
ations of FE-IP and HFE-LT from Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) and Decisional
Composite Residuosity (DCR) assumptions.
Besides, we proposed an encoding technique and improved the efficiency of the
inequality test in Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE).
8.2 Future Work
In data search, we proposed a semi-generic framework that converts an encryption
scheme to a keyword search scheme. An interesting future work is to find out
more LET-compatible encryption schemes in order to enable new keyword search
paradigms based on various access control mechanisms. Furthermore, we did not
consider the Keyword Guessing Attack (KGA) for our schemes. From the view of
Functional Encryption for Equality Tests (FE-ET), it is impossible to prevent such
an attack in the public key setting. However, it is still an interesting topic to find a
different method to do privacy-preserved keyword search with resistance to KGA.
In data sharing, we focused on the practical functionalities of inner products
and matrix products. Finding new practical and meaningful functionalities and
constructing the corresponding Functional Encryption (FE) schemes are perhaps
two of the most interesting open problems in this field.
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Appendix A
Breaking Sun et al.’s Scheme
Theorem A.1. Sun et al.’s scheme [SYL+14] is not IND-sCP-CKA secure.
Proof. We break the scheme by showing that an adversary A wins the IND-sCP-
CKA game with a challenger B for an overwhelming advantage. For simplicity, the
version control (for key revocation) part is discarded. In other words, we focus on
version 1.
At the initial state, adversary A randomly selects a challenge access policy
GT and send to the challenger B. After that, B publishes public keys PK =
(e, g, Y, T1, . . . , T3n), where Y = e(g, g)
u, Tk = g
tk . Then the adversaryA skips phase
1 and submits two randomly chosen keywords w0, w1 to the challenger B. At the
challenge state, the adversary A receives the challenge index Dµ = (ver,GT, D̂, D̃,




for some public fixed position i′. As the same as in phase 1, the adversary A skips




i′ ) = e(g,Di′)
The adversary A gets either µ′ = 0 or µ′ = 1 that the above statement is true, and








i′ ) = e(g, T
s
H(wµ)
i′ ) = e(g,Di′),
The probability for the adversary A winning the game is Pr[µ = µ′] = 1.
In other words, a malicious party can always distinguish keywords from cipher-
texts in Sun et al.’s scheme.
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